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Like American politics, the academic debate over justice is polarized, with 
almost all theories of justice falling within one of two traditions: egali-
tarianism and libertarianism. This book provides an alternative to the 
partisan stand-off by focusing not on equality or liberty, but on the idea 
that we should give people the things that they deserve. Mulligan argues 
that a just society is a meritocracy, in which equal opportunity prevails 
and social goods are distributed strictly on the basis of merit. That gives 
citizens their just deserts.
In addition to its novel conceptual approach, meritocracy is distinc-
tive from existing work in two ways. First, it is grounded in research on 
how people actually think about justice. Empirical research reveals that 
people don’t think that social goods should be distributed equally. Nor 
do they dismiss the idea of social justice. Across ideological and cultural 
lines, people want rewards to reflect merit. Second, the book discusses 
hot-button political issues and makes concrete policy recommendations. 
These issues include anti-meritocratic bias against women and racial 
minorities and the United States’ widening economic inequality.
Justice and the Meritocratic State offers a new theory of justice and 
provides solutions to our most vexing social and economic problems. 
It will be of keen interest to philosophers, economists, and political 
theorists.
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There will be justice in our world, in fact and in sentiment, when people 
have the things that they deserve. In the economic realm, this is realized 
through a two-step process: First we establish equal opportunity, and 
then we judge people strictly on their merits. When this is done—when 
we live in a meritocracy—citizens will have their just deserts, and our 
unsteady march toward justice will have taken its final step.
Establishing this thesis, and defending it from its critics, is the primary 
goal of this book. 
The second goal is to concretize the concept of meritocracy. Although 
we have an intuitive sense of what is meant by the term, we still lack a 
theory of meritocracy. The word itself is a surprisingly recent invention, 
coined by Michael Young for his 1958 satire, The Rise of the Meritoc-
racy. Since then, the concept has been variously regarded: as an implicit 
feature of a just state; an admirable if impractical ideal; a thinly-veiled 
excuse for racial or class discrimination; a conservative ideology; and 
a leftist justification for meddling in free markets. Lacking a theory of 
meritocracy, these ascriptions were neither true nor false; they were rhe-
torically useful, or they were not.
As David Miller says, “we don’t have a clear understanding of what 
meritocracy means, so we don’t have a proper measuring rod against 
which to gauge social realities, saying how far they do or do not con-
form to meritocratic criteria” (1999: 178). And Amartya Sen: “the idea 
of meritocracy may have many virtues, but clarity is not one of them” 
(2000: 5). I want to do some conceptual tidying-up.
My third goal is to explain how meritocracy can fix our broken, hyper-
partisan politics: by uniting Americans around the common cause of 
justice. As I survey the public outrage over our politics and our economy, 
I do not see it spilling forth from a wellspring of egalitarian or libertarian 
sentiment. As I will explain, it is a result of people not getting what they 
deserve. Americans left, right, and center want to live in a meritocracy, 
and that normative agreement can help us reach consensus on policy 
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disputes thought to be intractable, like affirmative action and taxation. 
Meritocracy can break through the theoretical impasse within the dis-
tributive justice debate, and it can cure what ails us politically, as well.
To anyone who is not a political philosopher, that justice and desert 
are one and the same may seem obvious. But among the professionals, 
few things are more widely denied. Since the 1970s, desert has attracted 
little attention, with philosophers polarized between egalitarianism and 
libertarianism. With the exception of a handful of philosophers who 
admit desert as merely one of plural principles of justice,1 it has been paid 
little heed.
Throughout this book, I shall contrast meritocracy with egalitarianism, 
in its Rawlsian form, and libertarianism, in its Nozickian form. I do this 
for a few reasons. First, as noted, these are the two approaches to justice 
to which most political philosophers subscribe. So any competitor must 
confront them.
Second, the theoretical polarization mirrors our current political cli-
mate. As I argue against the egalitarian I will in the process reject asso-
ciated leftist policies, and as I argue against the libertarian I will reject 
associated rightist policies.
Third, just as the meritocratic political position is centrist, meritoc-
racy resides, theoretically, between the egalitarian and libertarian poles. 
While not a hybrid of these two theories—meritocracy is a distinct, 
third way of thinking about justice—it does incorporate the best aspects 
of both.
From the libertarian, we take an emphasis on personal responsibility, 
individual choice, and unequal outcomes. There is something amiss, as a 
matter of justice, when the industrious and the lazy are rewarded alike, 
when the undeserving thrive while the deserving struggle.
From the egalitarian, we take a principle of equality—namely, equality 
of opportunity. Competition for social goods is inevitable owing to scar-
city. Justice requires that that competition take place on a level playing 
field. If a person gets ahead of his peers, it ought to be because he is more 
meritorious than they are—and not because of his race, sex, or family 
influence.
We found these ideas on a principle which was obvious to ancient 
thinkers: People ought to get what they deserve. If meritocracy has an 
intellectual ancestor, it is Aristotle, who remains, 2,500 years later, the 
most important proponent of the desert-based approach (§1.2).
The current state of the dialectic about justice is, I think, rather like 
the Indian tale of the blind men and the elephant. One blind man feels 
the elephant’s tusk, another its tail, another its trunk, and so on. They 
compare notes and find they disagree wildly about what the thing is. But 
in fact each has grasped part of the truth. What they ought to do is take a 
step back, and consider what entity captures all of the features they have 
individually discovered. This is what we shall endeavor to do with justice.
Meritocracy: The Basics 5
I ground meritocracy, in Chapters 2 and 3, by appealing to intuition 
and by pointing out that meritocracy satisfies metatheoretical desiderata. 
Among these is that meritocracy can surmount the “non-ideal” hurdles 
which philosophers have erected in recent years (§2.4), and resolve the to-
this-point-vexing “equity/efficiency” trade-off (§4.8, §5.11, and §6.11). 
And meritocracy makes predictions (§9.4).
Part II of the book is devoted to the theory of meritocracy. There are an 
infinite number of possible desert-based theories, so to talk about “desert-
based distributive justice” is to talk about an aspiration. To turn it into 
a theory, one must specify three things: first, the desert objects that fall 
under the sphere of inquiry. Second, the relevant desert basis or bases for 
these objects. And third, any necessary ancillary principles.
One such ancillary principle will be equal opportunity. We normally 
want to say that the fastest runner deserves the medal on the basis of 
his merit. But this is no longer true if the other runners were hobbled 
before the starting gun went off. In that case, the winner’s just claim on 
the medal—his claim to deserve the medal—is weakened, if not nullified. 
And as it goes for races, so too for our collective economic life. Justice is a 
matter of giving people what they deserve, and that is impossible without 
equal opportunity
For this reason, each child in a meritocracy enjoys (roughly) equal 
health care, education, and other forms of social support. No one has a 
head start because of inherited wealth or nepotism, and none suffers from 
the persistent disadvantage created by childhood poverty. Each citizen 
enjoys equal opportunity to develop her merits as she sees fit, in accor-
dance with the plan-of-life she has developed for herself.
The equal opportunity ideal is a popular one, but its connection to des-
ert has remained elusive. In Chapter 4, I argue that the two concepts are 
intimately linked. I give a transcendental argument: (1) People ought to 
get what they deserve; (2) economic desert is only possible under condi-
tions of equal opportunity; therefore (3) we ought to establish conditions 
of equal opportunity. It is thus a matter of conceptual necessity that a 
robust equal opportunity regime underlies desert-based distributive sys-
tems. Structurally, meritocracy is a monistic, desert-based theory which 
includes a necessary principle of equal opportunity.
The two desert objects that will concern us are jobs and income. In 
a meritocracy, jobs are distributed strictly on the basis of merit. They 
are not distributed with an eye toward equal representation (of genders, 
races, etc.), as an egalitarian might desire. Nor are owners given full lib-
erty to distribute jobs however they like—to family, friends, or members 
of their preferred race. According to the meritocrat, any factor irrelevant 
from the point-of-view of merit must be ignored in hiring.
A meritocratic government combats deviations from merit-based hir-
ing. Nepotism and cronyism (which are perfectly legal in the U.S. private 
sector) are proscribed, as is discrimination on the basis of race or gender 
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(sometimes legal in the U.S. private sector). This is required by justice, 
but it is also in our economic interest: Efficient economies hire on the 
basis of merit.
We will then turn to consider income. This should be distributed to 
citizens on the basis of their meritorious contributions to the economy.
Contrast Steve Jobs, who made bona fide contributions to our collec-
tive economic life on the basis of his ability, with former Merrill Lynch 
CEO Stan O’Neal, who mismanaged his firm for years, and then, after 
posting a $2 billion quarterly loss—the worst in Merrill’s history—floated 
away on a $162 million golden parachute.2
We feel that there is a moral difference between these two cases. And 
there is—but contemporary political theory cannot account for it. For 
Rawls, what matters is that incomes are distributed with an eye toward 
the welfare of the least-advantaged class. If it turns out that this is accom-
plished by enriching incompetent and greedy bankers, then, according to 
Rawls, justice requires precisely that. That is wrong. Justice is intrinsi-
cally connected to people’s character and contributions.
The libertarian, who protects market exchanges at all costs, also 
fails to show proper regard for merit—as the above example suggests. 
Meritocracy dispatches worries about crony capitalism which have 
plagued libertarian theory, and deals with subtler problems of injustice 
and inefficiency—such as the passage of corporate power and capital 
by nepotism.
Now, any good ideology needs an ethos. Meritocracy’s ethos is per-
sonal responsibility (§6.9). An egalitarian society of equal outcomes 
is a society in which a person does not command his own destiny. 
Whatever he does, or fails to do, has no effect on the course of his 
economic life. But a libertarian society of unequal opportunity also 
ignores personal responsibility. Under libertarianism, the quest for 
social goods turns on wealth, or class, or race; capricious facts—rather 
than character, effort, and choice—determine a person’s future. Only 
in a meritocracy is a person wholly responsible for the course of his 
life. Only in a meritocracy will his successes and his failures turn on his 
merits alone.
As we proceed through the theory, we will use it to diagnose injustice in 
our current economy. That our economy is broken is about the only thing 
that Americans agree on these days. But what exactly is amiss?
Some point to the unequal distribution of income. The bottom 50 per-
cent of Americans receives only 13 percent of national income. Within 
this group, the average income is $16,000—a figure that has not changed, 
in real terms, since 1980.
At the same time, the incomes of America’s richest have skyrock-
eted. The top 1 percent receives 20 percent of national income (average 
income: $1.3 million), and the top 0.1 percent receives 9 percent of 
national income (average income: $6 million).
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Put differently, the bottom 50 percent of our country makes roughly 
the same as the richest 0.1 percent, even though there are 500 times more 
people in the former than the latter. The United States now holds the all-
time world record for inequality of labor-based income.3
The distribution of wealth is even more skewed: The top 0.1 percent 
of Americans owns 22 percent of our nation’s wealth, which is the same 
share as the bottom 90 percent—a group which is, by definition, 900 
times larger. (See Saez and Zucman 2016.)
I agree that these inequalities are worrying. But they are worrying 
because they are symptoms of injustice rather than injustices in them-
selves. They are symptoms of an economy in which the connection 
between merit and remuneration has been severed. As I will explain, 
America’s high incomes do not reflect excellence, effort, or economic 
contribution. They are largely economic rents, and they are inefficient.
Even more worrying is how the meritocratic framework of our country, 
idealized in the American Dream, has been undermined over the last four 
decades. Once the source of extraordinary prosperity and civic pride, it 
has been dismantled, piece by piece, by regressive tax policies, a failure 
to invest in education, and a cultural disdain for merit.
The single best measure of the health of the American Dream is the 
intergenerational elasticity of earnings (IEE). This is a measure of the 
correlation between a person’s income and his parents’ income.4 Imagine 
an aristocratic society, in which a person’s socioeconomic position is com-
pletely determined by his parents’ position. This society has an IEE of 1. 
A meritocracy lies at the other extreme, with an IEE close to 0 (roughly 
speaking, it will be positive to the extent that earnings-relevant traits are 
genetically passed).
Estimates of the IEE in the United States vary, but the mean estimate 
is about 0.6 (see, e.g. Mazumder 2005). This is among the worst in the 
developed world, if not the worst (cf. Canada, Finland, and Denmark, 
with IEEs of 0.2). (See, e.g. Corak 2013.)
For Americans born during the 1940s, approximately 90 percent of 
them went on to make more money (in real terms) than their parents did 
(Chetty et al. 2017). This is true of only 50 percent of Americans born 
during the 1980s. While we do not of course know what the numbers will 
be for Americans born today, the trend is not promising.
In short, since 1980 we have seen a transformation in the way our 
economy determines compensation. For a young American entering the 
labor force today, skill, creativity, diligence, and intelligence are less 
important than family background or social connections. This is intui-
tively felt by anyone on the job market, who must contend with an 
emphasis on pedigree and the overwhelming importance of “network-
ing” (which is nepotism by another name).
Donald Trump is the ultimate manifestation of our failure to maintain 
the meritocratic structure of society. This is a man who was born into 
8 On Justice
extreme wealth, thus enjoying advantage over his peers. He has been a 
perennial professional failure, pauperizing his shareholders while enrich-
ing himself. He is unlettered and crude. He is devoid of moral fiber. He 
is a person of low merit. Yet our culture saw it fit to elect him President: 
a job which he does not deserve, and which, I predict, he will fail to dis-
charge effectively.
The left also bears blame for this state-of-affairs. It constantly cel-
ebrates personal characteristics like race, gender, and sexual preference 
when it should be celebrating intelligence, effort, and creativity. And its 
ruthless enforcement of silly political correctness norms has impeded the 
public’s ability to assess individuals on their merit.
The left’s focus on equality is a tactical mistake on its part. As we shall 
see, equality is widely regarded as an unjust distributive principle. No 
surprise, then, that the American left has failed to improve the material 
condition of the lower and middle classes in recent decades—it has based 
its policy in and crafted its rhetoric around a moral concept which is 
rejected even by the poor.
The way to advance progressive social programs is to found them on 
desert and to argue for them using the language of desert. The Earned 
Income Tax Credit (to be discussed in §9.3), which is one the largest com-
ponents of American welfare, is the best example of this.
Over the course of this book, we shall reach roughly the same policy 
conclusions as the American center-left endorses today, but via a 
very different normative route. We will not, for example, justify anti-
discrimination laws on grounds of equality. The real reason a firm ought 
not to discriminate against a black applicant is because that discrimi-
nation deviates from purely merit-based hiring. The most meritorious 
applicant deserves the job, and race is irrelevant from the point-of-view 
of merit.
I hope that by turning our attention away from the dominant rhetoric 
of equality and liberty and toward desert, we can find common ground 
politically and move our economy in a more just direction. Although 
other philosophers do not seem to feel this way, I regard the fact that no 
human beings anywhere—save a handful of academics—want to live in 
Nozick’s nightwatchman state or in Rawls’s quasi-egalitarian society as 
a damning indictment of these two leading approaches. The mission of 
political philosophy, insofar as distributive justice is concerned, must be 
to provide a coherent and compelling economic system that people feel 
is fair, and that serves the common interest by incentivizing productive 
behavior. These desiderata are satisfied when we treat people for who 
they are and what they have done—no more and no less. In the end, 
justice is found in what is simultaneously the most and least likely of 
places: the venerable but neglected idea that we should give people what 
they deserve.
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1.2 a Brief History of Meritocracy
Although the word “meritocracy” is new, the idea is old, and found in 
Eastern and Western cultures alike. We find talk about desert in the Bible: 
“Whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap” (Galatians 6:7).5 
And Confucius (551–479 BC) gave an argument for meritocratic politics 
which shaped Chinese governance for millennia:
Meritorious rule is one of the most central ideas in Confucian politi-
cal thought. The idea, simply put, is that those who occupy positions 
of power should possess the appropriate virtue and ability. . . . There 
should be a certain fit between position and virtue.
(Chan 2013: 32)
But why should there be a fit between position and virtue? The ancient 
Chinese gave a consequentialist justification. For example, the Mohists 
(c. 400 BC)—who developed Chinese philosophy’s first systematic 
approach to ethics and politics—argued for a political bureaucracy filled 
by “elevating the worthy”. Their justification was not that meritorious 
Chinese deserved these jobs, but that “the utility of the state and society 
[was] promoted by employing the most qualified candidates, without 
regard for their social background” (Fraser 2015). This is an early and 
important distinction regarding the justification for meritocratic distribu-
tion (in this case, of political offices): whether it is done on grounds of 
justice—giving people what they deserve—or of efficiency.6
By the Sui dynasty (AD 581–618), China had fully replaced nepo-
tism-driven politics with a system of civil service examinations, which 
were open to all (see, e.g. Xiao and Li 2013). These so-called Imperial 
Examinations persisted until the twentieth century, and have played an 
important role in Chinese culture—for example, its enduring emphasis on 
education. Although the aim of the system was to produce superior politi-
cal outcomes, it had the side-effect of increasing social mobility, giving 
meritorious Chinese from poor families the opportunity to enter the elite 
classes on the basis of their talent.
Meanwhile, in the West, the meritocratic ideal was being more pre-
cisely developed but less successfully implemented. In the Republic, Plato 
famously argues for political rule by “philosopher-kings” (despite the 
term, Plato does not discriminate—he thinks meritorious women should 
rule, too). Like the Mohists, Plato justifies meritocracy on consequential-
ist grounds. His argument goes as follows: Managing a state is hard, 
requiring specific skills, such as military prowess, a sense of justice, and 
the power to persuade through public speaking (Statesman, 303–304). 
These skills are not found in common people or among the wealthy. Just 
as it would be silly to allow anyone to weigh in on medical decisions 
or the command of a ship, democracy and plutocracy put important 
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decisions in the hands of those ill-equipped to make them. Plato hits a 
technocratic note when he says that the best political system is one in 
which “the rulers are not men making a show of political cleverness but 
men really possessed of scientific understanding of the art of government” 
(Statesman, 293c).
While the majority of his meritocratic arguments are consequentialist 
in this way, in the Laws, Plato does commend a desert-based distributive 
system:
By distributing more to what is greater and smaller amounts to what 
is lesser, it gives due measure to each according to their nature: this 
includes greater honors always to those who are greater as regards 
virtue, and what is fitting—in due proportion—to those who are just 
the opposite as regards virtue and education. Presumably this is just 
what constitutes for us political justice.
(757c)
This view—that justice is a matter of desert—is most closely associated 
with Aristotle, and for good reason. Aristotle provided the first—and, to 
this day, arguably the only—desert-based distributive theory. For Aristo-
tle, the “currency of justice” consisted primarily of political offices and 
honors (which are not typically considered part of the currency today), 
and, secondarily, wealth (which most certainly is).
According to Aristotle, justice is done when we give these scarce goods 
to the people who deserve them.7 But who among us is this? What is the 
basis, or bases, on which a person makes herself deserving of some par-
ticular good (§4.1)? And, given that goods are heterogeneous (political 
offices are different than wealth), should their desert bases differ as well?
Aristotle regarded the answers to these questions as uncontroversial: 
“All agree that the just in distributions must accord with some sort of 
merit [axía]” (Nicomachean Ethics, 1131a). Fair enough, but “merit”, 
like “desert”, is “thin”: We might regard the most intelligent person as 
the most meritorious, or the most hard-working, or the most virtuous, 
and so on. Further specification is necessary.
(Note that “merit” is not as thin as “desert” is. To say that justice is a 
matter of giving people what they deserve, without specifying a basis, is 
to say almost nothing at all. “Merit” is more limited. There are many pos-
sible desert bases—such as Fred Feldman’s (2016) “community essential 
needs”—which are unrelated to merit.)
For Aristotle, we “thicken” the definition of “merit” by looking to the 
end (télos) of the good in question. That tells us who is the most meritori-
ous, and thereby, the most deserving.
When a number of flute-players are equal in their art, there is no 
reason why those of them who are better born should have better 
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flutes given to them; for they will not play any better on the flute, 
and the superior instrument should be reserved for him who is the 
superior artist.
(Politics 1282b)
This is not to denigrate wealth, or noble birth, or beauty. They may be 
merits. But they are relevant to desert in other contexts. Beauty is relevant 
when we’re deciding who should get the tiara, but not when we’re decid-
ing who should get the flute.
Suppose, for example, that we come across a baseball glove and decide 
to give it to one among us. Only one person—Smith—has any interest 
or skill in baseball; everyone else would simply throw the glove in the 
closet. It seems obvious that Smith ought to get the glove, and Aristotle’s 
explanation why is that only Smith can ensure that the glove serves its 
purpose, which is to catch baseballs.
We should, thus, distribute social goods on the basis of merit, and 
when these goods are divisible, we should distribute them in proportion 
to merit. Equality is of no fundamental moral relevance. It is just to treat 
people equally only in the special cases in which they are themselves equal 
in merit.
Nevertheless, Aristotelian desert does define a sense of equality, known 
as proportional equality. What Aristotle seeks to make equal between 
persons are the ratios of merits to rewards. For example, if A1 has twice 
the merit of A2, then A1 should receive twice the reward. In general, for 
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This construal of equality (which contemporary political philosophers 
reject as a genuine principle of equality) avoids the problem of explaining 
how people are equal despite appearances to the contrary. Plenty of ink 
has been spilt trying to do that; I’ll simply say that I regard those efforts 
as unsuccessful. I agree with John Stuart Mill:
If it is asserted that all persons ought to be equal in every descrip-
tion of right recognised by society, I answer, not until all are equal in 
worth as human beings. It is the fact, that one person is not as good 
as another; and it is reversing all the rules of rational conduct, to 
attempt to raise a political fabric on a supposition which is at vari-
ance with fact.
(1859: 23)
Aristotle’s view of justice, like all desert-based views, is backwards-
looking. Feldman (1995) and Schmidtz (2002) deny that desert is necessarily 
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backwards-looking; I consider and reject their arguments in §4.7). We do 
not give the flute to the best flute player in order to enrich the community 
with beautiful music. That is a forward-looking, consequentialist justifica-
tion. Nor do we give Smith the baseball glove because he, and he alone, 
would be made happy by it. That is also a consequentialist justification. We 
distribute these goods as described because it is fitting to do so; a great flute 
fits with a great flute player, as a baseball glove fits on a hand.
After Aristotle, desert lay dormant. (We do find occasional hints of 
affection for the concept, in, e.g. the work of Leibniz, Kant, Sidgwick, 
G. E. Moore, and W. D. Ross. But desert is largely incompatible with these 
thinkers’ fully-articulated theories.) By the mid-twentieth century, phi-
losophers no longer took merit, desert, meritocracy, or related concepts 
seriously. In 1971, John Kleinig wrote that “the notion of desert seems by 
and large to have been consigned to the philosophical scrap heap” (p. 71).
That scrap heap was promptly set ablaze by the publication of Rawls’s 
A Theory of Justice. Rawls purported to show that no one deserves any-
thing at all. Although Rawls’s argument is unsound (Chapter 7), it has 
had a profound impact within political philosophy. To this day, most phi-
losophers regard the quest for a desert-based theory of justice as a fool’s 
errand, on Rawlsian grounds.
This is extraordinary when one recalls that even Marx has warm things 
to say about desert. In his Critique of the Gotha Programme, Marx argues 
that a form of desert-based distributive justice is a positive step on the 
road from capitalism to communism.8 It is a remarkable and true fact 
that “Marx is more a meritocrat than Rawls, Nielsen, Dworkin, and most 
contemporary liberal political philosophers” (Pojman 1999: 93).
Of course, Rawls has his detractors. Strikingly, they too deny desert 
a place in their theories. Libertarianism generally and Robert Nozick 
(1974) specifically are the exemplars here. That ideology, and that phi-
losopher, are deaf to the demands of desert. What is important for Nozick 
is that the distribution of social goods accord with principles of acquisi-
tion and exchange. So long as we meet those procedural hurdles, then the 
outcomes are just. It does not matter to Nozick if the evil prosper while 
the kind suffer; if geniuses are pushed aside to make room for idiots; if 
the lazy get rich while the industrious live in poverty.
Even as Rawls and Nozick were denigrating desert (Rawls explicitly 
and Nozick implicitly), they were living in a country which once was but 
no longer is the best embodiment of the meritocratic ideal.9 The Founders 
hoped to establish a nation led by a “natural aristocracy”, in which—in 
contrast to the historical and prevailing hierarchies in Europe—a person’s 
status turned not on “wealth and birth” but rather “virtue and talents” 
(Jefferson 1813).
Our national ethos is that each of us can enjoy a life of success and 
prosperity—no matter if we are Brahmin or immigrant—so long as we 
are willing to work for it.
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To every man his chance—to every man, regardless of his birth, his 
shining, golden opportunity—to every man the right to live, to work, 
to be himself, and to become whatever thing his manhood and his 
vision can combine to make him—this, seeker, is the promise of 
America.
(Wolfe 1940: 432)
Like all dreams, this one was imperfectly realized. Our country has sys-
tematically and wrongly denied opportunities to various groups through-
out our history—African-Americans, women, homosexuals, et al. And 
while progress has been made on issues of racial justice and the like, 
the connection between merit and economic outcomes is perhaps more 
frayed than ever. But failing to implement an ideal is no reason to aban-
don the ideal itself. The purpose of this book is, in part, to argue that we 
should redouble our efforts to make the American Dream a reality.
1.3  Remarks on the assumptions of This Work
By tradition, philosophy as a discipline was founded by Thales (c. 624—
c. 547 BC), a Greek living in Miletus (a city on what is today the western 
coast of Turkey). Thales is famous for his conjecture that all matter is, 
despite outward appearances, made of water. Of course, that is wrong. 
But Thales’s underlying claim—that there is some unifying structure to 
things—is, as best we can tell, correct: It is the structure described by the 
Standard Model of particle physics. That things should have a common 
structure is not at all obvious—not then, and not now. So Thales’s insight 
was profound.
This is the way philosophy has traditionally been conducted. We inves-
tigate foundational questions of existence, knowledge, and value through 
rigorous a priori reasoning and observation. We shall assume that this is 
the proper mode of philosophical inquiry. Not everyone who calls him-
self a “philosopher” would agree. One finds, for example, people who 
appeal to alleged divine revelation for philosophical insight, as well as the 
“Straussian” school of philosophy (named after the German-American 
Leo Strauss), which concerns itself with discovering “esoteric” meanings 
within the great works of philosophy. We assume that these radicals on 
the right are mistaken.
We shall also assume against radicals on the left. These include postmod-
ernists who deny that there is such a thing as objective truth; “critical theo-
rists” who regard philosophy not as an intellectual enterprise but as a tool 
for fighting “domination”; and various race-and gender-obsessed partisans 
who think that studying philosophy amounts to the study of “whiteness” 
and “maleness”. (This camp is especially silly; you are obviously not study-
ing whiteness or maleness—whatever that means—when you study Gen-
eral Relativity, even though that theory was developed by a white man.)
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I editorialize here as a plea for unity among the many scholars and 
members of the public who, though we disagree about moral theory and 
political practice, believe in the primacy of human reason. Questions of 
morality and politics are both the most perplexing and the most fervidly 
debated. The only way to continue to make progress on these questions is 
to proceed with sober reason and a sense of intellectual humility. Extreme 
forces on both the left and the right are threatening these shared values.
Sobriety and humility also require that we assess empirical work on its 
merit—no matter how it makes us feel. When a result imperils a dearly-
held belief, the rational reaction is not to reflexively reject the science. It 
is to put our belief into some doubt. And reason sometimes requires that 
we ask questions with potentially disquieting answers.
As an example of how we have failed in this regard, consider the plight 
of Larry Summers, economist and former Secretary of the Treasury, who 
was forced to resign as Harvard University’s President after some incau-
tious comments. In explaining the paucity of women in the sciences, 
Summers appealed to possible differences in the distribution of IQ: If men 
display greater variance than women, then even if the average man and 
the average woman are equally smart, we will find men hired in greater 
measure. This is because universities don’t hire people clustered around 
the mean but rather those who are several standard deviations above it.
Summers was not making a normative argument but a positive one. 
He sought to explain the state of gender in the academy. This is per-
fectly compatible with regarding it as unjust. Indeed, an explanation like 
the one he gave could provide grounds for progressive policy change. 
Since IQ differences are in part environmentally-derived (§6.5), unequal 
variance may imply unequal opportunity, and thereby justify economic 
redistribution.
But in the aftermath of Summers’s remarks, no arguments like this were 
made, and no interest paid to whether what he said was true or false.10 
Indeed, to ask such a question was to put oneself at risk of being regarded 
as a sexist. That attitude is simply incompatible with honest inquiry. One 
should be able to express one’s best judgment about positive truth with-
out putting one’s career on the line. These outcries stunt the search for 
empirical truth; ruin the solidarity and the culture of academia; and, as 
explained, interfere with the pursuit of justice.
Although I criticize the academic left here, I do not do so out of any 
special animus. The right’s contempt for rational inquiry is no less 
profound: climate change skepticism, creationism, religion-based public 
policy, Fox News and its fellow propagandists, our “post-truth” era, 
Donald Trump. There is no shortage of foolishness.
Philosophy has long served as the academy’s bulwark against sloppy 
reasoning. It should take up this task with vigor.
Moving on. When it comes to economic matters, we shall assume the 
wisdom of the mainstream, neoclassical approach. This is the approach 
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of Adam Smith and David Ricardo; members of the marginal revolution 
like Alfred Marshall and Léon Walras; twentieth-century giants like John 
Maynard Keynes and Milton Friedman; and, today, liberals like Paul 
Krugman and conservatives like Gregory Mankiw. Like analytic philoso-
phy, the neoclassical economic approach is widely endorsed. It is the eco-
nomics taught in high schools and colleges, and the method underpinning 
the vast majority of economic research.
I note that while the opponents of analytic philosophy are intellectually 
disreputable, opponents of neoclassical economics are not. They are, in 
my opinion, simply wrong. They include, on the left, followers of Karl 
Marx, whose views depart from the neoclassical approach in too many 
ways to summarize, and on the right, the Austrian School of economics—
most associated with Ludwig von Mises and Murray Rothbard—which 
rejects the mathematics underlying microeconomic theory.
So the general method of this book is to examine normative issues 
analytically and positive issues through neoclassical models (one excep-
tion will be made for economic value, in §6.7). We shall also make the 
following, specific assumptions.
First, we assume that political authority is justified. Political philoso-
phy has traditionally addressed two questions: (1) Is the state morally 
legitimate in the first place? Put differently, can the state justly do things 
to you (force you to pay taxes, imprison you, conscript you into military 
service), that no individual can? This is the question of political author-
ity. If (1) is answered in the affirmative, the second major question arises: 
(2) How should we arrange the institutions of government? What laws, 
regulations, tax-and-transfer policies, if any, ought to exist?
I answer (2) in this book, and so I must assume that (1) is true—that 
political authority is justified, that we need not be anarchists. There is 
overwhelming consensus among philosophers that this is the case (Wolff 
(1970) is the major exception).
Second, we make necessary metaphysical and epistemological assump-
tions: that the world is roughly the way it appears to us to be through 
the senses; that we are not brains-in-vats; that we have free will; and 
so on.
Bruce Brower has described these considerations to me as “pragmatic 
presuppositions of rational inquiry”. That is, these are the things that we 
must assume to be true in order to embark on philosophical investigation 
within a given domain—which in our case is distributive justice.
Third, and finally, we shall limit ourselves to considerations of justice 
within a single state. This has been a traditional assumption. According 
to Hobbes, the possibility of just relations between persons arises when 
we leave the state of nature and submit to a single sovereign. This view is 
still dominant, although there has been interest, over the last 40 years or 
so, in “global justice”—the possibility that citizens have duties of justice 
to foreigners. We shall not address this possibility.
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Notes
 1 Viz. Feldman (2016) (desert and need), Miller (1999) (desert, equality, and 
need), Schmidtz (2006) (desert, equality, liberty, reciprocity, and need), and 
Walzer (1983) (desert, liberty, and need). (Although Feldman’s theory is argu-
ably monistic, with need serving as the desert basis rather than an indepen-
dent principle of justice.)
 2 Mankiw (2010) makes a similar point.
 3 See Piketty (2014) and Piketty, Saez, and Zucman (2016).
 4 The IEE is the percentage difference in a child’s income associated with 
a 1 percent change in his parents’ income. The measure is typically made 
between children and fathers to avoid complexities related to changes in labor 
force participation by women.
 5 On the biblical roots of merit and desert, see Pojman (1997).
 6 Fraser (2015) notes that the Mohists “advanced the world’s earliest form of 
consequentialism, a remarkably sophisticated version based on a plurality of 
intrinsic goods taken as constitutive of human welfare”.
 7 For a fuller examination of Aristotle’s view of distributive justice, see Keyt 
(1991).
 8 As far as I know, Marx did not put things in terms of deserts. But in this 
phase of Marx’s theory, a worker is compensated proportional to his labor 
contributions to society. That is not far from the meritocratic approach that I 
endorse in Chapter 6, under which a person’s compensation is determined by 
his meritorious economic contributions. But it will be clear that meritocracy 
has little in common with Marxian theory.
 9 Singapore provides the best example of a meritocratic state now; indeed, 
meritocracy is (along with incorruptibility and impartiality) one of the foun-
dational values of the state. The Singaporean meritocracy is enabled by 
extensive public spending on education (20 percent of the national bud-
get), with the result that Singaporean children are the world’s best-educated 
(OECD 2016). And the extraordinary economic growth that has resulted 
from  Singapore’s investment in its children is well-known: Its per capita GDP, 
87,000 USD, is the fourth-highest in the world (the United States, at 57,000, 
ranks 14th).
10 Summers presented the evidence fairly. At least as far as mathematical ability 
is concerned, there is no mean difference in ability between men and women, 
but men do display greater variance than women (see, e.g. Hedges and Now-
ell 1995; Hyde et al. 2008). Whether this explains, even in part, the under-
representation of women is unclear.
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2.1  The Scope of Justice
A few words about the goal of this work—what I mean to accomplish 
and what I do not.
I shall not provide a theory of morality at its most general. For example, 
I shall have little to say about interpersonal relationships—how friends, 
or lovers, ought to treat each other, or how parents ought to treat their 
children and children ought to treat their parents. These are important 
ethical issues, to be sure, but I owe them consideration only inasmuch 
as they are relevant to the economic structure of society. And by in large 
they are not. (The salient exception is the relationship between the family 
structure and equal opportunity, to be discussed in §4.5.)
Instead, my interest is distributive justice—or economic justice, if you like. 
The answers I am obliged to provide respond to questions like, “On what 
bases should job candidates be evaluated?”, “How much income inequality 
is too much?”, “Which forms of affirmative action, if any, are morally per-
missible?”, and “Who should pay taxes, and how much should they pay?”
Clearly, these are all normative questions. And so, in contrast to posi-
tive questions (e.g. “Who does pay taxes, and how much do they pay?”), 
to answer them adequately we must have in mind some moral goal. 
After all, if I am simply seeking to maximize my own wealth, my answer 
to “Who should pay taxes?” will be rather different from the answer I 
would give were I to have some other, less selfish, goal in mind.
But on this matter there is little debate: The thing that we all aspire to 
is justice. We all want an economic arrangement that is just. Of course, 
we do not all want the same economic arrangement; we disagree about 
which is in fact just. Egalitarians believe that a just economy establishes 
some manner of equality among citizens; utilitarians think that it maxi-
mizes the general welfare; and libertarians, at least in their Nozickian 
form, believe that justice consists in protecting free exchanges among 
citizens. But the “thin” goal—justice—is shared.
The only scholar to deny our shared goal of justice is Friedrich Hayek 
(1976, 1978), but this is a conceptual error on Hayek’s part.1 He says 
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that “there can be no distributive justice where no one distributes” (1978: 
58), but this is mere wordplay. We want to know whether there are moral 
rules governing economic relations that call for intervention into markets. 
To say “no”, as libertarians do, is not to regard the concept of justice as 
empty or incoherent as Hayek did. What Hayek really seemed to oppose 
are patterned theories of justice—to use Nozick’s (1974) term—and this 
is a far more plausible target than the idea of justice.2
Distributive justice itself, and the philosophical challenge of identi-
fying its content, arise, Hume tells us, “only from the selfishness and 
confin’d generosity of men, along with the scanty provision nature has 
made for his wants” (1739: 495, italics removed). That is, were it not for 
conditions of scarcity (our demand for goods outstrips their supply) and 
human beings’ limited capacity for altruism, there would be no questions 
of justice. (Hume imposes a third condition, also satisfied: No human 
being is so powerful that he can dominate all others, living free from fear.)
Rawls approvingly calls Hume’s conditions the “circumstances of jus-
tice” and founds his theory upon them. And since I largely agree, I shall 
not tarry on the subject, except to point out one thing: Competition is 
built into justice. To say that there is scarcity is to say that there are at 
least two people who want some thing, and that, no matter how the mat-
ter is resolved, at least one will walk away unsatisfied. “Meritocracy” has 
a connotation of competition which some people find off-putting, but I 
ask these readers to keep in mind that competition is not just socially 
inevitable—it is essential to distributive justice.
While we cannot avoid competition, we can avoid arranging our com-
petitions in ways that are regarded as unfair by their participants. As we 
shall see, the economic competitions (for jobs, income, etc.) that we feel 
are fair and those that are required by justice are one and the same. They 
are meritocratic competitions.
For similar reasons, we cannot eliminate failure, nor the sadness that it 
brings. But we can eliminate resentment. Sadness is an inevitable part of 
life. It is dignified. But resentment, which is born out of unjust competi-
tion, is avoidable and pernicious (§5.6). It should be eliminated.
And, apart from all of that, we should not reflexively regard competi-
tion as a bad thing. We might maintain that a world without scarcity 
would be a better world (though I’m not convinced) while, perfectly 
coherently, speaking warmly of the value of competition. Among other 
things, competition stimulates human achievement, recognizes laudable 
character, and puts resources into the hands of those who can make effi-
cient use of them.
2.2  On the Distinction Between Justice and Morality
A metaethical matter which must be addressed is the possibility of justice 
coming into conflict with other moral ideals. If we want to say that our 
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economy ought to be arranged in a certain way because that is what 
justice requires, we must have a sense of what other ideals exist and 
their economic ramifications. If, for example, we believed that liberty 
was an important ideal which could come into conflict with justice, then 
discovering that some theory of justice was true would not get us to our 
real-world destination. We would be left pondering how our perfectly just 
economy ought to be modified to accommodate liberty.
This possibility is raised from time to time, but it did not trouble Rawls 
or Nozick. Rawls begins A Theory of Justice with the claim that
justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of 
thought. A theory however elegant and economical must be rejected 
or revised if it is untrue; likewise laws and institutions no matter how 
efficient and well-arranged must be reformed or abolished if they are 
unjust.
(1971: 3)
Rawls rules out the possibility of ideals other than justice playing a role 
in economic design.
Nozick is more obscure. Unlike Rawls, who draws as I do on the 
Humean tradition, with just principles and institutions, whatever they be, 
arising out of the circumstances of justice, Nozick admits from the start 
that he “does not present a precise theory of the moral basis of individual 
rights” (1974: xxiv). Still, at least as far as the entitlement theory of 
 Anarchy, State, and Utopia goes, Nozick regards the limits and the obli-
gations of the state as coextensive with its responsibilities under justice. 
Justice requires that the state prevent violence, theft, and fraud in the name 
of protecting individual rights—and little else.3
I do think it is fair to focus on justice—but not so single-mindedly. 
As we shall see, justice is indeed held in the highest moral esteem, but 
efficiency and need are also thought morally relevant to economic life. 
And, at least conceptually, they can conflict with justice. Rawls is right 
that justice is the first virtue of institutions—but it’s not the only virtue.
How can this complexity be handled? In two ways. First, questions 
about pluralism may simply be ignored: The theorist can say that he is 
going to talk about justice, what justice requires of us, and leave aside 
the possibility of competing ideals. While getting to the truth about jus-
tice in this way would be a great victory, the drawback is that it weak-
ens the case for acting on the theory, for arranging our institutions in 
its image.
The second way is to endorse a theory of justice which has, as a side-
effect, the promotion of the other identified ideals. If a theory of justice, 
when implemented, is also (1) efficient and (2) attentive to citizens’ needs, 
then no more conceptual work is necessary. This is the route I take. I 
shall devote a great deal of space to the efficiency benefits of meritocracy, 
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because the conflict between justice and efficiency is center stage in nor-
mative economics. And I address how meritocracy attends to citizens’ 
needs in §6.10. While it’s true that, for any given theory of justice, the 
theory should not be implemented if the efficiency/need trade-offs are too 
severe, no such worries arise in the case of meritocracy.
We should not underestimate the metatheoretical allure of this feature. 
If we take a step back to consider what features we expect a true theory 
of justice to have, one of these is that it be reasonably compatible with 
efficiency and need. Put differently, it would be odd if the true theory of 
justice were one which, when implemented, impoverished society. This is 
a point about justification which I shall discuss further in the next section.
I want to be precise about how I am and am not a pluralist. I am a 
pluralist when it comes to the morality of economic life—how we ought, 
in the broadest possible sense of “ought”, to set up our economy. The 
relevant ideals here appear to be justice, efficiency, and need, with justice 
the most important of the three by far (§3.2).
I am a monist when it comes to justice. Justice is a matter of giving 
people what they deserve. Nothing more. Of course, explaining what 
that means, and why that is true, is not simple. I devote the second part 
of the book to the task.
The finding that justice and morality are not coextensive is important 
for other reasons. First, it opens the possibility that we might, from time to 
time, find even a perfectly just system morally unsatisfying. It legitimates 
these feelings of moral dissatisfaction. To discover the nature of justice 
precisely and to implement it completely is not to create a utopia, the insti-
tutions of which never err morally. And that a theory of justice demands, 
in some individual cases, something immoral does not prove injustice.
As an example, consider the following “ticking time bomb” case: A 
terrorist has hidden a nuclear bomb in a city. The terrorist refuses to say 
where it is. We torture him, but he remains recalcitrant. We also have 
in custody the terrorist’s innocent, 12-year-old daughter. We know that, 
if we torture her in front of him, he will reveal the bomb’s location. Is 
it morally permissible, perhaps even required, to torture this innocent 
girl? Many people would say “yes”. After all, if the bomb goes off, 
thousands of innocent children will die. But nobody—not even hard-
core consequentialists—thinks that it is just to torture the girl. Rather, 
we think it is morally permissible, perhaps morally required, to do some-
thing unjust. This is a small conceptual point, but it’s an important one.
Second, once we admit that there are competing moral desiderata 
when it comes to our economy, we should be wary of the single-minded 
promotion of any ideal, no matter how noble. Implementation costs rise 
at the margin.
Suppose that we are choosing between two allocations, A and B. Under 
A, output is $18 trillion and there is a certain level of justice, j. Under 
B, output is $1 trillion and the level of justice is j plus some increment ε.
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Rawls would require us to prefer B to A. Efficiency should not concern 
us a whit, he thinks, if justice is at stake (suppose, i.e. that the worst-off 
in B has a teensy bit more than the worst-off in A). Many find this intui-
tively implausible.
Similarly, suppose that we could move from B to A by means of a mild 
intrusion on liberties (some efficiency-enhancing regulation). Who among 
us would really insist on the “immorality” of that, even if she believed, as 
Nozick did, that justice is a matter of inviolable side-constraints?
Third, by separating justice from morality, we explain why our gov-
ernment may tolerate some unjust conduct. Right or wrong, here in the 
United States the government tolerates—does not deter, does not punish— 
all sorts of injustice: hate speech, deceit, and (as decided by the Supreme 
Court in Snyder v. Phelps) the brutalization of the families of dead sol-
diers, in their hour of grief, by religious zealots. In these cases, we regard 
the behavior as unjust yet at the same time think that it would be bad if 
the government curbed it.
This is the essence of tolerance, a difficult concept which I analyze else-
where.4 One of the many paradoxes it gives rise to is how allowing bad 
things to happen could possibly be the right thing to do. A distinction like 
the one I make here explains things: If the conduct at issue is bad because 
it is unjust, and if justice is not the only element in the moral calculus, 
then we have created conceptual space for tolerating injustice.
2.3  Efficiency and Three Requirements of Justice
I shall have a great deal to say about economic efficiency in this book. So 
it is important to get clear about what is meant by the term.
Put imprecisely, an efficient economy is one in which there is no waste. 
Resources get put to their best productive uses (doctors practice medicine 
and lumberjacks log—not vice versa), and goods and services are allocated 
in a useful way (sick people visit doctors, not lumberjacks). One has the 
intuition that if production and allocation are not so arranged, that is a 
problem—perhaps one which can be fixed without any ill effects, anywhere.
The intuition is usually made precise in terms of Pareto efficiency. A 
Pareto efficient distribution is one in which it is impossible to make some-
one better off without making someone else worse off. You distribute a 
cake in a Pareto efficient way if there are no pieces left over after everyone 
gets her share. In contrast, if a slice of cake remains after distribution, 
that is Pareto inefficient: Why throw it away when you could give it to 
somebody, while, at the same time, not reducing anybody’s share?
Pareto efficiency has normative force, but it is clear that it is only a 
ceteris paribus force. Suppose a cake is cut into six slices, and we are 
choosing between two distributions. Under distribution A, each of five 
children gets one slice of cake and the sixth slice is thrown into the trash. 
Under distribution B, one child—the biggest bully of the group—gets all 
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six slices. Now, B is Pareto efficient and A is not—and that is a point in 
B’s favor—but A is morally superior to B. Put differently, we care about 
efficiency, but not as much as we care about justice.
Although Pareto efficiency is an indispensable theoretical tool, it is not 
very useful when it comes to analyzing public policy. There are a host of 
potential laws and regulatory changes that we want to call “ efficient”, but 
all of these doubtless make somebody worse-off. Consider the exemplar of 
“efficiency-enhancing” regulation: Taxes on negative externalities, like pol-
lution (to be discussed in §8.3). These taxes are not Pareto improvements; 
the polluter is better-off without them. But they still reduce waste of some 
kind. Similarly, breaking up a monopoly is not a Pareto improvement— 
it’s bad for the monopolist. But this is still a step we can rightly justify on 
grounds of efficiency.
For the purpose of evaluating policy, it is more useful to think of effi-
ciency simply in terms of the total surplus—the economic gains to con-
sumers and producers, as measured in dollars.5 The difference between 
what a consumer would pay for a good and what he actually pays (i.e. 
the market price) is a measure of his economic benefit. The difference 
between what a producer would sell its good for and the market price is a 
measure of the producer’s economic benefit. Indeed, creating this surplus 
is often regarded as the raison d’être of an economy.
It is clear that efficiency in this sense also has limited normative force. 
Social planners might increase the surplus by treading on property rights, 
or transferring resources from the virtuous to the wicked, or reducing the 
welfare of their society, etc. Increasing the total surplus is desirable, but 
only ceteris paribus desirable.
Now the distribution of cake and economic distribution differ in an 
important way: When we think about the best way to distribute a cake, 
we might think of justice and efficiency as going hand-in-hand. Whatever 
else we ought to do with the cake, we ought to give all of the slices out.
Economic distribution is not like this. For all plausible normative 
goals (welfare maximization, giving people what they deserve, protecting 
rights, maximizing the least-advantaged’s share, etc.), it is not necessary 
that the economy be efficient. The distributive system that maximizes 
welfare (e.g.) might produce fewer welfare-enabling goods than some 
other, feasible system.
The reason this is so is that we obtain our desired redistribution through 
taxation and social spending.6 And as Arthur Okun (1975) memorably 
puts it, redistribution is akin to carrying water in a leaky bucket: Some 
potential goods are destroyed by the redistributive process itself. These 
are the deadweight losses associated with taxation and social spending. 
Those who pay taxes reduce their labor time or otherwise modify their 
economic behavior as a result of the tax. And the recipients of public 
funds substitute leisure for work, or leave the workforce completely, 
when they receive the transfer.
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So there is a tension between our normative goal of justice and posi-
tive facts about the production and distribution of the resources needed 
to pursue that goal. The more vigorously we pursue justice, the more 
we may find ourselves unable to fuel that pursuit. In economics, this is 
known as the “equity/efficiency trade-off” (or sometimes the “equality/
efficiency trade-off”—for those, apparently, who assume that justice is 
about equality).
Philosophers too often ignore the trade-off.7 It is widely thought that 
our job is to identify, a priori, the ideally just distributive scheme. 
Once that is done, the matter is to be passed to social scientists, so that 
they can develop the necessary institutions, and then to politicians for 
implementation.
This is too quick. As I shall discuss in §3.2, we seem to grant inde-
pendent weight to efficiency. And, for the reasons just given, one cannot 
assume that a theory of justice will not unacceptably tread on efficiency. 
To be a functional guide for reforming our institutions, a theory of justice 
must either (1) make precise the efficiency losses that its implementation 
would create and argue that these are acceptable, or (2) advance a theory 
that is broadly efficient. I shall endeavor to make clear why (2) is true for 
meritocracy.
As alluded to in §2.2, this is also a justificatory consideration. It seems 
that we might deny the truth of a theory of justice on grounds of ineffi-
ciency. Again, that a theory of justice would impoverish a society suggests 
that the theory is false. It is not dispositive, but it is a point against the 
theory.
While it is hard to know how much inefficiency is too much, I think 
that the idea can be put adequately thus:
The First Requirement of Justice: A theory of justice should suggest 
an economy that is reasonably efficient.
Two points here. First, this is a metatheoretical principle because its sub-
ject-matter is political theorizing; it serves as a constraint on our political 
theories, not a constraint on our politics.
Second, I shall not define “reasonably efficient”. Again, I do not know 
where the relevant line here should be drawn. That problem I cannot 
solve—but I can bypass it. One of main contributions of this book is to 
show how meritocracy, unique among distributive theories, minimizes 
trade-offs between justice and efficiency. As economist Roland Bénabou 
puts it, “the analysis generally validates the common intuition that meri-
tocracy, appropriately defined, is desirable not only on grounds of fair-
ness but also on grounds of efficiency” (2000: 319).
This metatheoretical idea can be taken a step further. We evaluate 
theories of justice not only with an eye toward their efficiency, but toward 
their implications for public policy, as well.
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Consider taxation. Starting with James Mirrlees (1971), economists 
have looked at how to maximize the general welfare given the aforemen-
tioned disincentives that taxes create. This is the central task of optimal 
tax theory (§8.1). One of the implications of Mirrlees’s model is that 
marginal income tax rates should decrease with income; indeed, under 
suitable distributional assumptions, the top marginal tax rate should be 
0%. Why? Because that maximizes the general welfare.8
For most people, this is counterintuitive, as evidenced by the fact that 
income taxes are progressive almost everywhere, including in the United 
States. We believe that progressivity in the tax code is more just than 
regressivity in the tax code.
The utilitarian can confront this result in one of two ways. First, he can 
endorse this policy prescription, its counterintuitiveness be damned. Or, 
second, he can regard it as reason to revisit his normative commitments. 
If a perfect utilitarian society is one in which the richer you get, the less 
your (marginal) income gets taken from you—well, then perhaps the 
utilitarian ideal is not so just after all. Instead of a modus ponens from 
utilitarianism to regressive income taxes, we have a modus tollens which 
refutes utilitarianism.
Balancing theory and practice in this way should be handled by the 
standard method of reflective equilibrium, which I shall discuss in due 
course. This metatheoretical idea may be put in this way:
The Second Requirement of Justice: A theory of justice should sug-
gest morally attractive public policies.
Finally, I suggest a third requirement, related to the moral opportunity 
costs of our justice-mandated public policies. The true cost of anything is 
what you give up in order to get that thing. Hence the saying, “there’s no 
such thing as a free lunch”: You don’t have to pay money for it, but you 
do have to give up something—namely, your most-preferred alternative 
to spending that hour at the diner.
In the same way, there are opportunity costs to implementing justice. 
To economists, this will seem so obvious as to be hardly worth stat-
ing; but surprisingly few philosophers consider either (1) whether the 
resources spent implementing the policies their theories demand might 
be spent on more morally-pressing matters, or (2) the incentive effects 
of these policies, which could reduce (or increase) our overall ability to 
pursue justice or other moral ends.
Of course, what precisely the most-preferred foregone alternative is 
depends on one’s moral compass. Nevertheless, we can reach consensus 
on something that is, even if not the worst thing in the world, very nearly 
so. This is that thousands of children die every day from famine or pov-
erty-related disease—primarily in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. 
We need not let this happen; it costs about $2,000 to save one of these 
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innocent lives. We ought to keep that in mind when we evaluate the just-
ness of our policy prescriptions. I name this metatheoretical constraint 
after Peter Singer (1972):
The Third Requirement of Justice: A theory of justice should pass 
the Singer Test.
At Brown University, where I last taught, the administration has com-
mitted to spend $165 million on diversity-related initiatives, including 
the provision of “safe spaces” for students who feel offended by aspects 
of campus culture. The moral opportunity cost of this policy is 82,500 
dead African children. Brown’s administration, whether they were aware 
of it or not, made a choice: to advance diversity and to let those children 
die. Does justice require this? Perhaps it does; but that evaluation has to 
be made with the moral opportunity cost, which in this case is a mortal 
one, in mind.
Similarly, the American government spent $13 billion to build the U.S.S. 
Gerald R. Ford, an aircraft carrier. It is our 11th. The rest of the world 
combined has nine aircraft carriers, seven of which belong to friendly 
nations. The moral opportunity cost of the Gerald R. Ford is 6,500,000 
dead African children. Surely, with that figure in mind, the military 
expense seems less justified if nothing else.
When evaluating a theory of justice, we must put it to the Singer Test. 
We must ask if the theory is plausible in light of the moral opportunity 
costs. Of course, some theorists (utilitarians who pay no heed to national 
boundaries, like Singer himself) think that these considerations suggest 
that we simply ought to arrange our economy in the cosmopolitan, 
welfare-maximizing way. We need not adopt that view. But we must be 
honest with ourselves about the palatability of our abstract theories.
Consider, for example, the libertarian idea that we ought to protect all 
parts of a person’s income obtained through free contracts. If that is right, 
then we must protect the trillions of dollars in economic rents received 
by our highest-income citizens (§6.4). These rents do not reflect value-
added to the economy. They are always imperfectly connected to merit, 
and sometimes utterly unconnected. They may be taxed away without 
loss of efficiency. They may be taxed away without affecting their pos-
sessors’ welfare (the marginal utility of rents, since they are obtained by 
the wealthy, is practically zero).
Yet the libertarian insists that we not confiscate them, which may seem 
attractive in the abstract but is ludicrous when the moral opportunity cost 
of protecting them is kept in mind: the death of millions of children (or, 
more likely given the numbers involved, an end to global poverty).
The idea here is that when we evaluate the justness of some norma-
tive principle, we ought to make that evaluation with reference to moral 
opportunity costs. We learn that the right-libertarian is probably wrong 
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when we see the extraordinary human suffering that he chooses to per-
petuate when he protects the principle of exchange.
Of course, we would like to have a theory of justice that solved all 
the world’s problems, fighting poverty abroad as it establishes justice at 
home. I am certainly not claiming that meritocracy does this, although 
there are reasons to think that highly-efficient economies, which meri-
tocracy would produce, help eradicate global poverty—through direct 
giving, the aid apparatus they enable, and globalization. (See Wenar 2011 
for an introduction to some of the empirical issues involved.) I shall seek 
only to show that meritocratic justice can stand up to the Singer Test, in 
a way that other theories, including libertarianism, cannot.
2.4  Ideal and Non-Ideal Theory
Meritocracy offers an unabashedly utopian vision: of a world in which 
distinctions of class are not passed between generations; racism, sexism, 
and other biases wither under society’s strict focus on merit; and the 
economy approaches maximum productivity through sage, efficiency-
enhancing regulation. Of course, utopian thinking is nothing new within 
philosophy, but ever since Rawls (1971) drew a distinction between 
theorizing under ideal conditions (which for Rawls meant assuming that 
all citizens would obey identified principles of justice) and theorizing 
under non-ideal conditions (of more realistic, partial compliance), the 
traditional approach has come under threat from the non-ideal side of 
the debate.9
It has been claimed, variously, that ideal theory cannot serve as a guide 
for reforming our institutions; is incoherent for formal reasons; serves 
to perpetuate unjust social privilege; and is, has been, and will continue 
to be nothing but a tool for power-hungry politicians to oppress their 
citizens.
Some non-ideal criticisms are, I believe, sound—or at least plausible 
enough to take seriously; the ideal theorist must meet them or abandon 
his project. These I will explicate below, and I will hope to show, over the 
course of this book, that meritocracy meets the challenge.
Philosophers who deny the importance of all non-ideal considerations 
may skip this section. And do I agree that some of these considerations 
should not move us. For example, consider Charles Mills’s claim that 
ideal theory “is really an ideology, a distortional complex of ideas, values, 
norms, and beliefs that reflects the nonrepresentative interests and expe-
riences of a small minority of the national population—middle-to-upper 
class white males” (2005: 172).
Mills may be correct, in a limited sense: None of us is so disinterested, 
such a paragon of logic, that he can divorce his theories from facts about 
his upbringing, his social class, and so on. It is inevitable that to some 
degree the content of a theory of justice reflects the character and the 
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experiences of the person who advances it. And it is also true that we can 
always find a way in which this character or these experiences are non-
representative of the population. That is a straightforward consequence 
of living in a diverse society.
But this tells us nothing about the value of the work itself, which is 
what should concern us. It is obviously no accident that the majority 
of feminist philosophers are women. But that says nothing about the 
intellectual value of feminist thought. To learn that, we must judge the 
work—not the author.
I do think it is worthwhile to consider perspectives on justice that are 
absent from the debate owing to the non-representation of race, gender, 
and class which Mills identifies. The best way to do that is examine how 
people across lines of race and gender think about justice. We shall do this 
in the next chapter. The wrong way to incorporate these perspectives is 
to give special weight to the opinions of, say, black academics—not least 
because their perspective and ideology is quite different from the perspec-
tive and ideology of the black community at-large.
In any case, Mills has something else in mind: “If we ask the simple, 
classic question of cui bono? [who benefits?] then it is obvious that ideal 
theory can only serve the interests of the privileged, who in addition—
precisely because of that privilege (as bourgeois white males)—have an 
experience that comes closest to that ideal” (2005: 172).
Claims like these are frequent these days, and they are lamentable. 
Mills commits errors of both fact and logic. He makes a factual error 
because most ideal theories would not end up serving the interests of the 
“privileged”. Rawls’s theory, for example, would impose a relative harm 
on white men owing to its redistributive demands.
Mills makes a logical error, because the ideal world a philosopher 
desires may well be different from his socioeconomic experience (even 
as the theory is informed by his experience). In my judgment, it is the 
poor, not the privileged, whose experience better approximates Nozick’s 
nightwatchman state.
Mills is convinced that Rawls’s theory was “constructed to evade these 
problems [of racial justice]” (Pateman and Mills 2007: 258). I doubt that 
very seriously given Rawls’s impeccable character, but in any case I shall 
confront racial justice head-on.
I shall argue that it is unjust to discriminate against a best-qualified 
black applicant on the basis of his race, and that justice requires major 
wealth redistribution in the name of establishing equal opportunity—
redistribution which has the net effect (in the United States) of transfer-
ring wealth from whites to blacks.
But I will also argue that affirmative action programs that elevate 
less-qualified blacks over better-qualified whites are unjust (§9.2). And 
we will take seriously the possibility that blacks are at a genetic disad-
vantage when it comes to earnings-relevant traits, like IQ (§6.5). Our 
30 On Justice
best evidence suggests that this is not true—but again (§1.3), we will not 
shrink from uncomfortable possibilities.
I turn to describe the criticisms of the ideal approach that I regard 
as sound (or at least compelling enough to merit attention). I shall not 
defend these criticisms—their proponents do a good enough job of that 
on their own—since if they are unsound then they do not threaten my 
project.
Non-ideal challenge #1: Theories of justice must be feasible.
There must be a way for us to modify our world such that it conforms 
to our ideal of justice. It is not necessary that this route be easy or short, 
but it must be passible. We must not be precluded from attaining the 
ideal because of limitations of resources. These resources could be socio-
economic (natural resources, money, political capital), motivational, or 
something else.10
Although some extreme ideal theorists (e.g. Cohen (2003, 2008); 
Estlund (2011); and Mason (2004)) deny the necessity of feasibility, 
this challenge has intuitive support and has attracted many defenders. 
Recently, David Wiens (2015a, 2015b), invoking the language of possible 
worlds, has provided a perspicuous and powerful defense of the challenge 
on formal grounds.11
Wiens has shown two things. First, if a theorist concedes that his 
account of ideal justice is infeasible, then we should look to the ideal for 
guidance only if the social changes that lead to the ideal converge with 
the social changes that lead to the maximally just feasible world. There is 
no reason to think that this will generally be the case, and so these ideal 
theorists have a serious gap in their argument.
Second, ideal theorists who do not concede the infeasibility of their 
theories—like me—bear the burden of showing that their ideal worlds 
are likely in the set of possible worlds that we can reach given current 
resources. Wiens’s point is that, absent such a showing, we are simply 
unjustified in believing that our principles of ideal justice ought to be 
implemented. This is neither an impossible nor a trivial standard. It is one 
that I shall try to meet in this book.
A word above motivational limitations. These may be viewed as simply 
another type of scarce resource which constrains the possible worlds we 
might attain (and this is how Wiens views them).12 But we might also 
think that a theory’s ability to motivate people to comply with its dictates 
is a merit in itself—especially if this motivation exists across contingent 
lines of ideology and culture. One reason this is so is that intuition is an 
important part of our practical reason. To advance a theory that implies 
that the intuitions of many human beings are wrong is to regard the fac-
ulties of practical reason of many human beings as defective. That seems 
dubious.
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Non-ideal challenge #2: Theories of justice must offer policy pre-
scriptions that are sensible.
If a theory of justice fails to provide guidance (laws, regulations, cul-
tural norms) for social reform, it does not live up to its aspiration of mak-
ing the world a more just place. Or, if the theory does provide guidance, 
but that guidance is not “sensible”—it has little effect on social develop-
ment, or, worse, makes society less just—it is hard to see what value it 
has. As Colin Farrelly puts it,
a theory of social justice that yields impotent or misguided practical 
prescriptions is a deficient theory of justice. If the collective aspira-
tion to implement the conclusions of a theory would not result in 
any noticeable increase in the justness of one’s society then it fails as 
a normative theory.
 (2007: 845)
There is even a case to be made that political philosophers have a pro-
fessional duty to try to make the world a more just place. If that is true, 
then excessively ideal theorists act wrongly.
Some ideal theorists, like David Estlund, reject the idea that our theo-
ries need to have practical use. Estlund argues for the value of extreme 
ideal theory by way of comparison with pure mathematics:
To suggest that the general view that only practically applicable intel-
lectual work has value is difficult to maintain without implausibly 
implying that even what are widely regarded (not just by mathemati-
cians) as the greatest mathematical achievements have, it turns out, 
no great value of any kind. If higher math is important, then aspira-
tional theory is not shown to be unimportant simply for being (like 
much higher math) of no practical value.
(2014: 134)
Reply: This is a bad analogy. It blunts Estlund’s point rather than buttresses it. 
To begin with, pure mathematics admits of proof and most philosophy does 
not. The various theories of justice on offer are at best coherent conjectures. 
Their truth or falsity remains open. And many would claim that they are not 
even that, since every major theory of justice has been subjected to powerful 
counterexamples and accused of internal inconsistency. We are unable to 
prove, formally, even the most rudimentary and unambiguous moral facts: 
We’re pretty sure that it is wrong to torture infants for fun, but we cannot 
prove it. In contrast, there are myriad results in pure mathematics that have 
been established, beyond doubt, through the method of rigorous proof.
Moreover, even if we concede that they are without practical applica-
tion, the theorems of pure math and their proofs have intrinsic intellectual 
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value. It is not clear that our current theories of justice—whose math-
ematical analogues, again, are conjectures, not theorems—have the same 
value. To be sure, our theories have stimulated much worthwhile discus-
sion, and they are essential steps in the march toward philosophical truth. 
But those are instrumental grounds of value. And while it is true that if 
some actual theory of justice is true then it is intrinsically valuable, that 
is a conditional claim—again, unlike the theorems of pure math. What 
we should ask—the proper analogy—is whether the part of pure math 
that contains no proven theorems but only conjectures is valuable. That 
is debatable.
In any case, we should not concede the impracticality of pure math 
to Estlund. Even the most recherché fields have consistently found rel-
evance. Algebraic geometry has been applied to the making and breaking 
of codes, and fixed-point theorems from topology are commonly used 
by economists studying markets. In contrast, so far as I am aware, none 
of the contemporary work on distributive justice has had any effect on 
policymaking. How many members of Congress would even recognize 
the names “Nozick” or “Rawls”? Perhaps I am being too hard on our 
legislators, but I would wager very few.
Non-ideal challenge #3: Excessively ideal theories are dangerous.
This is a challenge which has been leveled against utopian theoriz-
ing by both liberals (especially pluralists like Berlin) and conservatives 
(Oakeshott 1962) alike. The danger is twofold. First, utopianism often 
leads to oppression:
Theories of politics that expect too much of human beings have done 
even more damage than have those that expect too little. Theories 
that preach the total malleability of human nature have proved coun-
terfactual and disturbingly open to excess. Faced with resistance, 
power-holders are wont to assume, not that their goals are unattain-
able, but rather that they haven’t pushed hard enough. So they go 
further, eventually disregarding all limits.
(Galston 2010: 401)
Second, adherents to the ideal—like True Believers everywhere—think 
they are justified in resisting any compromise. They alone have glimpsed 
moral truth, those on the other side of the debate are morally flawed, and 
so concessions only serve to undermine their purity. Of course, this is bad 
reasoning—but it does seem like an accurate description of how many 
people regard their ideological opponents.
Non-ideal challenge #4: Excessively ideal theories are deficient from 
a justificatory point-of-view.
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When a theory fails to delineate the public policies that its principles 
require, it bypasses an important step in the process we use to evaluate 
the theory itself: coming to grips with what it wants from us in practice. 
This point was made in §2.3: Discovering that a theory requires that 
marginal tax rates decrease with income, as utilitarianism may require, 
is, for most of us, a reason to doubt the theory itself. To be clear, I am 
not saying that because some policy makes us morally queasy we ought 
to abandon the associated theory. Every theory will do this to us to some 
degree. I am saying that it is a justificatory consideration.
Put differently, the further toward the ideal side of the “spectrum” a 
theorist is,13 the more he can get away with. He may simply leave unad-
dressed the possibility that his theory has, in practice, unseemly conse-
quences. And it is the nature of utopian thinking that we are not inclined 
to assume the worst. A sufficiently non-ideal theory submits itself to scru-
tiny; an insufficiently non-ideal theory does not—it may have justificatory 
flaws, but it keeps them concealed.
These are the non-ideal challenges that, I believe, pose a threat to tradi-
tional ideal theory. The onus is on me to show that meritocracy is feasible, 
that its policy demands make sense, that it will not be exploited, and that 
it is sufficiently detailed.
If you ask me where meritocracy lies on the ideal/non-ideal spectrum, 
I think that it is a bit more non-ideal than Rawls’s theory, but still within 
the range that counts, for most philosophers, as “ideal theory”. Rawls 
hopes to find a “realistic utopia” (2001)—and so do I. The theory I offer 
is more realistic. Its economic mechanisms have been either verified by 
history or are consonant with our best theory, or both. The public policies 
necessary to establish justice are given in some detail (in Part III) and are 
viable. The fundamental principles of meritocracy command widespread 
intuitive support (Chapter 3), and thus have motivational power.
2.5  Situating Meritocracy in the Debate about Justice
I defend a deontological, desert-based theory of justice, and explore its con-
cepts and its practical implications. As we shall see, this theory suggests a 
certain economic arrangement, one which is recognizably “meritocratic”.
My argument does not preclude the establishment of a meritocracy 
on other grounds. For example, there are a variety of consequentialist 
arguments which might be given in favor of some form of meritocracy. 
Maybe the production of primary goods is maximized when jobs are held 
by the best-qualified. If that is so, then a Rawlsian will want to establish 
a meritocracy of sorts—that yields that maximum number of goods avail-
able for redistribution to the worst-off. Similarly, there is a utilitarian 
argument: People are happy when they get good medical care instead of 
bad medical care, and so there is a moral obligation to hire doctors on 
the basis of their merit.
34 On Justice
But these are instrumental grounds for meritocracy which provide a 
weaker defense of the ideal than is warranted. I argue for the intrinsic 
justness of meritocracy.
I note, too, that a virtue ethical case for meritocracy could be made. I 
won’t make that case, except to argue (in §6.7) that decisions about how 
the state should cultivate character in its citizens cannot be avoided; they 
are part and parcel of the policy choices we make, or do not make, about 
how we should, or should not, regulate our economy.
Meritocracy as I understand it is grounded in two ways. First, it best 
satisfies the metatheoretical desiderata which I have just surveyed. Sec-
ond, meritocracy, in contrast to egalitarianism and libertarianism, is intu-
itively compelling. It harnesses widely shared, common sense ideas about 
justice, explaining these in a consistent and complete normative theory.
I suspect that many philosophers feel the appeal of desert-based justice. 
They want to be desertists. But they are not convinced that desert-based 
justice is plausible. Either desert is thought to be conceptually intractable 
(how could we possibly say what people deserve?) or it is assumed that 
desert-based justice would lead to reactionary public policies.
In fact, both worries are misplaced. The concept of desert is hard—that 
I don’t dispute—but it is manageable. Our many intuitions about justice 
yield a consistent and compelling theory. And a desert-based policy regime 
would be anything but reactionary: At least by contemporary American 
standards, if we want people to get what they deserve, if we want to live 
in a meritocracy, we must reform our politics in a progressive direction.
When it comes to policy, meritocracy can motivate change, and in this 
respect, too, it is different from other theories. Consider the perspective of 
an educated and thoughtful policymaker alive today, who looks to politi-
cal philosophy—as I think she should—for normative guidance. She faces 
an array of theories, all of which are esoteric and starkly at odds with her 
constituents’ desires and her own sense of justice.
In wondering whether people have a moral claim on their income, the 
policymaker will hear from Rawls that the answer is a resounding “no”—it 
matters not a whit how hard they worked for it, the value it created for 
others in the marketplace, and so on. That will strike the policymaker as 
implausible. But when she turns to Nozick, she finds a view that is no more 
compelling: that one’s moral claim on income is unbridled! Cronyism, fam-
ily influence, and racial preference can all generate a just claim. Surely, the 
policymaker will say to herself, there is a principled middle ground here.
According to meritocracy, there is. You have a moral claim on your 
income if you earned it under equal opportunity, and if it reflects your 
meritorious contributions. The left will say that this leads to too much 
inequality; the right, that it leads to too little. But I think it’s just about 
correct, and I think our policymaker would agree.
One salient feature of meritocracy is that it admits genetics as a 
legitimate ground for economic inequality. If Mick and Keith were raised 
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under conditions of equal opportunity, and Mick is richer than Keith 
because Mick is a more genetically talented musician, that inequality 
is just. I say this is “salient” because it is controversial, but it is in fact 
unimportant: Genetics have a small effect on economic outcomes (§6.5). 
(Effort is what matters most.)
A diagram may be helpful. Let’s identify theories of justice by the extent 
to which (1) they mandate equal opportunity and (2) they allow genetics 
to ground economic inequality (Figure 2.1). We plot theories on a plane. 
A positive y-coordinate means that genetics ground inequality; a negative 
y-coordinate means that they do not. A positive x-coordinate means that 
equal opportunity is mandated; a negative x-coordinate means that it is not.
While I have not tried to precisely situate theories, a few useful things 
can be said. Clearly, Nozickian libertarianism sits at the extreme north-
west point. None of the minimal state’s few powers are related to equal 
opportunity, and a person may justly leverage her genetics, like almost 
anything else in the world, to her economic advantage.
Some left-libertarian theories (e.g. that of Otsuka (2003)) will fall to 
the east and south of Nozick’s theory. How far to the east depends on 
how strong of an equal opportunity regime is called for, and how far to 
the south depends on subtle conceptual issues.
To the far southwest, we find a strict egalitarian approach under which 
nothing justifies unequal outcomes and there is no equal opportunity: 
People harness their natural talents, social advantages, and everything 
Figure 2.1 Genetics and Equal Opportunity
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else, and then it all gets redistributed so that everyone has the same (this 
may have the incidental effect of equalizing opportunity, but there is no 
equal opportunity regime). This is not an efficient form of strict egalitari-
anism, because equal opportunity investments would increase the social 
product.
Rawls sits in the southeast quadrant: Fair equality of opportunity and 
denying a role for genetics in just economic outcomes are salient elements 
of his theory.
Meritocracy is in the northeast quadrant. Note that meritocracy lies far-
ther to the east than Rawlsian egalitarianism does: The meritocratic equal 
opportunity regime is more robust than Rawls’s, proscribing, for example, 
various forms of family influence which Rawls would not object to.
One might wonder where luck egalitarianism resides. The only thing 
that can be said, I think, is that it’s somewhere in the southern half. It is a 
treasured luck egalitarian belief that, because you did not choose (or con-
trol) your genetics, they cannot justify inequalities. This argument fails 
for reasons similar to those that doom Rawls (Chapter 7), and the meri-
tocratic approach to justice differs from the luck egalitarian approach in 
myriad ways besides (§4.6).
Above I distinguished a meritocracy justified on instrumental grounds 
from a meritocracy justified on intrinsic grounds. We may also distinguish 
a “weak” meritocracy from a “strong” meritocracy by how it approaches 
questions of value.
“Meritocracy” connotes excellence. And rightly so, I think: Meritoc-
racy is desirable in part because it fosters achievement in art, music, phi-
losophy, science, athletics, and other fields of human endeavor.
One must take a stand on whether these achievements have the value 
that they do independent of their being desired. If the answer is “no”, 
then we have no reason to prefer a government that cultivates the music 
of, say, Justin Bieber over that of Beethoven. If the answer is “no”, we 
may not fret when Bieber is paid 150 times more than the concertmaster 
of the New York Philharmonic, as is actually the case. If the answer is 
“no” then we support meritocracy in a weak sense, on the grounds that 
it creates achievements of great subjective value.
I am convinced, however, that this view cannot hold, and that strong 
meritocracy—value understood objectively—is what we should defend. 
The example given is tongue-in-cheek, but as we shall see in §6.7 the 
problem is a serious one: Any economy that single-mindedly responds to 
market demand is morally indefensible on grounds of value. When atten-
tion is not paid to objective excellence, consumers may be badly hurt by 
their false beliefs; markets may shape people’s preferences in objection-
able ways; and nasty behavior, such as racism, may be incentivized.
A consequence of this understanding of value is that meritocracy is a 
perfectionistic theory: There are objective goods and a just government 
helps realize them. But meritocracy’s perfectionism is atypical.
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Perfectionist theories normally proceed by (1) providing an account of 
the good and then (2) exploring that account’s ramifications for politics. 
In contrast, meritocracy remains agnostic about what is good and instead 
establishes a framework under which the good—no matter what it be—
can best be pursued. It does this through strict attention to merit.
An example will illustrate what I have in mind. There is an objective 
truth about what is good music and what is bad music, and a just state 
fosters the production of the former. But none of us, let alone the state, 
knows what music is good and what is bad. It might be Bieber’s music; it 
might be Beethoven’s. And so the direct promotion of one over the other 
is unjustified.
What we do know, however, is that good music is produced by good 
musicians. Therefore, any market behavior that is at odds with merit 
will impede the production of high quality music. That we can have 
confidence in. We can have confidence that a meritocratic economic 
framework will, in the long run, lead to achievements of objectively high 
value. In contrast, if there is anti-meritocratic behavior in the market—if 
a less-qualified white applicant is chosen for the conservatory over a 
more-qualified black applicant owing to racism—the quest for musical 
excellence is impaired. The government cannot justifiably choose a par-
ticular musician to promote, but it can proscribe the use of race in college 
admissions, and thereby, indirectly, promote excellence.14
A few brief remarks on perfectionism. First, meritocracy’s perfection-
ism is not entirely humanistic, as many of the goods which meritocracy 
fosters, like cultural achievement, are unrelated to the development of 
human nature. In this respect, meritocracy arguably diverges from Aris-
totelian perfection (and accords with Rawls’s understanding).
Second, because meritocracy does not enumerate what the good things 
in life are, but rather establishes a merit-based framework compatible 
with many things being good (Bieber, Beethoven, et al.), it may appeal to 
proponents of neutrality.15 Indeed, in the face of disagreement over the 
good life, and given the necessity of choosing between economic arrange-
ments, all of which close off some paths-of-life, strict focus on merit may 
be as neutral as we can get.
Third, as George Sher reminds us, “no government can avoid either 
nonrationally shaping its citizens’ preferences or providing them with 
incentives” (1997: 66). Recent work on “nudging”, for example, makes 
this clear. Even “neutral” governments have a role in preference forma-
tion.16 And even if the role is limited, it seems to have moral features. 
Meritocracy provides guidance for this limited preference formation; a 
fully neutral theory does not.
Fourth, for readers wondering “is meritocracy illiberal?”, the answer 
turns on what kind of liberty one has in mind. Meritocracy proscribes 
racial discrimination in private economic transactions and places (weak) 
constraints on corporate officer compensation (§8.2). And it redistributes 
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resources, through coercive government, in the name of equal opportu-
nity. In these respects, yes: Meritocracy is illiberal. But of course this is 
not the sort of liberality we typically have in mind, and nothing about the 
theory requires regulating private religious, romantic, sexual matters, etc. 
There is one genuine worry about illiberality, which has to do with meri-
tocracy’s interference with the family structure (to be discussed in §4.5). 
In any event, I shall not defend the liberality of meritocracy but leave the 
theory to speak for itself in this regard.
A final comment. Contemporary philosophy and economics put wel-
fare and “resources” (i.e. money) at the heart of justice. To a large extent, 
whether justice requires some institutional change can be determined by 
looking at the associated impact on social welfare, the lot of the least-
advantaged, overall wealth, and similar measures.
We should consider whether the society we would create by such a 
focus is desirable. It seems to me that these societies—maximally happy, 
maximally rich ones—would be far removed from the human experience, 
and awful besides. For most of us, happiness and wealth are important 
parts of life, but they are hardly commanding. We also want to achieve 
things that we think are objectively important; to contribute to others, 
even at the cost of our own well-being; and to have a life which future 
generations will look back on with respect. Each of us can think of 
people who have had estimable lives—the sorts of lives we’d like to live. 
Of these, how many are marked by bliss or riches? Not many, I suspect. 
What is the story of a life gone well, if not one in which the hero, after 
enduring chapter upon chapter of failure, misfortune, and terror, takes 
satisfaction in the meager successes he has had along the way?
For this reason, we should not expect a just political arrangement 
to simply maximize welfare or resources. We should expect more: a 
social structure that encourages excellence. And in a just world, as in a 
good life, there is a place for deprivation and suffering—in reasonable 
measure.
These ubiquitous features of the human experience provide perspective 
on what is truly meaningful; help us deal with life’s travails; and stimulate 
achievement. We should be skeptical of any theory of justice that would 
seek to eradicate them, keeping Kant’s warning in mind: “The light dove, 
in free flight cutting through the air the resistance of which it feels, could 
get the idea that it could do even better in airless space” (1781: A5).
Notes
 1 What Hayek rejects, specifically, is the idea of distributive justice—he appar-
ently believed that justice can operate in other spheres, like interpersonal 
relationships.
 2 On this point, see Schmidtz (2016).
 3 Nozick’s later work (1989, 1993) arguably repudiates, to a degree, his liber-
tarian conclusions in Anarchy, State, and Utopia.
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 4 Mulligan (2015). The landmark conceptual analysis of tolerance is King 
(1976).
 5 There are theoretical problems with measuring efficiency in this way (see 
Boadway 1974) for the most general economies. But as a practical matter, it 
is an effective measure.
 6 The same holds true for libertarianism, which refuses some forms of effi-
ciency-enhancing regulation on the grounds that they violate liberty (for 
some libertarians, subsidies for producers of positive externalities would be 
an example).
 7 Le Grand (1990) makes some useful comments on the equity/efficiency 
trade-off.
 8 Although Mirrlees’s original model is no longer regarded as accurate, much 
(but not all) contemporary work in optimal tax theory continues to suggest that 
marginal income tax rates should decrease with income. See Tuomala (1990).
 9 See Stemplowska and Swift (2012) and Valentini (2012) for summaries. Phil-
lips (1985) is prescient.
10 The reader, with §2.1 in mind, might wonder whether all theories of justice 
must perforce be non-ideal, given that justice itself—at least on the Humean 
account—arises only because there is scarcity. That does seem right. The mat-
ter is discussed by Estlund (2011: 225–9).
11 See also Sen (2006: 225 n. 11).
12 See also Wiens (2016).
13 While it is often thought that there is a single continuum, running from the 
ideal (full compliance, no feasibility or motivational constraints) to the non-
ideal (constraints on compliance, feasibility, and human motivation defined 
by what we know about the actual world), these considerations are in fact 
multidimensional. A theory of justice might be developed, for example, that 
views compliance and human motivation as irrelevant to the truth of justice, 
but facts about scarcity as relevant. Such a theory could not be located on a 
simple line running from the “ideal” to the “non-ideal”. (Hamlin and Stem-
plowska (2012) make a similar point.)
14 Related considerations are discussed by Wilson (2003).
15 Examples here would be Dworkin (1978); Larmore (1987); and Rawls 
(1993).
16 Some proponents of neutrality, like Dworkin (1978, 2011), recognize this.
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3.1  Human Beings are Not Selfish
The simplest model of economic motivation treats human beings as sin-
gle-minded self-interest seekers (i.e. as members of “Homo economicus”). 
For many years, philosophers and economists believed that this was accu-
rate. On this classical model, human beings show compassion to others 
just in case it is in our interest to do so; we care about “justice” only 
because that provides a more pleasant society within which to live; and 
so on.
But over the last 35 years, experimentalists have scrutinized this model 
and found it wanting. In fact, economic agents do not make decisions, in 
the marketplace or elsewhere, with an eye toward maximizing their own 
advantage.
The first work here was done by Güth, Schmittberger, and Schwarze 
(1982), who developed the ultimatum game. In it, one experimental sub-
ject, Player 1, is given a sum of money and then charged with offering a 
fraction of it to another subject, Player 2. Player 2 may accept or reject 
Player 1’s offer. If Player 2 rejects the offer, neither player receives any-
thing. If Player 2 accepts it, she receives the offered amount and Player 1 
keeps the remainder.
Under the Homo economicus assumption, the correct, game-theoretic 
solution is for Player 1 to offer the minimum amount possible. And 
Player 2 will accept this, as it leaves her better off she would be if she 
rejected the offer (in which case she gets nothing).
But human beings do not play the game this way. Player 2s do not 
accept any non-zero offer, and Player 1s do not make minimum offers. A 
sense of justice trumps self-interest. Player 2s respond to what they regard 
as an unjust, low-ball offer by forgoing all the money, thereby forcing 
Player 1 to forgo it as well. And Player 1s altruistically give some of the 
money away. Player 1s typically offer 40 percent of the sum, and these 
offers are accepted. Offers less than 30 percent are typically rejected.
The dictator game is similar in design and obtains similar results. In it, 
Player 1’s “offer” is decisive: He simply decides how much of the money 
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he wishes to keep for himself and how much he wishes to share with 
Player 2, and then he distributes it, and that is the end of the experiment. 
Here, Player 1 need not fear that his offer will be rejected. Naturally, the 
“rational” choice for Player 1 is to keep all of the money. But once again 
this does not actually happen. Player 1s—who, I stress, have complete 
control over the distribution—deviate from pure self-interest, giving 
away, on average, 28 percent of the sum (Engel 2011).
3.2  The Content of Justice
The results just described are thin, in that they demonstrate only that 
human beings have a sense of justice in distribution which trumps self-
interest. They do not themselves provide insight into the particular norm 
of justice at work. They are compatible with an aversion to inequality, 
to be sure—and this is how they were originally interpreted—but they 
are also compatible with a concern for deserts, since in the experiments 
discussed there were no relevant differences between the players which 
could give rise to different desert-claims.
More sophisticated experiments show that it is fact desert which 
motivates players in these cases. For example, Frohlich, Oppenheimer, 
and Kurki (2004) ran a variant on the dictator game in which players 
engaged in a productive enterprise (proofreading documents) before the 
distribution. Strikingly, many of the Player 1s gave their Player 2 more 
than they kept for themselves—when their Player 2’s productive contri-
bution was greater. In fact, this “just deserts” behavior was the modal 
response—more frequent than egalitarian behavior, and much more fre-
quent than libertarian behavior. Ruffle (1998) and Konow (2000) report 
similar results.
Cappelen, Sørensen, and Tungodden (2010) ran an even more sophis-
ticated variant, which allowed for differences during the production 
phase in (1) working time, (2) productivity (defined as share of total 
output), and (3) value (as measured by price). This variant allowed the 
experimenters to test four different distributive norms: strict egalitarian-
ism, “choice egalitarianism” (income in proportion to working time), 
“meritocracy” (income in proportion to productivity), and libertarianism 
(under which people were held responsible for all factors affecting their 
income, including exogenous factors like price). The “meritocratic” norm 
dominated, preferred by 48 percent of the subjects (strict egalitarianism: 
20 percent, choice egalitarianism: 6 percent, libertarianism: 26 percent).
Now, the dictator game is limited in that it has no strategic component. 
Player 1, when deciding on how he will distribute the money, need not 
consider what Player 2 might do, since Player 2 cannot affect the distri-
bution. (For this reason, the dictator game is not technically a game.) 
Real-world economic distribution has an important and obvious strategic 
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component, and so in this respect, at least, it is better modeled by the 
ultimatum game.
Surprisingly, only recently was the ultimatum game expanded in the 
necessary way. To wit, Barber and English (Manuscript) report that in 
ultimatum games, as in dictator games, attention to players’ deserts is the 
driving norm. (See also Lee and Shahriar 2017.)
In the first phase of Barber and English’s experiment, subjects earned 
money for their performance on a spelling test. In the second phase, two 
of these subjects were paired, their earnings were pooled, and one of them 
was randomly designated as Player 1. In the third phase, Player 1 made an 
offer which was either accepted or rejected in the typical way.
Barber and English report three things: First, Player 1s offered more 
(48 percent of the total wealth, on average) than in the standard ultima-
tum game, with lower variance in offers. This is consonant with (1) Player 
1s recognizing that justice has a role to play in distribution, and (2) Player 
1s being guided by a common norm of justice.
Second, offers were proportional to earned wealth. That is, if Player 
1 earned $25 from the test and Player 2, $15, then Player 1 would offer 
Player 2 $15 during the distribution phase. Perfect proportionality was, 
in fact, the modal offer. Offers were almost never rejected.
Third, “low earners” (i.e. Player 1s who earned a smaller share of the 
total wealth) offered more to Player 2 than they kept for themselves. 
Again, this is at odds with the game-theoretic solution. It illustrates that 
there is moral psychology at work here which is not captured by standard 
ultimatum games.
Barber and English’s conclusions? That their experiment provides 
“strong evidence that when money available for redistribution was per-
ceived to be ‘earned’ this powerfully influenced preferences for redistribu-
tion”; that “considerations of ‘fairness’ influence people’s redistributive 
preferences”; and that fairness is “largely indexed to judgments of desert”.
Experimental economics has revealed an affection for desert in other 
contexts as well. One example is the adjudication of conflicting claims. 
Suppose that a bank fails, and its remaining assets are to be distributed 
to depositors—but these assets are insufficient to make everyone whole. 
How should they be distributed? Herrero, Moreno-Ternero, and Ponti 
(2010) examine how claimants can reach consensus in cases like this, 
finding that a desert rule—payment proportional to original asset share—
has unique power in reaching consensus.
And when objective observers are asked to select the just distributive 
rule in a variety of conflicting claims contexts (bankruptcy, estate divi-
sion, taxation), in all contexts, a desert rule is preferred. (See also Bos-
mans and Schokkaert 2009.)
None of these results from the economics literature come as a surprise 
to social psychologists, who have, over the last half-century, amassed an 
enormous literature showing that we are motivated by a sense of desert. 
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This is the core idea of equity theory, which is devoted to studying human 
beings’ ubiquitous urge to proportion the benefits that we receive from a 
social task to our contributions to it.
Equity theory originated in the work of Stacy Adams (1963, 1965), 
who noticed that human beings naturally seek to establish an equilibrium 
between contributions and rewards: If we are underpaid, we get angry; if 
we are overpaid, we feel guilty (see also Walster, Berscheid, and Walster 
1973). We are content only when rewards and contributions are in bal-
ance. When they are not, we modify our behavior on both the input side 
and the output side to reestablish the balance. Desert is the equilibrium 
condition.
What does this mean in practice? For one thing, our happiness turns on 
getting what we deserve. While it is true that we feel more distress when 
we are underpaid than when we are overpaid, we are happiest of all when 
we receive precisely what we deserve—no more, and no less (Austin and 
Walster 1974).
The same goes for job satisfaction. If a person believes that he is being 
paid too little or too much, in light of his contributions, he is less satisfied 
with his job than he would be were he paid what he thinks he deserves 
on the basis of his productivity (Pritchard, Dunnette, and Jorgenson 
1972). Moreover, inequity leads to bad behavior in the workplace: If pay 
cuts disrupt the equity equilibrium for some, employee theft rises. Why? 
Because in the eyes of those whose pay was cut, this restores the just bal-
ance (Greenberg 1990).
Human beings are not the only species that has a sense of justice. Other 
animals feel the drive too, and for them, as for us, justice is desert. Capu-
chin monkeys who complete the same task revolt when they see a peer get a 
more desirable reward; they’ve done the same work, so they want the same 
reward.1 (There are amusing videos online of monkeys throwing pieces of 
cucumber—the less desirable reward—at the faces of unjust researchers.)
The same is true of chimpanzees, who will sacrifice their own  interests—
refuse a reward—when they see an equally deserving peer receive less.2 
Aversion to inequity has also been observed in dogs (Range et al. 2009), 
cotton-top tamarins (Neiworth et al. 2009), long-tailed macaques (Massen 
et al. 2012), and squirrel monkeys (Talbot et al. 2011). This suggests an 
early evolutionary origin for desert.
To be fair, the evidence supporting justice-as-desert is less robust in 
non-human animals, owing to difficulties in experimental design. But this 
is an area of active research; researchers like Sarah Brosnan at Georgia 
State are developing experiments to test how far members of other species 
will go to ensure that they and their peers get their just deserts.
Recent neurological research supports the idea that desert has a unique 
role in human morality. Cappelen et al. (2014) monitored people’s brains 
while exposing them to egalitarian and desert-based economic distribu-
tions. No unusual activity was noted in the former case, but when a 
46 On Justice
subject saw people getting their just deserts, his striatum—the part of the 
brain managing behavior and moral choice—lit up.
The empirical literature on justice generally, and justice-as-desert specifi-
cally, is enormous; I can only provide a summary of the main findings here. 
I do want to caution that specific results turn on subtleties of experimental 
design, and to say that we are sure that justice simply is desert is too quick. 
Better to say that it has been conclusively demonstrated that “the concepts 
of moral desert and justice are deeply connected, and one needs the other 
for a proper definition” (Rustichini and Vostroknutov 2014).
Despite the dominance of desert, might other moral ideals play a role 
in our economic life? The answer is yes—but conceptual care is needed.
James Konow—in my view, the world’s leading researcher on positive 
justice—concludes that justice is, indeed, simply a matter of giving people 
what they deserve. Our guiding norm is what he calls an “accountability 
principle”, which holds that rewards ought to be proportional to produc-
tivity (Konow 1996, 2001). This is essentially the meritocratic distribu-
tive norm for income.
But, like me, Konow is not an extreme monist about desert. On his 
assessment, desert is not the only thing that is morally relevant to eco-
nomic distribution for human beings. It is simply the most important 
thing. Also relevant are (1) efficiency and (2) ensuring that people’s mini-
mal needs are met.
This view is consonant with both my conceptual analysis of economic 
morality and our natural language use. To reiterate, suppose that we are 
deciding between two distributions, A and B. In A the social product is 
distributed such that everybody gets exactly what he deserves. In B, there 
is a deviation from desert, but the social product is greater. It seems to me 
that if the desert deviation in B got small enough, or the social product dif-
ference big enough, we would, eventually, prefer B to A on moral grounds.
Just how strong is our independent attention to efficiency? Within the 
context of a voting game, Bolton and Ockenfels (2000, 2006) find that 
it is weak:
[The] willingness to pay for social efficiency is rather low, and as a 
social good, equity [i.e. justice] is in greater demand. One way to 
gauge the magnitude of the difference is to note that . . . an efficiency 
proposal that benefits two-thirds of the group was overridden by a 
coalition of the potential losers, together with the potential winners 
sympathetic to equity.
 (2006: 1909)
As an aside, considerations of efficiency appear to play a larger role 
in the moral calculus of the young and the educated. Therefore, because 
experiments often use college students as subjects, the literature may 
overstate the moral relevance of efficiency.3
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Similarly, if C is more perfect than D from the point-of-view of justice, 
but C has many more people under the sufficiency line, we might prefer 
D to C.
A few analytical points. First, it is hard, probably impossible, to know 
what the precise numbers involved are. How much efficiency should 
we give up for a given improvement in desert? I have no idea. What we 
know is that the most important moral consideration is justice, by which 
we mean giving people what they deserve. Sufficiency is of secondary 
importance. And efficiency is the weakest part of the moral triad (“even 
the ostensibly innocuous Pareto Principle loses support when it conflicts 
with accountability [i.e. desert]” (Konow 2001: 148)).
Second, the sufficiency principle is not a proxy for equality or priority. 
What is important to us, morally, is that we lift citizens above a minimum 
distributive floor.4 If everyone were above this floor, then, ceteris paribus, 
we wouldn’t regard the neediest person as having any moral claim on 
goods. As Konow puts it, “when needs are satisfied, this term falls away 
as a distributional concern” (2001: 151).
Third, one way to avoid having to come down on how to balance these 
three moral desiderata is to endorse an economic approach that promotes 
all of them. Meritocracy does this.
I’ll note here that sufficientarian concerns will be far less acute in a 
meritocracy than they actually are. For one thing, meritocracy rewards 
productive activity, thus incentivizing people to develop their human 
capital. And we know from historical experience and economic theory 
that productivity is ultimately what lifts a society out of poverty.
In addition, establishing equal opportunity goes a long way toward 
meeting citizens’ basic needs. All children will be lifted above the suf-
ficiency line by the definition of equal opportunity. As far as adults are 
concerned, equal opportunity measures ensure that everyone, save the 
seriously disabled (who are protected—§6.10), has the necessary human 
capital to ensure sufficiency for themselves. Only those who fail such 
self-provision, whether by choice or not, would require public aid. Only 
this residual could conflict with justice. (See the discussion of the social 
safety net, in §6.10.)
Fourth, admitting need and efficiency into our moral calculus does 
not make us pluralists about justice. Need and efficiency compete with 
justice. That is, they compete with desert. This is not merely a linguistic 
point. It seems to me that some of the normative disputes within the dis-
tributive justice debate result from failing to identify the proper domains 
of the moral principles we think relevant to economic distribution. As 
Konow observes,
Efficiency and needs exist as distributional goods distinct from jus-
tice, whereas accountability [i.e. desert] represents the distinguish-
ing feature of justice. . . . Although substantial evidence has been 
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presented in the foregoing sections that efficiency and needs impact 
and sometimes even dominate experiential justice, some readers view 
certain scenarios featuring those principles as being rather ‘forced’ to 
think of in justice terms, to which I respond: ‘Precisely!’ They lack the 
specific sense of justice, and this intuition adds support, I believe, to 
the contention that accountability [desert] is specific justice, indeed 
that accountability [desert] is the quintessence of justice.
(2001: 156–7, emphasis in original)
We must be pluralists about morality, but most of us knew this anyway. 
What is surprising is that we need not be pluralists about justice. Desert 
captures what that concept means to us, and everything it means to us.
3.3  Children and Justice
Beginning with the work of the Swiss clinical psychologist, Jean Piaget 
(1932), researchers have explicated and verified a standard model of 
moral development in human beings.5 It goes roughly like this: From 
birth until age five, children act selfishly—we might say, not entirely 
fairly, that they act like little libertarians. This selfish norm—which 
governs behavior across spheres of justice—is replaced by a concern for 
equality. But as their cognition develops, children gain the concept of 
desert and replace equality with equity (i.e. reward in proportion to con-
tribution). That process culminates around the onset of puberty, and the 
desert norm dominates throughout adulthood, as I have described. In this 
sense, meritocratic distributive justice is a fuller expression of our moral 
cognition than libertarianism or egalitarianism is.
On top of this, there is evidence that very young children—infants, 
even—possess a sense of desert-based justice. This is significant because 
desert is a much more sophisticated concept than self-interest or equality; 
it requires understanding that people contribute to a process, assessing 
the size of those contributions, assessing the outputs of the process, and 
making relevant comparisons. These conceptual demands outstrip the 
cognitive capacity of young children. Therefore, any sense of desert-based 
justice which babies do have reflects an innate, culturally independent, 
genetic basis of human morality. I stress that children continue to behave, 
broadly speaking, selfishly—as described by the standard model of moral 
development. But these results are important because they suggest that 
selfish behavior and, later, egalitarian behavior are really biases rather 
than manifestations of an underlying moral code that changes over time.6
For example, Sloane, Baillargeon, and Premack (2012) found evidence 
of desert-based justice in 21-month-olds. In their experiment, infants 
watched two people working together (putting away toys) for a reward 
(a sticker). In the first scenario, the two people divided the work evenly, 
putting away an equal numbers of toys, and were then both rewarded 
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with a sticker. In the second scenario, one person put away all the toys 
while the other continued playing, and then, as in the first scenario, both 
received stickers. Infants visually fixated on the second scenario, suggest-
ing that they found something amiss: “21-month-olds expect individuals 
to be rewarded according to their efforts: Infants . . . detected a violation 
when the worker and the slacker were rewarded equally” (p. 202).
Similarly, Baumard, Mascaro, and Chevallier (2012) asked 3- and 
4-year-olds to watch two characters, Amélie and Hélène, bake cookies 
together. These preschoolers were then tasked with distributing cookies 
to the two characters. When Hélène got bored midway through, stop-
ping work to play with dolls, the preschoolers would give Amélie the 
large cookie and Hélène the small one. Why? In the words of one child, 
“because Amélie prepared more”.
3.4  Cultural Stability and Support for Redistribution
It is reasonable to worry that our intuitions about justice are mere arti-
facts of the cultures in which we are raised. After all, the subjects in most 
of the experiments cited are Westerners—indeed, many are students at 
Western research universities, which is an unrepresentative demographic. 
And in these cultures, the argument goes, institutions that may well be 
unjust—private property, say—shape moral sentiment from an early age. 
If this is so, then perhaps intuition counts for nothing from the justifica-
tory point-of-view.
I shall discuss the justificatory status of intuition in §3.6. I note, first, 
that this argument is contradicted by the findings, already discussed, that 
very young children have a common sense of justice, and by the cited 
work in neuroeconomics. In a way, the diversity of support for desert is 
as wide as it could possibly be, given that it appears to include not just 
human beings but other animals as well.
Nevertheless, it is worth considering what we ought to make of con-
flicts between intuitions—were it to come to that. We might think, as 
above, that any such conflicts would reveal that one or more of the intu-
itions at play is biased for reasons of cultural contingency.
But there is a second way to think about things. Perhaps conflicting 
intuitions are like conflicting observations in the physical sciences. To 
regard one or both of them as wrong simpliciter is a mistake. Rather, 
conflicts reveal the need for more fine-grained empirical investigation. 
Such investigation can produce consensus.
For example, blacks are much more likely to regard affirmative action 
as just than whites are. The right response is not to assume that bias is 
present—that this is because blacks are helped by affirmative action and 
whites are hurt by it—but to investigate more closely this prima facie 
conflict. We might conjecture that blacks and whites actually agree on the 
underlying moral principle—namely, that a less-qualified black should 
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not be hired over a more-qualified white. We might further conjecture 
that what they disagree about is a much less serious, purely positive 
matter—whether real-world affirmative action programs violate that 
principle. Whites might think it does; blacks might think that affirmative 
action simply serves to offset anti-meritocratic bias in hiring.
And this is, indeed, what some research suggests. For example, Son Hing, 
Bobocel, and Zanna (2002) find that among people who care strongly 
about merit in hiring, support for affirmative action rises with the percep-
tion of discrimination in the workplace. People understand that, in these 
cases, affirmative action ensures that blacks are judged on their merits.
In any event, we find consensus, not conflict, across contexts (intuitions 
about justice, epistemology, etc.) and across demographic lines (national-
ity, race, gender, etc.) Let’s consider nationality. We are most concerned 
with economic justice, of course. This is how Konow describes the state 
of research: “The striking similarity of responses to fairness survey ques-
tions among subjects in different countries . . . suggests little variation in 
notions of fairness across this contextual dimension [nationality], the one 
across which it would be perhaps most expected” (1996: 15).
My favorite test of the cross-cultural stability of our judgments about 
justice was conducted during what was arguably the world’s most ideo-
logically polarized moment—the Cold War. American citizens, living 
under free market capitalism, and Soviet citizens, living under socialist 
central planning (and the Soviet propaganda machine), were interviewed 
about their views on economic justice. Little difference was found in their 
normative judgments, despite the huge economic, political, and cultural 
differences among them. When it came to income, “most Soviet econo-
mists appeared to advocate what one might call a meritocratic structure 
of wages” (McAuley 1980: 242).
Later, after the breakup of the Soviet Union, Alwin, Gornev, and 
Khakhulina (1995) surveyed citizens of postcommunist nations like Bul-
garia, Poland, and Russia; citizens of welfare states like the Netherlands; 
and citizens of Japan and the United States. Majorities in every country 
opposed equality as the fair principle of distribution. Majorities in every 
country agreed that those who work harder deserve a higher income.
Although my prime concern is the cultural and socioeconomic invari-
ance of moral intuition, it is worth noting that epistemological intuitions 
are invariant as well. For example, intuitions about Gettier cases (Gettier 
1963) are universal—there are no differences across cultures or across 
socioeconomic strata.7 And we know that men and women share the 
same epistemological and moral intuitions.8
Here is how Joshua Knobe, experimental philosopher, summarizes 
things:9
Some commenters seem to assume that it is somehow built into the 
mission of experimental philosophy as a field that part of its aim 
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is to show that intuitions vary from one demographic group to the 
next and that appeals to intuitions are therefore methodologically 
suspect. As anyone who actually works in experimental philosophy 
will know, this assumption is wildly incorrect. . . . Consider again 
the particular case of research on the relationship between philo-
sophical intuitions and demographic factors (ethnicity, gender, age, 
etc.). It is true that some experimental philosophy studies have sug-
gested that people’s intuitions vary with demographic factors, but 
there have also been a very large number of studies exploring the 
ways in which people’s intuitions do not vary with these factors. In 
fact, my sense is that the majority of experimental philosophy stud-
ies on this topic actually come down on this second side, exploring 
ways in which people’s intuitions are surprisingly invariant across 
demographic variables that one would have thought would make 
a difference.
Of special interest to us is how economic redistribution is regarded 
across socioeconomic lines. Implementing any patterned theory of justice, 
including meritocracy, requires redistribution. And we should like, if 
possible, to advance a theory whose redistributive demands are broadly 
acceptable. If they are regarded as too outrageous, they will not be viable 
(and so perhaps they fail qua theoretical principles, for the reasons given 
in §2.4).
Christina Fong (2001) finds that Americans’ socioeconomic status is a 
poor predictor of their support for redistribution. The strongest predic-
tors of support for redistribution are, instead, beliefs that (1) bad luck, 
and not effort, is the cause of poverty; (2) opportunity is lacking; and (3) 
good luck, and not effort, produces wealth. That is, redistribution is mor-
ally justified when equal opportunity was lacking or goods are obtained 
on grounds other than merit. This lines up precisely with the conceptual 
structure of meritocracy.
Alesina and Angeletos (2005) explain cross-national differences in sup-
port for redistribution in the same way.
If a society believes that individual effort determines income, and that 
all have a right to enjoy the fruits of their effort, it will choose low 
redistribution and low taxes. In equilibrium, effort will be high and 
the role of luck will be limited, in which case market outcomes will 
be relatively fair and social beliefs will be self-fulfilled. If, instead, 
a society believes that luck, birth, connections, and/or corruption 
determine wealth, it will levy high taxes.
(p. 960)
People across cultures and socioeconomic lines regard welfare pro-
grams as just or unjust by looking at the deservingness of those who 
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benefit from them: “In essence, utilizing a ‘deservingness heuristic,’ 
individuals across cultural divides, welfare state regimes, ideology, and 
political sophistication support welfare benefits for recipients who are 
perceived as hard-working and reject welfare benefits for recipients who 
are perceived to be lazy” (Aarøe and Petersen 2014: 685).10
This deservingness heuristic has an evolutionary origin: It is an adap-
tive trait, regulating small-scale interaction (Petersen 2012). It was easier 
for early humans to obtain food and shelter if they worked together, but 
there was then, as there is now, a risk of free riding: One might contribute 
to a shared project in good faith only to watch another abscond with the 
goods. Thus, it was useful to be able to distinguish the “cheaters” from 
the “reciprocators”.11
The deservingness heuristic is rooted in evolved cognitive categories 
designed to detect and represent ‘cheaters’ and ‘reciprocators’. . . . 
The cross-cultural nature of the present evidence supports the view 
that these categories are not learned. Rather, they are something we 
as humans naturally come equipped with.
(Petersen 2012, p. 12)
Perhaps most striking—at least from the perspective of a twenty-first 
century American, observing all the Sturm und Drang about economic 
injustice—is that there actually is consensus among Americans about the 
structure of a just economy.
Majorities in all ideological and economic groups, including Republi-
cans and the wealthy, agree that income inequality is too great. Of course, 
it appears that their real objection is not to the inequality per se, but to 
what it illuminates: a failure to give people their just deserts. We know 
that majorities in all ideological and economic groups believe that the 
government should intervene as a result. We know that majorities in all 
ideological and economic groups wish to protect equality of opportunity 
while allowing for differences in economic outcomes. We know, in sum, 
that everyone wants to live in a meritocracy:
The public strongly supports educational initiatives to expand oppor-
tunity and create a society based on meritocracy in which work and 
education pay off. . . . In order to provide both genuine opportunity 
and a measure of economic security—large majorities of Americans 
favor a number of specific government programs that go well beyond 
education policy. . . . Support for these government programs comes 
from all sectors of society: from Republicans, from self-described 
middle-class and upper-class people, from whites, and from those 
with high incomes, as well as from Democrats, working-class people, 
African Americans, and lower-income citizens.
(Page and Jacobs 2009: 22–23)
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3.5  Rejecting Rawlsian Justice
The purpose of this book is to construct, not to criticize. I am advancing 
my own theory of justice, and explain how other theories go wrong only 
insofar as it serves that purpose.
Nevertheless, I do want to pay special attention to Rawls. Not only 
was he the most important political philosopher of the contemporary era, 
he, more than anyone else, is responsible for desert’s dismissal from the 
distributive justice debate. Many philosophers assume that Rawls pretty 
well killed off the concept in A Theory of Justice, but, as we shall see 
(Chapter 7), this is not so.
Rawls arrives at his distributive rule—the difference principle—via a 
two-stage process. The first stage is normative. Rawls proposes a method 
by which we may discover the truth about justice. Namely: We identify 
the principles of justice that citizens would choose, were they to bargain 
over these on equal terms and under conditions of very limited infor-
mation (no information about race, social class, gender—all the things 
obscured by the veil of ignorance). And those counterfactually chosen 
principles, whatever they be, are the ones that we actually ought to 
implement.
The second stage is positive. Rawls claims that suitably situated citi-
zens (i.e. citizens in the original position) would in fact choose (1) equal 
liberties, (2) fair equality of opportunity, and (3) the difference principle.
As Rawls himself recognized, these two stages are conceptually dis-
tinct; one may endorse his normative set-up without endorsing his posi-
tive conclusions: “One may accept the first part of the theory . . . but not 
the other, and conversely. The concept of the initial contractual situation 
may seem reasonable although the particular principles proposed are 
rejected” (1971: 15).
Thus, to arrive at Rawlsian egalitarianism, it is insufficient to find his 
fairness ideal compelling; one must also endorse his positive assessment 
of contractors’ reasoning. Although Rawls does explain why he thinks 
contractors would choose his preferred principles of justice, that is at base 
speculation about a purely positive matter.
Some philosophers believe that Rawlsian contractors would not, in 
fact, select the conservative difference principle; some have suggested that 
they would instead choose distribution based on desert.12 Contractors’ 
reasoning might go like this: “While I don’t know whom I will be in my 
new society, however things turn out I want to have the ability to achieve 
on the basis of my character, effort, and interests. I want to be able to 
realize my chosen plan-of-life the best that I can. I may face natural dis-
advantage. But I may enjoy advantage as well. Most probably, like just 
about everybody else, I will face some combination of the two. I know 
that since my society will be characterized by fair equality of opportunity 
and meritocratic selection, whether I succeed or fail will truly be up to 
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me. So I don’t want an egalitarian distributive scheme. I want only to 
get what I deserve.” This reasoning is perhaps even more plausible if the 
desert-based theory under contemplation includes a social safety net, 
which meritocracy does (§6.10).
Ultimately, though, we can conclude little from mere speculation. Rawl-
sian contractors are very thinly defined and thus ripe targets for manipula-
tion: We know which distributive rule we want, and so we generate a story 
about how to fill up these empty vessels. As R. M. Hare puts it, “the truth 
is that it is a wide open question how the POPs [parties in the original 
position] would choose; [Rawls] has reduced the information available 
to them and about them so much that it is hard to say what they would 
choose, unless his own intuitions supply the lack” (Hare 1973: 250).
The principled way to investigate this matter is through experiment. 
We can put human beings into the original position, as best we are able, 
and then observe their bargaining behavior. Do they choose the difference 
principle?
Experimenters have done precisely this, and the answer is “no”. Not 
only do contractors in the original position not choose the difference 
principle, it is among the most unpopular of distributive rules, if not the 
most unpopular.
Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and Eavey (1987) ran an experiment in which 
subjects were familiarized with four potential distributive rules: maximiz-
ing the minimum income (i.e. the difference principle); maximizing the 
average income; maximizing the average income with a floor constraint; 
and maximizing the average income with both floor and ceiling constraints.
Subjects were then asked to bargain over the distributive rule that 
would govern the allocation of actual money to them. This was done 
under conditions of limited information to simulate the original position. 
Subjects knew only that (1) if they reached unanimous consensus on a 
rule, then they would be paid from an allocation that conformed to that 
rule; and (2) if unanimous consensus was not reached, they would be 
paid according to an allocation randomly chosen from the full set of pos-
sibilities. In this way, these “contractors” were behind a veil of ignorance: 
They didn’t know the “personal facts” that would determine their places 
within a particular payoff. But they did have the ability to constrain that 
through selection of a distributive rule.
Of the 44 runs of this experiment, consensus was reached 44 times. So 
one of Rawls’s positive conjectures was verified: “A ‘veil of ignorance’ 
permits a group to reach stable decisions in which they have considerable 
confidence” (Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and Eavey 1987: 628).
But Rawls’s other conjecture was not verified: The difference principle 
was not the most popular distributive rule. In fact, it was never chosen. 
Dominant was maximization of average income, subject to a floor con-
straint. This rule was chosen by 35 of the 44 groups. The experiment was 
later replicated in Poland (Lissowski, Tyszka, and Okrasa 1991).
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Unfortunately, experimental design did not permit the robust test of a 
desert principle. Although subjects were in theory free to reach consensus 
on whatever distributive rule they liked, they were strongly primed with 
the four principles given above: They read a text introducing those prin-
ciples and only those principles; they then were asked to rank the four; 
they then read several examples of allocations under those principles; 
they were then given a test on those principles; and they were again asked 
to rank them. (See also Frohlich and Oppenheimer 1992.)
So far as I am aware, there have been no subsequent experiments test-
ing this part of Rawls’s theory. My prediction is that a suitably designed 
experiment would show that desert wins the day. Because I reject Rawls’s 
normative set-up, this is immaterial to my argument; but it could bring 
new adherents to the cause of desert—namely, those convinced by Raw-
ls’s ideal of fairness.
An updated, large-scale, and sophisticated test of reasoning in the 
original principle would be an excellent project for an experimental 
philosopher to undertake. All that can be said conclusively at this point 
is that “empirical studies provide almost no support for egalitarianism, 
understood as equality of outcomes, or for Rawls’s difference principle” 
(Konow 2003: 1199).
3.6  The Importance of Intuition
What is the theoretical relevance of our ubiquitous and deep intuition 
that justice is giving people what they deserve? Answering this question 
in a fully satisfactory way would require a separate monograph; the jus-
tificatory status of intuition is a complicated matter. Here I only wish to 
summarize the prevailing wisdom and offer a few new thoughts of my 
own.
There are skeptics who believe that intuition has no justificatory power 
whatsoever.13 These skeptics should skip this section. I note, for the lay 
reader, that while the skeptical view is a minority one among philoso-
phers, it is not ridiculous.
But it has a principal problem: It requires that we endorse deeply coun-
terintuitive moral results so long as the theories that produced them have 
desired structural features.
Imagine, for example, a theory of justice that is consistent, complete, 
elegant—as structurally virtuous as you like. The theory also holds 
that it is just to torture infants for fun. Now, coming to grips with this 
theory means either (1) allowing ourselves to be swayed by its structural 
virtues, and thus endorsing the torture of infants for fun; or (2) viewing 
that deeply counterintuitive result as grounds to believe that the theory 
is flawed. These considerations come in degrees, of course—I give an 
extreme example here—but if we believe that there is some point at which 
intuition can undermine a theory, we cannot be skeptics.
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So: Setting the skeptical concern aside, there are five reasons why the 
intuitive consensus about justice-as-desert is important. First, there is 
a view of justification, which is admittedly unpopular within political 
philosophy, and which I regard as erroneous, but which has an estimable 
pedigree within the analytic tradition and does have adherents.14 For 
these thinkers, the task of philosophy is simply to extract and analyze 
concepts from our intuitions. If that is so, then this chapter decisively 
establishes the truth of meritocracy; all that is required for political phi-
losophers to do is to provide a more precise definition of “meritocracy”.
Second, there is the prevailing view of justification—the view I 
endorse—which is that our intuitions play a role in a process of reflec-
tive equilibrium.15 We cannot blindly obey the dictates of theory, for that 
leads to the possibility of engaging in what appears to be plainly immoral 
conduct, as above. At the same time, pure intuitionism provides no way 
to systematically resolve disputes that arise when intuitions conflict—as 
they often do. So we seek a balance: We verify the truth of a theory, to 
some extent, by comparing it to our intuitions; and in those cases where 
intuitions clash, we look to theory for help.
Among those who subscribe to the method of reflective equilibrium, 
there are differences of opinion about how much our theories should 
defer to our intuitions. I tend to agree with Saul Kripke, who puts it with 
his characteristic eloquence:
Some philosophers think that something’s having intuitive content 
is very inconclusive evidence in favor of it. I think it is very heavy 
evidence in favor of anything, myself. I really don’t know, in a way, 
what more conclusive evidence one can have about anything, ulti-
mately speaking.
(1972: 42)
In any case, intuition has some justificatory power for everyone who 
subscribes to the method of reflective equilibrium. Why, then, is concrete 
analysis of intuition so rare in political theory? Nozick pays the matter no 
mind whatsoever. Rawls does better, in that he at least offers a conjecture 
about what his contractors would choose from the original position. But 
he adduces no empirical data for his view, which we now know (§3.5) 
is erroneous. The luck egalitarian probably does best of all—a typically-
cited motivation for luck egalitarianism is to capture our pre-theoretical 
affection for personal responsibility. But that talk about intuition tends to 
be hand-wavy; I do not recall a single citation to the empirical literature 
in any of the foundational luck egalitarian articles.
I think the reason why this is so is that philosophers worry that our 
intuitions are tainted by cultural contingencies. In this way, philosophers 
can accept a justificatory role for intuition while devaluing those intu-
itions that we actually have. This is convenient for them, since our actual 
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intuitions conflict with their theories. But this should only be a concern if 
our relevant intuitions are in fact severely contingent. And we have seen 
that our intuitions about justice are not.
Third, intuition is relevant for the non-ideal reasons covered in §2.4. 
Unless we know that citizens would be sufficiently motivated to comply 
with some theory, we are simply unjustified in believing that it is a guide 
to justice. So long as that is our goal, intuitions constrain our theorizing. 
And when the intuitions are deep, and when they are broad—as is the 
case with our intuitions about desert—these constraints are tight.
Fourth, it is dangerous to violate our meritocratic intuitions. When 
people feel that the distributive system they live under is unjust, they 
regard themselves as justified in violating it in the name of justice.
By way of illustration, suppose that Mary, a teacher, gets in a car acci-
dent with Chad, an investment banker. And Mary feels, apart from all 
of this, that teachers make less than they should and investment bankers 
make more. Although Mary is uninjured in the accident, she lies and says 
that she is, suing Chad for damages. The lie does not strike Mary as an 
immoral one, since its result will be, by her lights, to restore the just bal-
ance. And that might well be true: Mary’s duplicity might lead to a more 
just distributive pattern.
At the same time, Chad correctly regards Mary as a liar. Perhaps he 
generalizes this judgment to her profession or gender. The legal system 
gets clogged with a claim that in some sense never should have been 
made. Part of the social product is used up in litigation. Class divisions 
harden. And the social stability is, in the large, undermined. In this way, 
the more counterintuitive a theory is, the more unstable the political sys-
tem within which it operates. In contrast, if people feel, intuitively, that 
a theory is just, then a system based on it can maintain an equilibrium.
Fifth, there is something odd about imposing a distributive pattern, 
whatever its theoretical virtues, on people who do not want it because 
they think it unjust. To take the extreme case, imagine a world in which 
there is perfect consensus on the just distributive principle(s). People live 
under it, inevitably some win and some lose, but everyone believes that 
their society is just. Then some clever philosopher among them devel-
ops what he believes to be the True Theory of Distributive Justice, and 
he seeks to implement it. One consequence is that everyone becomes 
unhappy with the state of justice in their society. It is unclear to me what 
this philosopher has accomplished, morally. Perhaps he has accomplished 
something—perhaps the people are being brought to a morally better 
place, and perhaps they will recognize this in due course. But surely 
reaching consensus on justice would be a moral victory, not to be given 
up lightly.
Obviously I think such a consensus has already been reached—on 
desert-based justice generally and meritocracy specifically. But even more 
striking is the consensus that competing theories of justice are wrong. 
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Rawls’s theory is the most roundly rejected here (§3.5), but this is only 
because it has been the most widely tested. I suspect that Nozick’s night-
watchman state would strike people as even less morally plausible. The 
simple fact is that no one wants to live under these distributive systems. 
Blacks don’t want to, whites don’t want to; men don’t want to, women 
don’t want to; the poor don’t want to, the rich don’t want to. How can 
we regard this as anything but a flaw, indeed a fatal one?
Notes
 1 See Brosnan and de Waal (2003) and Takimoto, Kuroshima, and Fujita 
(2010).
 2 See Brosnan, Schiff, and de Waal (2005) and Brosnan et al. (2010).
 3 See Fehr, Naef, and Schmidt (2006) and Pelligra and Stanca (2013). Relat-
edly, in ultimatum and dictator games, young people and the educated show 
less interest in considerations of justice and greater attention to self-interest 
( Bellemare, Kröger, and van Soest 2008).
 4 The landmark normative work here is Frankfurt (1987).
 5 See, e.g. Damon (1977) and Hook and Cook (1979).
 6 See especially Hamann, Bender, and Tomasello (2014) and Kanngiesser and 
Warneken (2012).
 7 See Kim and Yuan (2015); Machery et al. (2017); and Seyedsayamdost 
(2015).
 8 See, e.g. Adleberg, Thompson, and Nahmias (2015) and Sinnott-Armstrong 
et al. (2008).
 9 <http://philosophycommons.typepad.com/xphi/2015/08/what-has- 
experimental-philosophy-discovered-about-demographic-effects.html>, 
retrieved 19 June 2017.
10 See also Fong, Bowles, and Gintis (2006) and Gilens (1999).
11 See also Aarøe and Petersen (2014); Petersen et al. (2011); and Petersen et al. 
(2012).
12 E.g. Daniels (1978); Holmgren (1986); and Sterba (1974).
13 Skeptics about intuition include Singer (1974, 2005) and Williamson (2004).
14 E.g. Audi (2004); Huemer (2005); and Shafer-Landau (2005). The progenitor 
of intuitionism is Sidgwick (1874).
15 See Goodman (1955) and Rawls (1971).
3.7  References
Aarøe, L. and Petersen, M. B. 2014. Crowding out culture: Scandinavians and 
Americans agree on social welfare in the face of deservingness cues. Journal of 
Politics 76: 684–97.
Adams, J. S. 1963. Toward an understanding of inequity. Journal of Abnormal 
Psychology 67: 422–36.
———. 1965. Inequity in social exchange. In Advances in Experimental Social 
Psychology, Volume 2, ed. L. Berkowitz, 267–99. New York: Academic Press.
Adleberg, T., Thompson, M., and Nahmias, E. 2015. Do men and women have 
different philosophical intuitions? Further data. Philosophical Psychology 28: 
615–41.
What We Think About Justice 59
Alesina, A. and Angeletos, G.-M. 2005. Fairness and redistribution. American 
Economic Review 95: 960–80.
Alwin, D. F., Gornev, G., and Khakhulina, L. 1995. Comparative referential 
structures, system legitimacy, and justice sentiments: An international com-
parison. In Social Justice and Political Change: Public Opinion in Capitalist 
and Post-Communist States, eds. J. R. Kluegel, D. S. Mason, and B. Wegener, 
109–30. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
Audi, R. 2004. The Good in the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Austin, W. and Walster, E. 1974. Reactions to confirmations and disconfirma-
tions of expectancies of equity and inequity. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology 30: 208–16.
Barber, B. and English, W. Manuscript. Divide our dollars, not divide the dollar: 
Redistribution, fairness, and the ultimatum game.
Baumard, N., Mascaro, O., and Chevallier, C. 2012. Preschoolers are able to 
take merit into account when distributing goods. Developmental Psychology 
48: 492–8.
Bellemare, C., Kröger, S., and van Soest, A. 2008. Measuring inequity aversion in 
a heterogeneous population using experimental decisions and subjective prob-
abilities. Econometrica 76: 815–39.
Bolton, G. E. and Ockenfels, A. 2000. ERC: A theory of equity, reciprocity, and 
competition. American Economic Review 90: 166–93.
———. 2006. Inequality aversion, efficiency, and maximin preferences in simple 
distribution experiments: Comment. American Economic Review 96: 1906–11.
Bosmans, K. and Schokkaert, E. 2009. Equality preference in the claims problem: 
A questionnaire study of cuts in earnings and pensions. Social Choice and 
Welfare 33: 533–57.
Brosnan, S. F. and de Waal, F. B. M. 2003. Monkeys reject unequal pay. Nature 
425: 297–9.
Brosnan, S. F., Schiff, H. C., and de Waal, F. B. M. 2005. Tolerance for inequity 
may increase with social closeness in chimpanzees. Proceedings of the Royal 
Society B: Biological Sciences 272: 253–8.
Brosnan, S. F., Talbot, C., Ahlgren, M., Lambeth, S. P., and Schapiro, S. J. 2010. 
Mechanisms underlying responses to inequitable outcomes in chimpanzees, 
Pan Troglodytes. Animal Behaviour 79: 1229–37.
Cappelen, A. W., Eichele, T., Hugdahl, K., Specht, K., Sørensen, E. Ø., and Tun-
godden, B. 2014. Equity theory and fair inequality: A neuroeconomic study. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 111: 15368–72.
Cappelen, A. W., Sørensen, E. Ø., and Tungodden, B. 2010. Responsibility for 
what? Fairness and individual responsibility. European Economic Review 54: 
429–41.
Damon, W. 1977. The Social World of the Child. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Daniels, N. 1978. Merit and meritocracy. Philosophy & Public Affairs 7: 206–23.
Engel, C. 2011. Dictator games: A meta study. Experimental Economics 14: 
583–610.
Fehr, E., Naef, M., and Schmidt, K. M. 2006. Inequality aversion, efficiency, and 
maximin preferences in simple distribution experiments: Comment. American 
Economic Review 96: 1912–17.
60 On Justice
Fong, C. M. 2001. Social preferences, self-interest, and the demand for redistribu-
tion. Journal of Public Economics 82: 225–46.
Fong, C. M., Bowles, S., and Gintis, H. 2006. Strong reciprocity and the welfare 
state. In Handbook of the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity, 
Volume 2, eds. S.-C. Kolm and J. M. Ythier, 1439–64. Amsterdam: North- 
Holland.
Frankfurt, H. 1987. Equality as a moral ideal. Ethics 98: 21–43.
Frohlich, N. and Oppenheimer, J. A. 1992. Choosing Justice: An Experimental 
Approach to Ethical Theory. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Frohlich, N., Oppenheimer, J. A., and Eavey, C. L. 1987. Choices of principles 
of distributive justice in experimental groups. American Journal of Political 
Science 31: 606–36.
Frohlich, N., Oppenheimer, J. A., and Kurki, A. 2004. Modeling other-regarding 
preferences and an experimental test. Public Choice 119: 91–117.
Gettier, E. L. 1963. Is justified true belief knowledge? Analysis 23: 121–3.
Gilens, M. 1999. Why Americans Hate Welfare: Race, Media, and the Politics of 
Antipoverty Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Goodman, N. 1955. Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press.
Greenberg, J. 1990. Employee theft as a reaction to underpayment inequity: The 
hidden cost of pay cuts. Journal of Applied Psychology 75: 561–8.
Güth, W., Schmittberger, R., and Schwarze, B. 1982. An experimental analysis 
of ultimatum bargaining. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 3: 
367–88.
Hamann, K., Bender, J., and Tomasello, M. 2014. Meritocratic sharing is based 
on collaboration in 3-year-olds. Developmental Psychology 50: 121–8.
Hare, R. M. 1973. Rawls’ theory of justice—II. Philosophical Quarterly 23: 
241–52.
Herrero, C., Moreno-Ternero, J. D., and Ponti, G. 2010. On the adjudication 
of conflicting claims: An experimental study. Social Choice and Welfare 34: 
145–79.
Holmgren, M. 1986. Justifying desert claims: Desert and opportunity. Journal of 
Value Inquiry 20: 265–78.
Hook, J. G. and Cook, T. D. 1979. Equity theory and the cognitive ability of 
children. Psychological Bulletin 86: 429–45.
Huemer, M. 2005. Ethical Intuitionism. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Kanngiesser, P. and Warneken, F. 2012. Young children consider merit when shar-
ing resources with others. Plos One 7: 1–5.
Kim, M. and Yuan, Y. 2015. No cross-cultural differences in the Gettier car case 
intuition: A replication study of Weinberg et al. 2001. Episteme 12: 355–61.
Konow, J. 1996. A positive theory of economic fairness. Journal of Economic 
Behavior & Organization 31: 13–35.
———. 2000. Fair shares: Accountability and cognitive dissonance in allocation 
decisions. American Economic Review 90: 1072–91.
———. 2001. Fair and square: The four sides of distributive justice. Journal of 
Economic Behavior & Organization 46: 137–64.
———. 2003. Which is the fairest one of all? A positive analysis of justice theo-
ries. Journal of Economic Literature 41: 1188–239.
Kripke, S. A. 1972. Naming and Necessity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
What We Think About Justice 61
Lee, K. and Shahriar, Q. 2017. Fairness, one’s source of income, and others’ deci-
sions: An ultimatum game experiment. Managerial and Decision Economics 
38: 423–31.
Lissowski, G., Tyszka, T., and Okrasa, W. 1991. Principles of distributive jus-
tice: Experiments in Poland and America. Journal of Conflict Resolution 35: 
98–119.
Machery, E., Stich, S., Rose, D., Chatterjee, A., Karasawa, K., Struchiner, N., 
Sirker, S., Usui, N., and Hashimoto, T. 2017. Gettier across cultures. Noûs 51: 
645–64.
Massen, J. J., van den Berg, L. M., Spruijt, B. M., and Sterck, E. H. 2012. Inequity 
aversion in relation to effort and relationship quality in long-tailed Macaques 
(Macaca fascicularis). American Journal of Primatology 74: 145–56.
McAuley, A. 1980. Soviet attitudes toward redistribution. In Income Distribu-
tion: The Limits to Redistribution, eds. D. A. Collard, R. Lecomber, and M. 
Slater, 238–61. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
Neiworth, J. J., Johnson, E. T., Whillock, K., Greenberg, J., and Brown, V. 2009. 
Is a sense of inequity an ancestral primate trait? Testing social inequity in cot-
ton top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus). Journal of Comparative Psychology 123: 
10–17.
Page, B. I. and Jacobs, L. R. 2009. Class War? What Americans Really Think 
about Economic Inequality. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Pelligra, V. and Stanca, L. 2013. To give or not to give? Equity, efficiency and 
altruistic behavior in an artefactual field experiment. Journal of Socio-Eco-
nomics 46: 1–9.
Petersen, M. B. 2012. Social welfare as small-scale help: Evolutionary psychology 
and the deservingness heuristic. American Journal of Political Science 56: 1–16.
Petersen, M. B., Slothuus, R., Stubager, R., and Togeby, L. 2011. Deservingness 
versus values in public opinion on welfare: The automaticity of the deserving-
ness heuristic. European Journal of Political Research 50: 24–52.
Petersen, M. B., Sznycer, D., Cosmides, L., and Tooby, J. 2012. Who deserves 
help? Evolutionary psychology, social emotions, and public opinion about 
welfare. Political Psychology 33: 395–418.
Piaget, J. 1932. The Moral Judgment of the Child. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, 
Trübner & Co.
Pritchard, R. D., Dunnette, M. D., and Jorgenson, D. O. 1972. Effects of percep-
tions of equity and inequity on worker performance and satisfaction. Journal 
of Applied Psychology 56: 75–94.
Range, F., Horn, L., Viranyi, Z., and Huber, L. 2009. The absence of reward 
induces inequity aversion in dogs. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences 106: 340–5.
Rawls, J. 1971. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Ruffle, B. J. 1998. More is better, but fair is fair: Tipping in dictator and ultima-
tum games. Games and Economic Behavior 23: 247–65.
Rustichini, A. and Vostroknutov, A. 2014. Merit and justice: An experimental 
analysis of attitude to inequality. Plos One 9: 1–19.
Seyedsayamdost, H. 2015. On normativity and epistemic intuitions: Failure of 
replication. Episteme 12: 95–116.
Shafer-Landau, R. 2005. Moral Realism: A Defence. New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press.
62 On Justice
Sidgwick, H. 1874. The Methods of Ethics. London: Macmillan and Co.
Singer, P. 1974. Sidgwick and reflective equilibrium. Monist 58: 490–517.
———. 2005. Ethics and intuitions. Journal of Ethics 9: 331–52.
Sinnott-Armstrong, W., Mallon, R., McCoy, T., and Hull, J. G. 2008. Intention, 
temporal order, and moral judgments. Mind & Language 23: 90–106.
Sloane, S., Baillargeon, R., and Premack, D. 2012. Do infants have a sense of 
fairness? Psychological Science 23: 196–204.
Son Hing, L. S., Bobocel, D. R., and Zanna, M. P. 2002. Meritocracy and oppo-
sition to affirmative action: Making concessions in the face of discrimination. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 83: 493–509.
Sterba, J. P. 1974. Justice as desert. Social Theory and Practice 3: 101–16.
Takimoto, A., Kuroshima, H., and Fujita, K. 2010. Capuchin monkeys (Cebus 
apella) are sensitive to others’ reward: An experimental analysis of food-choice 
for conspecifics. Animal Cognition 13: 249–61.
Talbot, C. F., Freeman, H. D., Williams, L. E., and Brosnan, S. F. 2011. Squirrel 
monkeys’ response to inequitable outcomes indicates a behavioural conver-
gence within the primates. Biology Letters 7: 680–2.
Walster, E., Berscheid, E., and Walster, G. W. 1973. New directions in equity 
research. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 25: 151–76.
Williamson, T. 2004. Philosophical “intuitions” and skepticism about judgement. 
Dialectica 58: 109–53.
Part II
a Meritocratic Theory of 
Economic Justice

4.1  The Concept of Desert
The first step in developing the theory of meritocracy is to get clear about 
the concept of desert. John Hospers says that “justice is getting what 
one deserves; what could be simpler?” (1961: 433), but in fact, almost 
anything is simpler: Desert is a rich and labyrinthine concept which has 
defied easy analysis for millennia. That said, progress has been made—by, 
especially, Joel Feinberg (1963); Kleinig (1971); and Sher (1987).
To begin with, desert-claims come in the form “X deserves y on the 
basis of z”. While the language used can vary—“by virtue of z” and “for 
z” are common—and while elements of the claim are often left implicit 
(“You deserve it!”)—in all cases, a bona fide desert-claim has these three 
components.
That is, a bona fide desert-claim includes, first, a desert subject, X, 
which is typically a person but need not be (we may also say that a manu-
script deserves to be published and that the Grand Canyon deserves its 
reputation (Kleinig 1971)). Second, a desert object, y, for which there are 
an almost infinite number of examples: one can deserve an award, deserve 
punishment, deserve a piece of blueberry cobbler, deserve to have one’s 
manuscript published, deserve to be happy, and so on.
It is sometimes said that when it comes to personal desert (i.e. cases 
in which the desert subject is a human being), the desert object must be 
either beneficial or injurious to the desert subject. But this is not correct.
Consider Lance Armstrong, who was stripped of his Tour de France 
titles in the face of doping allegations. Let us stipulate that he deserved 
this treatment. But suppose their loss had no effect on Armstrong; he just 
didn’t care, one way or another, whether he had those titles. That does 
nothing to imperil the claim that Armstrong did not deserve them.
So desert is about more than just rewarding or punishing; it is also 
about making things right—in this case, ensuring that the record books 
reflected Armstrong’s duplicity. As Feinberg puts it, “to say that a person 
deserves something is to say that there is a certain sort of propriety in 
his having it.” (1963: 71). A notion of propriety, often “fittingness”, is 
ubiquitous in the literature on desert.
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The third component of desert-claims is the desert basis, z. A physi-
cist deserves the Nobel Prize on the basis of his discoveries; a criminal 
deserves jail on the basis of his crimes; and I deserve a piece of cobbler 
because I baked the thing. Here the issue of fit arises, as there must be 
a proper connection between the desert basis and the desert object. One 
can deserve the Nobel on the basis of one’s scientific discoveries, but no 
one could ever deserve that prize on the basis of his crimes, or because 
he baked a cobbler.
There is, thus, a conceptual connection between X and y (the Grand 
Canyon can never deserve a job), and between y and z, as just described. 
There is also a connection between X and z—between the desert subject 
and the desert basis—which is of critical importance moving forward.
Philosophers have debated the nature and the strength of the connec-
tion. Some say that desert subjects must be responsible for their bases.1 
But this is wrong, or at least too quick: A sick child, not responsible for 
his sickness, may well deserve our sympathy.2
In any case, I shall rely on the weakest, and uncontroversial, construal of 
the connection—sometimes known as the “aboutness principle” (Feinberg 
1963). To wit: To be bona fide, desert bases must be about the desert sub-
ject. Tiffany cannot deserve the tiara on the basis of Jennifer’s beauty. Frank 
cannot deserve to go to jail on the basis of Phillip’s crimes. And so on.
Next, we must take care to differentiate desert from entitlement, which 
is sometimes what people mean when they talk about “desert”, but which 
is conceptually distinct from true desert.
Imagine that a man has committed a murder, is known to have com-
mitted the murder, and is put in jail. Yet because of a procedural error, 
the evidence collected against him cannot be used. Prosecutors must let 
him go free.
This man is entitled to his freedom. That is, within the rules of criminal 
law he ought to be let go. And one might, and some do, carelessly say 
that this man “deserves” his freedom, as a sort of synonym for “proper 
under the rules”. But that use of “desert” refers to something else. This 
man does not really deserve his freedom; quite the opposite, justice was 
not served. What the man deserves is a prison cell.
So when I talk about “desert” in this work I mean true desert—not 
entitlement. Entitlement is sometimes regarded as a “post-institutional” 
notion and desert a “pre-institutional” notion, which is a reasonable 
way of looking at things. Rawls, for example, while rejecting desert 
as a principle of justice, accedes to what he calls a person’s “legitimate 
expectations” under the government. (Perhaps this is Rawls’s attempt to 
accommodate moral intuitions about desert.)
There are two more features of the concept of desert to cover. First, 
desert is retrospective (or “backwards-looking”) in the sense that desert 
bases must lie in the past. If an individual deserves a certain mode of treat-
ment now, it is on the basis of contributions he’s made, or the actions that 
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he’s taken, or the character that he’s formed, etc. Walton cannot deserve 
punishment on the basis of future crimes. Only if Walton actually com-
mits those crimes will he thereby deserve to be punished. Although this 
view of desert as purely backwards-looking is widely held, there are dis-
senters. I devote §4.7 to responding to them.
Second, it is sometimes wondered whether desert is a comparative or a 
non-comparative notion. If desert is non-comparative, then figuring out 
what someone deserves can be done by scrutinizing that person alone, by 
asking: Does she possess the relevant desert basis in the proper measure? 
If, on the other hand, desert is comparative, this cannot be determined 
without reference to how other people are faring.
Issues of comparative and non-comparative desert quickly become 
complex and quite technical (Kagan (2012) discusses them in extreme 
detail.) But desert within distributive justice is standardly understood to 
be comparative in nature (see, e.g. Olsaretti 2004). Whether Joe deserves 
a job depends at least in part on the qualifications of the other applicants. 
(Joe might also fail to reach a non-comparative standard of merit, ren-
dering him undeserving of the job, even if he is more meritorious than 
everyone else.)
The reason the distributive justice debate is fundamentally comparative 
is because of scarcity. In contrast, consider criminal justice: There is no 
hurdle to each person receiving the punishment that he non-comparatively 
deserves, since there is no shortage of punishments we might mete out.
But even if there were a non-comparative way to determine what 
income Sarah deserves, deciding how much Sarah ought actually to be 
paid, given those deserts, requires contact with others. Sarah may deserve 
a $50,000 salary if she is working in the United States, but not if she 
moves to Mali, where the average yearly income is $700. Maybe there 
are ways around this (perhaps what Sarah deserves, non-comparatively, 
is some share of national income), but these are abstractions which are 
irrelevant to the matter at hand—which is how to actually respond to 
people’s economic deserts.3
To summarize, then: A person deserves a job, or income, just in case 
she possesses the relevant desert basis (which may but need not be dif-
ferent for these two desert objects) in the relevant measure. The desert 
basis must not be a product of institutions. That is, she doesn’t deserve 
the object because that’s what the rules say; the rules ought to be writ-
ten so that people get the objects that they deserve. And in all cases the 
desert basis must be about that person. This is the conceptual schema to 
be filled in.
4.2  The Connection Between Merit and Desert
Justice cannot simply be a matter of responding to people’s merits. 
Suppose we wish to hire a new art teacher. The fact that A is a more 
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meritorious artist than B is a good reason to think that justice demands 
that the job go to A. But it is insufficient to establish this. If A is Adolf 
Hitler, then it is unjust to give him the job, no matter how talented a 
painter he be.
This is a simple point, but it’s an important one conceptually, since it 
suggests that if merit has a role to play in justice, it’s by virtue of the rela-
tion it has to something of more fundamental moral importance. Stand-
ing in conceptual isolation, merit is not a plausible principle of justice.
The thing that is of fundamental moral importance is, of course, desert. 
Merit serves as the basis for our most important and powerful desert-
claims. If justice is about getting what one deserves, and if one deserves 
on the basis of one’s merits, then we have connected merit to desert, merit 
to justice, and merit to morality.
This ground has been traveled before. William Galston notes that 
the idea that the best should be chosen is “one of the historically and 
conceptually most important desert-claims” (1980: 176). And the first 
definition of “merit” in Merriam-Webster’s dictionary is a surprisingly 
sophisticated one: “The qualities or actions that constitute the basis of 
one’s deserts”.4
Here a question arises: If merit is just one desert basis among many, 
how can it control distributive decisions? It would be a sorry sort of 
meritocracy, if merit were constantly defeated by other, more compelling 
bases when determining people’s deserts.
The answer is that it is rare for a non-merit desert basis to overcome 
merit. The above Hitler-as-art-teacher is an example: The negative desert 
basis (genocidal lunacy) is so strong that it swamps considerations of 
merit.
Moreover, often desert bases thought to be independent of merit in fact 
are not. Suppose A is not Hitler but a run-of-the-mill jerk. One might 
believe that, because of this, he does not deserve the teaching job. How-
ever, this judgment comes from making a reasonable inference about his 
pedagogical skill from his character. One is judging this man undeserving 
on the basis of his merit. If we knew that A, despite being a general jerk, 
was friendly in the classroom, and thereby truly a better teacher than B, 
we would insist that A deserves the job.
Consider a familiar scenario in which these considerations arise: aca-
demic hiring. In today’s slack market, search committees receive hun-
dreds of applications for each tenure-track job. The applicants differ 
in merit, as that term is defined and interpreted by the committees. But 
the applicants also differ in non-merit bases: Some are alumni of the 
schools doing the hiring; some are donors to these schools; some have 
done charity work; some are veterans; some have family members who 
require care near the schools; and so on. These are all facts that could, 
conceptually, render a person deserving, none of them related to merit. 
And wouldn’t we find it odd, indeed unprofessional, if a committee chose 
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a less meritorious applicant over a more meritorious applicant on the 
basis of them? I think so.
Now, a non-merit basis might justly be used as a tie-breaker between 
two equally meritorious applicants. If a committee simply cannot distin-
guish between A’s merits and B’s merits, but B is a veteran, then perhaps 
B deserves the job. But if we heard that a committee had decided that A 
was the more meritorious applicant, but then chose the less meritorious B 
on the grounds that B was a veteran, I think that choice would strike us as 
faulty and morally wrong. Maybe there is an extreme case in which B would 
deserve the job—if, for example, he were a Medal of Honor  winner— 
but I don’t think so.
So these cases—economic desert turning on a non-merit basis—are 
rare, if indeed they exist at all. I don’t want to devote more space to this 
conceptual analysis (for that, see Mulligan 2015), except to make the 
following point.
Owen McLeod describes meritocracy like this:
One view is that merit is a quite specific kind of desert: A merits x if 
and only if x is a position, and A would perform excellently in x. This 
might be the notion that ‘meritocrats’ have in mind when they urge 
that positions be assigned on the basis of merit only.
(1999: 67)
While this is close to correct, McLeod makes two small errors.
First, meritocrats do not urge that positions be assigned on the basis 
of merit only. That would produce outrageous results like Hitler-as-art-
teacher. Meritocrats, rather, urge that positions be assigned on the basis 
of desert only. It happens to be true that almost always the most meritori-
ous applicant is the most deserving.
Second, it may be the case that the most meritorious candidate for 
some position will not perform excellently in it. Dysfunctional external 
factors can and often do intervene to cleave merit apart from perfor-
mance. Imagine a factory in a racist society which seeks to hire a new 
widget maker. The best-qualified candidate, Matt, is black. The meri-
tocrat says that Matt ought to get the job: He is the best widget maker, 
and so he deserves it. Yet suppose it is also known that, if he is hired, the 
other workers, who are racist, will sabotage Matt’s work and cause him 
to underproduce. (This is a case of taste discrimination, to be discussed in 
§5.9.) Here, the most meritorious candidate will not perform excellently. 
To the meritocrat, that is irrelevant: Matt still deserves the job.
That said, except in these cases, merit does have a powerful predictive 
quality: It tells us not only who is more excellent now but who will per-
form better in the future. This is a consideration of efficiency.
So we value merit for its own sake (and not, e.g. its instrumental power 
in promoting the general welfare). In so valuing merit, a worry may arise: 
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It is a short move from the claim that effort is valuable, or skill is valu-
able, or beauty is valuable—as I believe—to the claim that those who 
possess these merits are valuable, and, more worrying, more valuable 
than those who are not meritorious.
Providing a fully-developed theory of value is outside of the scope of 
this book. It will suffice to show that the above implication does not hold.
It is true that it is better to be hard-working than lazy; better to be tal-
ented than inept; and better to be beautiful than ugly. And it is true that 
these features of a person constitute the person himself. But it is a simple 
fallacy of composition to say that the whole person is valuable because 
his parts are. (The sorry history of some rock and roll “supergroups” 
provides an analogy: Individual virtuosity does not guarantee group 
virtuosity.)
In this way, the meritocrat is not committed to the idea that a society 
composed of highly-skilled people is more valuable than a society of the 
unable. It is the merits themselves that have value. A person or a society is 
excellent not to the extent to which they are meritorious, but to the extent 
to which they develop, promote, and apply merit.
This is important for two reasons. First, it thwarts dystopian attacks 
against meritocracy; for example, the charge that a meritocratic society 
demonizes the unskilled. That simply does not follow from meritocratic 
principles. That Daryl is more meritorious than John does not imply that 
we ought to hold Daryl in greater esteem.
Indeed, John is more estimable if he shows better attention to develop-
ing and applying his more meager merits than Daryl shows to his. In a 
similar way, a poor society that seeks to improve its lot by developing 
excellence in its citizens is superior to a wealthy society that has become 
contented and decadent.
Second, this is relevant for the role that natural traits should play in 
economic distribution. Since Rawls, they have been regarded as “arbi-
trary from a moral point-of-view” and therefore unable to justify eco-
nomic inequalities. I shall argue at length in Chapter 7 that that is 
wrong—we cannot escape these traits, they define our identity in part, 
and thus we must respect them politically and allow them to influence 
distributive decisions.
But another objection to the Rawlsian view, which has been raised by 
Elizabeth Anderson (1999) and Jonathan Wolff (1998), is that compen-
sating people for natural flaws violates a norm of equal respect. While 
I don’t think there is such an equality norm, I do believe that people 
are owed respect and that this respect does not turn on their natural 
capacities. Meritocrats can maintain this position because, as explained, 
we have no per se reason to value a disadvantaged person less than an 
advantaged person.
The meritocrat accepts the natural diversity of persons without cel-
ebrating or lamenting it. He recognizes that natural traits play a role in 
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the way a person develops and pursues a plan-of-life. And he recognizes 
that respect for that plan-of-life requires respect for the natural traits on 
which it is based.
In contrast, respect is not shown by the egalitarian, who feels com-
pelled to erase natural differences through the homogenizing power of 
equal outcomes. Respect is also not shown under libertarian laissez-faire; 
there, the extent to which a person may exploit or mitigate his natural 
traits is under the partial social control of others (e.g. the wealthy). But 
respect is shown to the individual in a meritocracy, through the provision 
of equal opportunity and strict attention to merit. Demonstrating this 
requires explaining the essential relevance of equal opportunity, a task to 
which I now turn.
4.3  No Justice Without Equal Opportunity
The metaphor most frequently used to explain equal opportunity is that 
of a race.5 Suppose that the rules for a race include the provision that all 
black runners get a minute added to their finishing times. William, who 
is white, goes around the track in 4:30. Brian, who is black, goes around 
in 4:00. William’s finishing time gets recorded as 4:30 and Brian’s as 5:00. 
And so, under the rules, William is entitled to the medal. We say that this 
competition lacks formal equality of opportunity (Formal EO). Why? 
Because the competitors were not judged meritocratically; they were 
judged, in part, on the basis of their race.
Formal EO is thus tantamount to a meritocratic distributive rule. The 
meritocrat holds the above result to be unjust; Brian deserved the medal 
since he was the faster runner. (Again: Desert is pre-institutional.) Other 
theories of justice may not arrive at this result: If society is racist, the 
general utility may be served by giving the medal to William. And the 
libertarian holds that there was no injustice if Brian agreed to the rules 
when he decided to race. The meritocrat disagrees: Brian was the best, 
and so he deserves the medal, and that is all there is to it.
Yet Formal EO is only a necessary, and not a sufficient, condition for 
ensuring that the most deserving runner receives the medal. Suppose that 
this society is in fact racist: Blacks are malnourished and lack health care 
while whites have access to elite trainers and facilities. Then, even if the 
race is judged only on the basis of merit (i.e. even if Formal EO prevails), 
Brian faced hurdles to becoming meritorious which William did not. 
In this society, it is not really true to say that each runner had an equal 
opportunity to win the race—no matter what the rules say. A deeper, 
substantive sense of equal opportunity—fair equality of opportunity (Fair 
EO)—was lacking. As a result, William’s moral claim to the medal—his 
claim to deserve the medal—is undermined.
There has long been a sense that meritocracy and equal opportunity are 
connected.6 It is intuitive. I want to make the intuition precise.
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The meritocratic argument for equal opportunity is a transcendental 
one, going as follows:
(1) We should give people what they deserve.
(2) Economic desert requires Fair EO.
THEREFORE, we should establish Fair EO.
This is a valid argument. There are both metaphysical and epistemo-
logical issues involved here. Metaphysically, if Fair EO is perfectly imple-
mented and Formal EO prevails, then everyone gets her economic deserts. 
When Fair EO is lacking, on the other hand, the degree to which this 
happens—the degree to which the world is just—is diminished.
Epistemologically, absent Fair EO, one cannot have confidence that the 
outcome of a meritocratic process is just. Indeed, even if a hobbled runner 
like Brian happens to win, his desert-claim on the medal is mitigated by 
the possibility that another hobbled runner might have won instead, were 
the race conducted under Fair EO.
The precise connection between Fair EO and desert is found in the 
aboutness principle (§4.1). When conditions of Fair EO are lacking, the 
putative desert basis is in part about people other than the desert subject. 
And, once again, it is conceptually impossible to deserve something on 
the basis of who someone else is or what someone else has done.
Take a run-of-the-mill economic example: Daisy and Myrtle are compet-
ing against each other for a place at Yale. Daisy attended an elite high school 
and as a result is more meritorious than Myrtle. Daisy attended this school 
because her parents, in contrast to Myrtle’s, were rich. And Daisy’s parents 
were rich either as a result of their own merits or because they enjoyed a 
bequest which they passed along to Daisy in the form of elite education.
Thus, when Daisy, the more meritorious applicant, is admitted rather 
than Myrtle, it is not her merits, in full, that control the distributive deci-
sion. Her parents’ merits (or her grandparents’, etc.) control it too. These 
historically-grounded components of Daisy’s merit are not really about 
Daisy; they cannot ground her desert-claim here. And Daisy appreciates 
this if she is self-reflective; she takes limited pride in her achievement, 
understanding that the competition for the scarce admissions slot was not 
conducted on level terms. This reduces Daisy’s sense of desert.
Now, this account may be objected to in two ways. First, it might be said 
that Daisy’s merit in its entirety is still “about” her—after all, she is the 
one, and the only one, with the merit. But this does not satisfy the about-
ness principle, which means something different. Suppose that Anna slips 
a mind-control drug into Veronica’s drink, thereby inducing Veronica to 
commit some crime. We ask whether Veronica deserves to be punished. The 
answer is “no”. Punishing Veronica would violate the aboutness principle, 
even though the crime is “about” her in some weak sense. What the about-
ness principle seeks to do, rather, is limit the moral judgments made about 
The Foundation of Meritocracy 73
a person to admirable or objectionable facts about her—and her alone. As 
Sher puts it, “how better to capture the moral importance of the differences 
between persons than to say that each person uniquely deserves things for 
precisely what he does, and for precisely what he is?” (1987: 211)
Plainly, stronger principles than aboutness yield the relevant result, too. 
Veronica is not responsible for the crime, and therefore cannot deserve on 
the basis of it. The same may be said about Daisy.
When Formal EO is lacking, merit no longer determines who gets 
what, and so people do not get their just deserts. When Fair EO is lacking, 
other people’s merits influence individual distributive decisions, and so 
people’s desert-claims lose force. Merit, the heart of justice, comes alive 
under equal opportunity.
This explains, I think, why philosophers have been so skeptical that 
merit has a role to play in justice: Because opportunities have been 
unequal, we find out there in the world many meritorious but undeserv-
ing people. It is wrong to conclude from this that merit should not matter. 
It’s quite the opposite: Merit should matter, and we should establish equal 
opportunity so that it can serve its central function in distributive justice.
The second conceptual objection may be disposed of easily. It says 
that because equal opportunity can never be perfectly established (which 
I concede), it is impossible for anyone to deserve anything. This objec-
tion would only be sound only if any inequality of opportunity nullified 
desert-claims in their entirety. But there is no reason to think that this is 
true. And consider this: Suppose someone comes from relative disadvan-
tage (there is no Fair EO), yet through her extra efforts becomes meritori-
ous and receives the good at stake on the basis of her merit. She certainly 
deserves it, no? But that verdict would be impossible to deliver if this 
objection were sound. The meritocrat’s point is that as equal opportunity 
is better implemented, desert-claims gain more and more force, and the 
world becomes a more and more just place.
I close this section by considering two objections to equal opportunity. 
Despite its broad political appeal—or perhaps because of it—objections 
have been leveled by scholars on both the left and the right. Equal oppor-
tunity has been variously regarded as the harbinger of socialism, a means 
to discriminate against minority classes, a means to provide unjust advan-
tage to these classes, and an invitation for the government to meddle in 
private affairs. My all-time favorite bit of alarmist rhetoric comes from 
John Schaar, who warns that equal opportunity
opens more and more opportunities for more and more people to 
contribute more and more energies toward the realization of a mass, 
bureaucratic, technological, privatized, materialistic, bored, and thrill-
seeking, consumption-oriented society—a society of well-fed, conge-
nial, and sybaritic monkeys surrounded by gadgets and pleasure-toys.
(1967: 231)
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It is hard for me to see how, for example, efforts to ensure that the 
best-qualified candidate is not excluded from a job on the basis of his race 
put us in danger of becoming pleasure-toy-wielding monkeys, but that is 
an example of the sort of scaremongering that one sometimes hears from 
critics of equal opportunity (and of meritocracy more broadly).
The first objection I consider is also one of Schaar’s, and it is rather 
more sober. Schaar says that equal opportunity “promises that the doors 
to success and prosperity will be opened to us all yet does not imply that 
we are all equally valuable or that all men are really created equal” (1967: 
229).
Reply: That is correct. Meritocracy takes no stand on those questions 
of deep equality between persons. True or false, claims about people 
having equal value, or being “created equal”—whatever that means—
are compatible with meritocracy. To my mind, it is a weakness, not a 
strength, of a theory of justice that it requires that one or both of those 
propositions be true.
Richard Arneson gives a second objection to Fair EO—namely, that it 
is overbroad:
One sign that [equal opportunity] overreaches is that it not only for-
bids Christian heterosexuals . . . from excluding gays from the vast 
bulk of desirable employment opportunities, but also and equally 
forbids a few gays who want to form a communal workplace from 
establishing a single business in which all employees are gay.
(1999: 88)
Reply: Gays who arrange a workplace like this act unjustly. Sexual 
orientation cannot justly be used in employment decisions, neither as a 
benefit nor a burden. And it certainly must not be used as a decisive fac-
tor in hiring, as the homosexuals here wish to do. The fact that a group 
has been treated unjustly in the past does not legitimate its own unjust 
conduct now.
4.4  Elaborating Equal Opportunity
In a meritocracy, we would find a sharp distinction between state inter-
vention into the lives of children, which would be significant, and state 
intervention into the lives of adults, which would be small.
When it comes to adults, the government’s principal economic respon-
sibility is to ensure that citizens are not discriminated against on grounds 
irrelevant from the point-of-view of merit. The state enforces Formal EO.
When it comes to children, the government is driven by concerns about 
Fair EO. A just state ensures that each person, upon reaching moral 
agency, has had a de facto equal opportunity to pursue the economic 
goals that he sets for himself. This requires ensuring that no person is 
The Foundation of Meritocracy 75
disadvantaged by substandard health care, lackluster education, or the 
like during her childhood.
But what, exactly, does Fair EO demand of us? Clearly, the state must 
invest more in the human capital development of children born into 
disadvantage. But just how much more? And for what, precisely, are we 
trying to equalize opportunity? What should count as “disadvantage”?
I first address the question of proper outcomes. The two economic 
goods I concentrate on are income and jobs. These are the foci of the phil-
osophical and popular debates, and in my view exhaust almost the whole 
of economic justice. (Wealth is merely a stockpile of income, and, in a 
meritocracy, a person’s wealth is a result of his justly-received income.) 
As a practical matter, we may concentrate on equalizing opportunity for 
income. There are a few reasons for this.
First, owing to the heterogeneity of jobs it is hard to know what it 
would mean to equalize opportunity for employment simpliciter, beyond 
those protections provided by Formal EO. (Note, too, that establishing 
Formal EO has a Fair EO effect: Young people who know that they will 
have no formal barriers to future employment will be more inclined to 
make the necessary human capital investments.)
Second, preferences for particular jobs are shaped during childhood in 
myriad ways, and more acutely than the general preference for income 
which we share. It is not clear that it is possible or desirable to intervene 
against these influences (e.g. to prevent a child born to a happy lawyer to 
develop her own interest in law). More on that in the next section.
Third, equal opportunity for employment is likely to be achieved instru-
mentally, through equal opportunity for income. Human capital specializa-
tion in preparation for a particular job happens after reaching adulthood. 
Fair EO regimes, with future income in mind, provide the broad prepara-
tion necessary for adults to have many employment paths open to them.
Next, we must clarify how equal opportunity will be achieved. Educa-
tion has traditionally been considered the most important means—and 
I agree—but it is not sufficient. Disadvantaged children must also have 
access to health care, for example. Implementing that is comparatively sim-
ple: A system of universal health care suffices. There must also be interven-
tion into some family affairs, which I discuss next. And, it should be noted, 
state action alone cannot establish Fair EO; there must also be a degree of 
cultural “buy in”—a shared adherence to the meritocratic ideal—to sustain 
the equal opportunity framework and discourage subtle violations of it.
The next question is where the so-called “responsibility cut” should be 
made. Must unequal opportunity that arises from birth into poverty be 
nullified? To be sure. But what about race? What about IQ, insofar as it 
is environmentally obtained? Insofar as it is genetic?
For egalitarian philosophers, including luck egalitarians, the answer is 
“yes” to all of the above: Facts about an individual’s family, location of 
birth, IQ however obtained, genetics, and more cannot justly play a role 
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in determining economic outcomes. (Note, however, that luck egalitarians 
are not typically asking where to make the responsibility cut for the pur-
pose of establishing equal opportunity; they seek to equalize outcomes— 
typically, welfare.) These philosophers follow Rawls’s anti-desert argu-
ment: Because we do not deserve our traits, natural or otherwise, we do 
not deserve that which we might obtain through them.
Clearly, the meritocrat does not reject this idea in toto, but the merito-
crat does reject the idea that natural traits cannot justly influence economic 
outcomes. Economic outcomes should not turn on family wealth, location 
of birth, parental education, and that portion of IQ due to environmen-
tal factors. But they can justly turn on one’s adult efforts, IQ genetically 
obtained, one’s native social skill, and one’s personality.
Chapter 7 is devoted to justifying this idea. I will simply note here that 
the meritocratic responsibility cut accords with intuition. People find 
economic inequalities that derive from social advantage, like elite school-
ing, unjust, but we are not disturbed when a person becomes wealthy as 
a result of her natural skill (Goya-Tocchetto, Echols, and Wright 2016).7
With the normative structure of meritocratic equal opportunity now 
fixed, how can it be implemented? John Roemer (1998, 2003) provides 
the necessary formalism. He suggests the following. First, we make the 
responsibility cut, separating circumstances (which ought not to play 
a role in determining one’s economic outcomes) from abilities (which 
should).8 Second, we define a type as a class of people who share the same 
circumstances. We then distribute resources so that the incomes of each 
type are in some sense equal,9 but the incomes within types are not. In this 
way, income is a function of ability but not circumstances.
Although I disagree with Roemer about where to make the responsibility 
cut—like most luck egalitarians, he views natural traits as inadmissible— 
his model is a good one and the best tool we have to turn vague claims 
about equal opportunity into concrete policy recommendations.
What might such a policy look like in practice? This depends on the 
elasticity of income with respect to educational investment for each 
type. In theory, equal opportunity could require big differences in public 
spending on poor children versus public spending on rich children. This 
could be the case if elasticities are roughly equal across types (see Betts 
and Roemer 2007). However, recent work (viz. Jackson, Johnson, and 
Persico 2016) finds that elasticities are not equal—the elasticity for poor 
children is roughly double that of “non-poor” children—and that miti-
gates inequality of public investment.
In any case, the philosophically important question is this: Suppose the 
state really did have to invest 10 times more (e.g.) in the education of poor 
children in order to establish equal opportunity. Would the meritocrat 
really insist on such an unequal investment?
Yes. This is required by theory. It is, however, a result that neither the 
right nor the left will be keen to accept. It is unpalatable to libertarians 
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for categorical reasons: Redistribution, even to poor children, violates 
putative rights.
But it is also unjustifiable to egalitarians who believe in “equal respect” 
and “equal concern” (§4.2). Massive differentials in the way children 
are treated by the state, on the basis of socioeconomic status, plainly 
violate equal concern, because there is no equal concern: The state shows 
more concern for the development of poor children. And equal respect 
is violated because, according to the egalitarian, no poor person could 
maintain his self-respect in the face of such public spending. These argu-
ments find no purchase with the meritocrat. If equal opportunity requires 
spending much more on poor children than rich children, that is what we 
are morally obligated to do.
One final reason why equal opportunity is important. While economic 
competition between adults is not only inevitable but admirable, there 
is little more viscerally nasty than the sight of children being forced to 
compete against each other for future advantage. But this is precisely 
what is happening in the United States today: Elite jobs go to those with 
elite higher education; but admissions to elite universities are hyper-
competitive; and so children are pitted against each other in an unpleas-
ant but necessary battle to earn a place on the path to prosperity. With 
every passing year, the competition begins earlier and earlier in life; for 
elite preschools, parents solicit letters of recommendation on behalf of 
their toddlers.
As William Deresiewicz (2014) puts it,
wealthy families start buying their children’s way into elite colleges 
almost from the moment they are born: music lessons, sports equip-
ment, foreign travel (‘enrichment’ programs, to use the all-too- perfect 
term)—most important, of course, private-school tuition or the costs 
of living in a place with top-tier public schools.
I am not sure what to say about this state of affairs except that it is 
morally horrible and inefficient and should be eradicated through equal 
opportunity.
4.5  Equal Opportunity and the Family
One apparent obstacle to equal opportunity is the family. Plainly, a per-
son’s prospects are shaped not only by broad social circumstances and 
by genetics, but also by the particular family environment in which he is 
raised. Socioeconomic status aside, it is a huge boon to be raised by lov-
ing parents; it is a disadvantage, sometimes an irrecoverable one, to be 
raised by bad ones.
This is a perennial worry about equal opportunity, best advanced by 
James Fishkin (1983), who argues that we face a trilemma: We must 
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either give up Formal EO, or we must give up Fair EO, or we must give 
up the autonomy of the family. We cannot have all three.
Fishkin’s argument is in fact unsound, in part because he relies on the 
mistaken empirical claim that Fair EO can only be established by level-
ing down advantaged children: “Strategies of leveling up are either so 
paltry in their efficacy or so utopian in their expense that they cannot be 
expected to provide a solution to our problem” (p. 66).
In the 30-plus years since Fishkin wrote his book, the efficacy of level-
ing up policies has been demonstrated. And the charge of utopianism is 
wrong in light of the efficiency gains associated with Fair EO (§4.8).
But the general worry Fishkin raises persists, and so it is fair to ask: 
Which leg of the trilemma should we kick out? I answer that we should 
limit the autonomy of the family. Now, to some this might seem an impos-
sible case to make. Fishkin thinks so:
It would not be an exaggeration . . . to conclude that the portion of 
the private sphere of liberty that is least controversial and of great-
est importance to most of us is, without doubt, the part singled out 
by the autonomy of the family. . . . Were this portion of the private 
sphere of liberty to be sacrificed, the realm of negative liberty remain-
ing would be mutilated virtually beyond recognition.
(pp. 42–3)
Fishkin overstates things. While establishing equal opportunity does 
reduce the negative liberty of parents, the reduction is modest, and it 
comes with an enormous expansion of the positive liberty of children. 
Because equal opportunity is an essential feature of a just state, at some 
point protecting the negative liberty of parents comes at the expense of 
justice. That is a trade-off that cannot be avoided.
It is uniformly accepted that parents have a moral obligation to their 
children. Even philosophers who regard children as mere property (e.g. 
Narveson (1988)) concede that this is so. It is also accepted that this 
standard of care includes attention to a child’s future ability to flourish. 
Feinberg (1980), for example, argues that children have a “right to an 
open future” which limits parental autonomy.
With this obligation in mind, we must attend to a subtle but critically 
important point: Parents’ responsibility is not to promote their children’s 
future ability to flourish by the means that they believe to be best. Their 
responsibility is to act in a way that is maximally likely to promote their 
children’s future ability to flourish.
An example will illustrate the difference here. Suppose that Darlene is 
trying to decide whether or not to have her child vaccinated. Darlene is 
intelligent, educated, and has a perfectly good will; she is doing the very 
best she can to make good decisions about her child’s health. After her 
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due diligence, Darlene decides that vaccines cause autism, and so she does 
not have her child vaccinated.
Has Darlene fulfilled her responsibility to promote her child’s future 
ability to flourish? Does it suffice to do one’s best to understand vaccine 
safety and then to act on that understanding? The answer is “no”. It is 
one thing to have a maximally justified belief about vaccine safety—let’s 
stipulate that Darlene has this—but is another thing to act in a maximally 
justified way.
What Darlene must do, to fulfill her responsibility to her child, is step 
outside of her own reasoning about vaccine safety and engage in a virtual 
collective decision-making process. For the purposes of determining how 
she ought to act, Darlene must consider not only what she believes about 
vaccine safety, but what other people believe as well. And she must (in 
a technical way which I won’t get into here) weight these beliefs in an 
appropriate way—in proportion to the competence of those that hold 
them. And the virtual collective decision-making process regarding vac-
cination is unambiguous: If you want your child to be healthy (which 
you must, that is your duty), you should vaccinate your child. This is the 
consensus belief, and the overwhelming consensus of experts; it is the 
justified action yielded by the process.
Note that the virtual collective decision-making process does not tell 
Darlene what to believe with respect to vaccinating her child, but how to 
act with respect to vaccinating her child. These can come apart. I call this 
the principle of epistemic modesty: When a morally important goal, like 
a child’s future ability to flourish, hangs in the balance, one must act with 
an eye toward maximizing the probability that that goal is realized, even 
if that means acting in a way that one believes is wrong.10
For some, this will have the appearance of paradox: How can the right 
thing to do be that which you believe will result in the wrong outcome? 
In fact, there is no paradox. There is only the appearance of paradox, a 
result of generally-accepted but false views about the connection between 
belief and action. In fact, to do the right thing, it is neither necessary nor 
sufficient that you believe that what you are doing is right.
It is not sufficient because, it if were, then many of history’s worst moral 
monsters would be exonerated. Some Nazis were simply insane, but oth-
ers honestly believed, using their best judgment, that by killing Jews they 
were making the world a better place. Of course, that these Nazis acted 
“in good faith” in this way changes little if anything about the immorality 
of what they did. They should have known that they were acting wrongly. 
Their beliefs were badly contradicted by prevailing moral sentiment, by 
the implicit collective decision-making process that had taken place.
It is also not necessary that one act in accordance with the moral view 
that one believes to be correct. This was explained above: Darlene might 
truly believe, and might be justified in light of the evidence that she has, 
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that she will harm her child through vaccination. But that belief does not 
change how she is morally obliged to act.
In this way, the folk notion that you should “follow your conscience” 
is deeply flawed. Obeying such a maxim can and often does lead one into 
moral error.11
Epistemic modesty is counterintuitive, and can only be made per-
spicuous through technical explanation (I refer the interested reader to 
my Manuscript-A). I’ll just mention two things. First, this distinction 
between justified belief and justified action cannot be resolved by the 
epistemology of disagreement. No matter how Darlene ought to modify 
her beliefs in light of the beliefs of others, the possibility that she is justi-
fied in acting in a way contrary to her belief persists.
Second, for the purposes of this book, the technicalities are unimport-
ant. Parents must be circumspect about their own epistemic limitations 
and act accordingly. Epistemic modesty thus provides a new justification 
for intervening into family affairs. The government is justified in inter-
vening against parents if they are (1) not meeting the standard of care 
simpliciter (by, e.g. not feeding their children) or (2) not meeting the stan-
dard of care owing to violations of epistemic modesty (e.g. by refusing to 
vaccinate because they think it harmful).
Whatever the good motivations of vaccine-denying parents be, they are 
acting to fulfill their own plans-of-life at the expense of their children’s. 
Whether they appreciate it or not, for these parents it is more important 
that they get the thing that they want (viz. raising a child in the way that 
they desire) than that their children be healthy.
The state should enforce epistemic modesty by mandating vaccination. 
If it did, it would reduce parents’ negative liberty but it would hugely 
increase positive liberty: Some children will live rather than die. This is 
good. “Liberty” is a poor excuse for hurting another to satisfy one’s ego.
In a similar way, religious education should probably be proscribed, 
or at least heavily regulated—to ensure that children born into reli-
gious households are not disadvantaged, or, worse, brainwashed. This is 
already a concern: In New York City, the yeshivas that cater to Orthodox 
Jews have been criticized for failing to provide rudimentary secular edu-
cation (writing, arithmetic, etc.) to boys, who spend their days studying 
the Talmud and the Torah. The fact that some Orthodox parents believe 
that focused religious study is of prime moral and religious importance 
is irrelevant. It is fine to make decisions about oneself on these bases, 
but when the decisions affect another—and especially a child—epistemic 
modesty must be practiced.
We should also be wary of homeschooling. While doubtless there are 
parents who homeschool because they correctly judge their local schools 
to be inadequate, many seek to inculcate their own religious or political 
views. In doing so, they promote their own plan-of-life, which includes 
indoctrinating their progeny, at the expense of their children’s future.
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All of that said, we must be attentive to the ways in which clumsy 
regulation can do more harm than good. If unrestricted homeschooling 
better promotes the future abilities of children to flourish than any viable 
regulatory regime, we should permit unrestricted homeschooling. That is 
a positive matter, to be sorted out by the relevant experts (§9.1).
A few more points. First, we should not overestimate the effect of the 
family on economic outcomes. Bruce Sacerdote points out that “while 
educational attainment and income are frequently the focus of economic 
studies, these are among the outcomes least affected by differences in 
family environment” (2007: 120). Sacerdote finds that family environ-
ment explains only 11 percent of variance in income.
Second, I suspect that equal opportunity will turn out to be more a 
matter of satisfying a minimal standard of care rather than establishing 
strict equality. The goal is not to raise every child under identical cir-
cumstances, but to ensure that each is cared for in such a way that, upon 
reaching adulthood, she can compete against her peers for scarce social 
goods on a more-or-less level playing field.
In a meritocracy, there would be more government oversight of family 
matters than is typical today. But there would be no dystopian invigila-
tion. If a parent wants to inculcate in her child an interest in ballet, there 
is no bar of justice to that. After all, some hobbies are necessary—to 
ensure that childhood time is not wasted, and to get a sense of what 
hobbies are and how they can contribute to a life of meaning. It does not 
violate equal opportunity when a parent chooses a hobby arbitrarily, or, 
indeed, on the basis of her own preference. That promotes filial bonding.
The moral violation occurs when the child is able to consciously reject 
the hobby and does so. At that point, it no longer promotes her future 
flourishing—she will not be practicing ballet as an adult—and it wastes 
time that might be spent on bona fide personal development. There 
are complications here, but the basic point is intuitive, I think. We can 
spot when the activities a parent chooses for her child—even if they’re 
not loved by the child—promote that child’s development. And we can 
spot when they are burdens on the child, serving only the parent’s own 
interests.
Third, meritocratic equal opportunity policies work with and not 
against the incentives of parents. It is increasingly clear from research that 
inequalities of opportunity arise early on in life—and so public interven-
tion must take place in early childhood.12 To that end, a meritocratic gov-
ernment might subsidize preschool, or offer it directly as a public good. 
That would be attractive both to altruistic parents and to those seeking 
time for work or leisure.
Fourth, there need not be leveling-down in a meritocracy. Brighouse 
and Swift (2008), for example, suggest abolishing “elite private schools” 
as a step toward establishing Fair EO (and they feel such an abolition 
would not violate parental liberty).
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While I find these schools distasteful (§4.4), Brighouse and Swift 
misdiagnose the problem. Especially when it comes to higher educa-
tion, elite institutions do not provide significantly better human capital 
development than, say, good public institutions. If your sole interest is 
getting smarter, you’re as well off at UMass as at Harvard. What elite 
schools provide is an interpersonal advantage in the form of pedigree and 
personal connections. Put differently, by attending elite schools, one can 
later extract rents from the economy. In a meritocracy, neither pedigree 
(a non-existent or poor proxy for merit) nor nepotism may be used as a 
hiring criterion. In a meritocracy, the advantages that these schools pro-
vide are limited to their actual educational superiority. And so Brighouse 
and Swift’s worry about their potential damage to Fair EO is eliminated.
4.6  On the Difference Between Luck Egalitarianism and 
Desert-Based Justice
That meritocracy differs radically from egalitarianism is, I hope, clear. 
Among other things, meritocracy does not require equal outcomes or 
even take them as presumptive; egalitarianism has no conceptual mecha-
nism for rewarding merit for its own sake; and egalitarians typically give 
little attention to economic efficiency.
Nevertheless, it might be thought that desert-based justice is similar 
to a variant of egalitarianism which has attracted attention in recent 
years: namely, luck egalitarianism. Some philosophers seem to think so; 
Nicholas Barry says that luck egalitarianism is “both an egalitarian and 
a desert-based theory” (2006: 201). And Arneson describes luck egali-
tarianism as “a response to conservative critics of the welfare state and 
egalitarian redistributive policies who assert that they erode personal 
responsibility, reward the undeserving, and punish the deserving” (2011: 
28, my emphasis). So a few words about how luck egalitarianism and 
desert-based justice differ are worthwhile.13
The central claim of luck egalitarianism, which was first proposed by 
Ronald Dworkin (1981a, 1981b) is that it is unjust when some people are 
worse off than others owing to bad luck. This principle has two ambigu-
ous features, and how to interpret these two features constitutes much of 
the luck egalitarian literature.
First, there is the question of what “worse off” means. This is the 
question of the currency of justice. Dworkin holds the currency to be 
resources. Others (e.g. Arneson (1989, 2000)) prefer welfare. Still others 
(e.g. Cohen (1989)) think that it is both.
Second, it must be said what is meant by “bad luck”. All luck egalitar-
ians (save one—Segall (2010)) reject the view that all inequalities arising 
from bad luck are unjust. After all, Joe might choose to bet some money 
on the favorite in a football match. And Joe might—unlucky for him—
lose. This produces an inequality, but it hardly seems an unjust one. On 
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the other hand, if Joe has the bad luck of being robbed while walking to 
the bank, making him worse off than his peers, that is more plausibly an 
unjust inequality, in need of repair. A distinction is thus made between 
inequalities due to option luck (i.e. inequalities due to a person’s choices, 
or which he controlled), which demand repair, and inequalities due to 
brute luck, which do not.
To see why meritocracy and luck egalitarianism are hopelessly at odds, 
consider the following scenarios:
(1) Ross has religious views which are unpopular. He is the best-qualified 
applicant for a job, but, owing to religious prejudice, he does not 
get it.
(2) Emily is running for political office. Emily’s sexual tastes are found 
distasteful by the electorate. Emily is the best candidate for office but 
because of her sexual tastes she is defeated.
(3) Sarah is pro-life and an outstanding worker. The company she 
works for is owned by ardent leftists. Sarah is up for a bonus but 
does not get it because her company’s owners dislike her views on 
abortion.
In all three scenarios, the meritocrat diagnoses injustice: Jobs ought to go 
to best-qualified applicants, and income ought to turn on merit.
This diagnosis is unchanged if we stipulate that Ross was fully aware 
of his community’s religious prejudice; Emily knew that the electorate 
would find her sexual tastes problematic; and Sarah had freely chosen, 
with full knowledge of her bosses’ moral views, to work for her company. 
According to the meritocrat, that is irrelevant: In (1)-(3), merit is not rec-
ognized, and so justice is not done.
In contrast, those conditions render (1)-(3) morally unproblematic in 
the luck egalitarian’s eyes. The inequalities of employment and income 
therein are not matters of brute bad luck. After all, Ross could have cho-
sen to adopt different religious views; Emily could have chosen to engage 
in different sexual activities or to have kept her tastes private; Sarah could 
have chosen to work for pro-lifers rather than pro-choices. All three knew 
the economic risks when they made the choices that they did.
We have, I think, the sense that injustice remains in (1)-(3), and the luck 
egalitarian cannot reinterpret the examples to consist of something other 
than free choice (or control). To say, for example, that we have no choice 
over our sexual practices is to abrogate the commitment to personal 
responsibility which is luck egalitarianism’s raison d’être.
To press the case, suppose that Emily’s “problem” is simply that she 
is a lesbian and the electorate is prejudiced against homosexuals. This is 
a perfectly plausible scenario, and I presume the luck egalitarian agrees 
about the existence of injustice here. If that is so, he must identify the 
relevant source of bad luck. What would this be?
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The most obvious contender is Emily’s sexual orientation. Just as it’s 
bad luck to be born with serious physical defects (a typical example of bad 
brute luck which, the luck egalitarian says, requires recompense), it’s bad 
luck to be born homosexual.
That will strike some people as ludicrous. It strikes me that way. And, 
in any case, isn’t it simpler, and more compelling, to say that it’s unjust 
to discriminate on the basis of sexual preference? That is the meritocrat’s 
response. In contrast, the luck egalitarian refocuses the source of injustice 
to the very person who suffered unjust harm (i.e. to Emily, who had the 
alleged bad luck of being born a lesbian).
Maybe there are other ways for the luck egalitarian to put it. Maybe 
Emily’s bad luck was being born into the world that she was. But now 
things are getting tortuous, and that explanation fails to account for cases 
in which the sexual preference is not inborn but chosen: Suppose Emily 
has a taste for bondage. I don’t see any difference in injustice between 
discriminating against Emily because she’s a lesbian, and discriminating 
against her because of her taste for bondage. The meritocrat explains why 
simply: Justice requires that the most meritorious candidate be chosen. 
Period.
Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen makes precisely this mistake when he 
attempts to identify the source of unjust inequality in Apartheid-era 
South Africa:
In the bad old days of Apartheid most black South Africans were 
much worse off than most white South Africans. This was so, not 
because black South Africans were less hard-working than white 
South Africans or anything of that sort. It was . . . due to the fact 
that, under Apartheid, South Africans lived in a society in which 
being born black meant being subjected to all sorts of unjust restric-
tions. . . . While being born black is not in itself an instance of bad 
luck, under Apartheid it was an instance thereof.
(2016: 2)
The claim here is that while being black is not necessarily bad luck, it 
was bad luck for blacks in Apartheid-era South Africa. There are two 
problems with this claim. First, because one is black owing to one’s genes, 
and having the genes that one does is a matter of metaphysical necessity, 
it does not make sense to talk about a person’s race in terms of luck (see 
Chapter 7). Second, it seems wrong—some might say offensive—to go to 
a black South African and say, “Sorry about the injustice you’ve faced! 
What bad luck, you happen to be black.” No. Luck has nothing to do 
with it. The injustice is the bigotry.
Finally, I note that desertists’ and luck egalitarians’ analyses of the cur-
rency of justice are quite different. Luck egalitarianism is a fully liberal 
theory; the individual is the unit of moral measure, and the distribution 
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question turns wholly on what the individual is morally entitled to (wel-
fare, resources, opportunity for welfare, etc.) In contrast, desert-based 
theories contain a communitarian element.
Imagine a race in which Elaine comes in first and Tori, second. Elaine 
deserves the gold medal and Tori deserves the silver medal. But suppose 
Elaine hates gold and loves silver, and her welfare would be improved if 
she were to get the silver medal and Tori, the gold. Would the desert theo-
rist then say that Elaine ought, morally, to get the silver medal? No. What 
if the currency of justice were different? What if silver somehow provided 
Elaine more opportunity for welfare? Or more “capabilities to function” 
(Sen 1985)? None of that matters. The community has decided that excel-
lence is recognized by gold, not silver. Elaine was the most excellent, she 
deserves the gold medal, and that is what she ought, morally, to get.
Of course, typically the gold medal redounds to the winner’s advan-
tage, as a source of psychic utility if nothing else. But for the desertist, 
considering how the individual will fare, in light of some proposed distri-
bution, is insufficient. Incentive effects are also relevant. So is symbolizing 
great achievement. And so on. Insofar as we think that a theory of justice 
ought to be able to promote communal values like these, we must prefer 
desert-based justice.
4.7  Desert Is Never Forward-Looking
I have said that desert is, as a matter of conceptual necessity, backwards-
looking: If a person deserves something, it’s on the basis of who she is or 
what she has done. (While “who she is” may sound like a contemporane-
ous claim, the moment of desert must be preceded by the formation of the 
character that makes the person deserving.)
This was the accepted wisdom for decades, and it largely still is. How-
ever, Feldman (1995) and David Schmidtz (2002) argue against it; they 
believe that desert sometimes can be forward-looking. Although tangen-
tial to the main argument of this book, I wish to make a few comments 
about why they are mistaken.14
In support of forward-looking desert, Feldman offers the following 
example (pp. 70–71): A soldier volunteers for a suicide mission. Before 
embarking on it, he is feted for his bravery—there is a ceremony, he 
receives a medal. We may think that he deserves these honors, even 
though the desert base—which Feldman says is the sacrifice—has not yet 
occurred. If that is right, then desert is sometimes forward-looking.
To get at the truth of the matter, we must thicken the thought experi-
ment. Consider, first:
(SM1) Master Sergeant Schaefer, a 25-year Army veteran, volunteers 
for a suicide mission. Schaefer is decorated, widely respected, and 
renowned for his courage and loyalty. On the helicopter, en route to 
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his final operation, he receives a medal for his upcoming sacrifice. 
Schaefer deserves that medal.
To be sure. But what if we thicken the thought experiment in a different 
way?
(SM2) Private Buckwheat, fresh out of boot camp, volunteers for 
a suicide mission. Despite knowing little about Buckwheat, Army 
officers sign him up (they’re happy to have gotten a volunteer). The 
mission is scheduled to take place five months later, but Buckwheat 
is given the medal now. Buckwheat deserves that medal.
This is dubious. There is an intuitive difference between SM1 and SM2. 
It appears to be epistemological: We know that MSG Schaefer deserves 
the medal, but we do not know this of PVT Buckwheat.
Also, it appears that the relevant knowledge is not, pace Feldman, 
whether the sacrifice will in fact be made; it is whether Schaefer and Buck-
wheat are disposed to make the sacrifice. Suppose that, against all odds, 
Schaefer emerges from the mission unharmed. Do we believe that we 
committed an injustice when we awarded him the medal? Do we believe 
now that he didn’t deserve it after all, because he did not in fact sacrifice? 
No. This is because the medal served to recognize laudable facts about 
Schaefer’s character, like his loyalty and courage.
Feldman is aware of this argumentative line. He considers it a “desper-
ate manoeuvre”, giving the following putative counterexample (p. 71): 
Two sick children are in the hospital. Both have suffered equally, but 
doctors are confident that one will recover while the other will die. The 
Make-a-Wish Foundation is able to grant a wish to only one of them. It 
is plain, Feldman says, that the terminal child deserves that benefit, and 
that he deserves it on the basis of what will happen to him in the future.
I agree with Feldman that the terminal child deserves to have his wish 
fulfilled. But this is not a case of forward-looking desert, because the 
child’s unhappy future is not the desert basis.
Instead, this is an archetypical case of moral desert. The desert subjects 
are the two children. The desert object is the welfare that wish fulfillment 
provides (observe that we would not insist that the terminal child deserves 
his wish if we knew that it would reduce his welfare). The desert basis is 
something like virtue, and by design of the thought experiment, the two 
innocent children do not differ in this way (if we knew the terminal child 
to be evil and violent, we would no longer regard him as deserving). And 
proportional equality (§1.2) tells us that when two desert subjects possess 
a desert basis in equal measure, they deserve equal desert objects.
But this is impossible; one child is terminal. We can, however, get 
closer to moral parity—do a better job of giving the children what they 
deserve—by granting the terminal child’s wish. It is not that he deserves 
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this on the basis of future suffering. Instead, our knowledge of that suf-
fering helps us maintain the moral balance.
Claims about forward-looking desert rest on mistakes related to the 
epistemology of the cases under consideration. This is true for Schmidtz’s 
view, as well. He asserts that “a person who receives opportunity X at t1 
can be deserving at t1 in virtue of what she will do if given the chance” 
(2002: 781), and gives the following example:
Two students receive scholarships. One [June] works hard and gets 
excellent grades. The other [Madison] parties her way through her 
first year before finally being expelled for cheating. Does their con-
duct tell us nothing about which was more deserving of a scholarship?
(p. 779)
Of course it does. Admissions committees want to give their scarce schol-
arships to diligent, intelligent, and honest high schoolers. But committees 
cannot precisely determine who has these qualities from the scanty infor-
mation an application provides. Mistakes get made. It is not that Madison’s 
moment of desert gets undone by her subsequent indolence and plagiarism; 
rather, those things illuminate unhappy features of her character, and dem-
onstrate that she never deserved the scholarship in the first place.
Suppose, for example, that, at the moment of award, the committee 
knew that June’s and Madison’s merits were equal and awarded them the 
scholarships. Subsequently, Madison undergoes a change of personality 
and starts ignoring her studies and cheating on tests. Would we say that 
Madison did not deserve her initial scholarship as a result of this change? 
I do not think so. We would say that Madison does not deserve to have 
her scholarship renewed, but justice was done when it was awarded to 
her the first time around.
Now, Schmidtz thinks that no explanation of this kind will work:
Can we defend the convention . . . [that] the students’ conduct is rel-
evant only because it reveals what they were like before receiving the 
award? It would appear not. When we look back at the expelled stu-
dent’s disgraceful first year, our reason for saying she did not deserve 
her award has nothing to do with speculation about what she did in 
high school. We may agree that both students were equally qualified 
for scholarships qua reward.
(p. 779)
This misunderstands the nature of the desert object. A scholarship is not 
a reward—or, at least, it is much more than that. A scholarship is also an 
object that looks to future achievement. And one can deserve on the basis 
of traits that support future achievement—but those traits must already 
exist. That is the requirement of backwards-looking desert.
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To illustrate, imagine a third applicant, who had an unambiguously 
better record than either June or Madison, but who, tragically, suf-
fered brain damage after graduating from high school. We do not think 
that that applicant deserved a scholarship, no matter his record. This is 
because merely recognizing high school achievement is not what scholar-
ships are for.
Similarly, Schmidtz wonders what we would say were we to discover 
that June and Madison were “equally unqualified . . . chosen via cleri-
cal error” (p. 779). In his view, June, given her subsequent performance, 
deserved the scholarship. Madison did not.
I do not agree. We are certainly pleased that June turned out as she 
did, but this does not make her retroactively deserving. Suppose Tyler, 
who lost out on the scholarship owing to the error, confronts us about 
our choice. It would be odd to respond to him in this way: “Tyler, had we 
not made a mistake, we would have known that you deserved the schol-
arship and given it to you. But we gave it to June, and in fact she ended 
up deserving it, because she made good use of it.” I find that confusing.
A more plausible response is this: “Tyler, you deserved that scholar-
ship. We thought that June did, but we made a mistake. You were the 
better applicant. Maybe you would have done better in college than June, 
maybe not. All we can do is take solace in the fact that June didn’t squan-
der her undeserved opportunity.” That sounds right.
I should say that Schmidtz’s purpose in proposing forward-looking 
desert is to justify the moral relevance of “natural and positional advan-
tages” (p. 786). As discussed, since Rawls, philosophers have typically 
assumed that these advantages undermine the possibility of desert. Thus, 
anyone who wants to admit desert as a moral principle, which a pluralist 
like Schmidtz does (see his 2006), must explain how the two are compat-
ible. Schmidtz’s “promissory desert” provides a way: We can “come to 
deserve” our advantages on the basis of what we do with them.
As I have argued, that is wrong. But I do agree with Schmidtz that (1) 
the existence of some advantages do not undermine the possibility of 
desert, and (2) demonstrating why this is so is a necessary task for the 
desert theorist.
Schmidtz and I disagree in the following two ways: First, I believe 
that “positional advantages” (e.g. receiving a large inheritance) do indeed 
undermine desert; Schmidtz does not. Second, I recover desert by ground-
ing desert-claims in the metaphysics of personal identity (Chapter 7) and 
requiring equal opportunity (§4.3); Schmidtz appeals to promissory desert.
4.8  The Justice/Efficiency “Trade-Off”, Part 1
It is sometimes thought that there is an inevitable tension between justice 
and efficiency; that improvements in one must come at the cost of the 
other. For some, this is a truism of public economics.
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Taxation provides the classic example: If we construe “justice” as util-
ity maximization, as economists almost always do, or about equality, as 
philosophers often do, then we must keep Okun’s leaky bucket (§2.3) in 
mind: Any redistribution in the name of justice reduces the surplus owing 
to the deadweight loss of taxation. Each step we take toward justice is a 
step away from an efficient economy.
In fact, there need not be a trade-off between these two moral goals. 
Some public policies are efficiency-enhancing, and if one’s preferred 
theory of justice calls for these, then we may satisfy the moral demands 
of justice and of efficiency at the same time.
Here and in two subsequent sections (§5.11 and §6.11) I explain how 
meritocracy’s principal features—equal opportunity, merit-based hiring, 
and income-responsive-to-merit—are efficiency-enhancing. Thus, I give 
more careful attention to efficiency than either Rawls or Nozick. And this 
is necessary for metatheoretical reasons (§2.3).
Public policy is not discussed in detail by Rawls, and so the efficiency 
losses associated with his theory (and everyone agrees there will be loss) 
were and largely still are unknown. As for Nozick, the public policies 
(lack thereof, really) are clear enough, but the results are opaque. Wak-
ing up in the nightwatchman state would be to wake up in Cockaigne or 
present-day Somalia—I’m not sure which.
Meritocracy does not suffer from this defect. We have good evidence—
microeconomic and macroeconomic, theoretical and empirical—that its 
public policies are efficient. In this section, I discuss the equal opportunity 
component of the theory, and explain in particular why publicly-funded 
education provides economic gains. There are three reasons.
First, education improves workers’ human capital, and thereby their 
productivity—and, as Paul Krugman reminds us, “productivity isn’t 
everything, but in the long run it is almost everything. A country’s ability 
to improve its standard of living over time depends almost entirely on its 
ability to raise its output per worker.” (1994: 11). Further, human capital 
improvement has a spill-over effect: When we educate a worker, W, he 
becomes more productive—and so do W’s peers, through their subse-
quent interactions with W.15
Second, education enables a wider range of jobs, making it easier for 
a person to find work and recover from layoffs. This, in turn, reduces 
his incentive to engage in criminality and other forms of socially damag-
ing behavior. (Education may also cultivate a moral disquietude toward 
crime.) Lochner and Moretti (2004) estimate that a 1 percent increase in 
the high school graduation rate for men saves $1.4 billion in social costs 
(property loss, incarceration expenses, etc.) These certainly must be taken 
into account when considering the “cost” of education.16
Third, education cultivates a respect for the truth, rational decision-
making, and a reliance on evidence over emotion—in short, all those 
traits that we educators hope to instill in our students. I know of no way 
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to even begin to estimate the positive externalities associated with these 
virtues, but they might be enormous.
Public education also solves various forms of market failure. One 
example involves an imperfection in credit markets: We should like for 
parents to be able to finance their children’s education by borrowing 
against their children’s future earnings, which get increased by education. 
But this is not generally possible, not least because the relevant contract 
cannot be enforced: The child did not sign the contract—his parents did.
Glenn Loury (1981) gives a model in which parents divide their incomes 
between consumption and providing education to their children. Owing 
to decreasing marginal returns to education, it is in everyone’s interest for 
rich parents to transfer some of their income to poor parents so that it can 
be invested in education. But this cannot be done privately for the reasons 
given above. Loury shows that redistribution, in the name of universal 
public education, can leave all parties, including the taxed rich, better off.
Fernández and Rogerson (1997, 1998) present a model of this class and 
calibrate it using data from the United States They estimate that moving 
from purely private education to a public system would produce a welfare 
gain equivalent to 3 percent of national income (over $500 billion today).
Bénabou summarizes the lesson of these models in this way: “The long-
run gains from redistributing resources (either directly or through income 
transfers) toward educational investment by poor families or communi-
ties could be quite large, amounting to several percentage points of GDP” 
(2000a: 328–9).17
Macroeconomic work also suggests that public investment in education 
is efficiency-enhancing. One approach, pioneered by Mankiw, Romer, and 
Weil (1992), examines cross-country economic data to determine the rela-
tionship between education and economic growth.
Robert Barro (1991) finds that a 1 percent increase in primary (sec-
ondary) school enrollment is associated with 2.5 percent (3.1 percent) 
increase in the per capita GDP growth rate. Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(1991) obtain a similar result for primary school enrollment—a 2.2 per-
cent increase in the growth rate. And Levine and Renelt (1992) obtain 
a similar result for secondary school enrollment—a 2.5–3.7 percent 
increase.18
I note that a new focus on educational investment would be in keeping 
with American tradition. The United States was the first nation to provide 
secondary education to all young citizens (although African-American 
children did not initially share in this good). This was a surprisingly 
recent innovation, ushered in by Progressives at the beginning of the 
twentieth century. Until then, high school had largely been limited to the 
children of the wealthy. In 1900, 10 percent of children attended high 
school; 50 years later, after massive public investment, 76 percent did.19 
Educational attainment continued to rise until roughly 1980. Since then, 
it has stagnated. Some economists believe that this explains, in part, 
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America’s historical prosperity and recent economic challenges; as Goldin 
and Katz (2008) put it,
that the twentieth century was both the American Century and the 
Human Capital Century is no historical accident. Economic growth 
in the more modern period requires educated workers, managers, 
entrepreneurs, and citizens. . . . Because the American people were 
the most educated in the world, they were in the best position to 
invent, be entrepreneurial, and produce goods and services using 
advanced technologies.
(pp. 1–2)
I want to mention, in conclusion, that it would be hugely inefficient 
(not to mention impossible) to try to perfectly implement any principle 
of justice—and that includes equal opportunity. No one is suggesting 
that. What we ought to concern ourselves with is the impact that viable, 
justice-mandated public policies have on our economy. For some theories 
of justice (e.g. strict egalitarianism), the associated public policies are 
known to be hugely inefficient. For others (e.g. luck egalitarianism), the 
necessary policies are unclear. In contrast, the public policies, like equal 
opportunity, that meritocracy calls for are straightforward, and known 
to be efficient.
Notes
 1 Pojman (1997) and Rachels (1978) think so.
 2 This rejection of the responsibility principle, given by Cupit (1996a, 1996b) 
and Feldman (1995), has come under attack by Smilansky (1996a, 1996b), who 
thinks that alternate forms of the principle can handle these counterexamples.
 3 Interested readers may see Hurka (2003) for further discussion.
 4 <www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/merit?utm_campaign=sd&utm_
medium=serp&utm_source=jsonld>, retrieved 3 August 2017.
 5 The metaphor may have first been used by Lyndon Johnson, in a 4 June 1965 
address at Howard University: “Imagine a hundred-yard dash in which one of 
the two runners has his legs shackled together. He has progressed ten yards, 
while the unshackled runner has gone fifty yards. At that point the judges 
decide that the race is unfair. How do they rectify the situation? Do they 
merely remove the shackles and allow the race to proceed? Then they could 
say that ‘equal opportunity’ now prevailed. But one of the runners would still 
be forty yards ahead of the other. Would it not be the better part of justice 
to allow the previously shackled runner to make up the forty-yard gap, or to 
start the race all over again?”
 6 See, e.g. Arneson (2015) and Daniels (1978).
 7 See also Weinzierl (2016).
 8 What I call “ability”, Roemer calls “effort”—confusing, given that diligence 
(i.e. what we typically think of as “effort”) is only one part of what we intui-
tively believe should affect economic outcomes.
 9 There is no obviously right way to compare ability across types, given that, 
generally, each type will see a different distribution of it. Roemer suggests that 
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we equalize quantiles across types; e.g. those in the top 1 percent of ability in 
type A should have the same economic outcomes as those in the top 1 percent 
of ability in type B, etc.
10 I discuss epistemic modesty in my 2015, Manuscript-A, and Manuscript-B.
11 On the moral irrelevance of conscience, see Foot (2002); Schueler (2007); and 
Wilcox (1968).
12 See, e.g. Cunha et al. (2006); Heckman (2013); and Heckman and Krueger 
(2003).
13 I limit the exposition I give here for reasons of space. Huub Brouwer and I 
have a paper which analyzes the differences in detail (Brouwer and Mulligan 
Manuscript).
14 See also Celello (2009) for a reply to Feldman and Schmidtz.
15 See, e.g. Moretti (2004) and Rauch (1993).
16 There are other possible social returns to education which I exclude for rea-
sons of space. For example, the more education a woman receives, the less 
she smokes and the more attentive she is to prenatal care—to the benefit of 
her child (Currie and Moretti 2003).
17 See also Bénabou (2000b, 2002); Gradstein and Justman (1997); and Saint-
Paul and Verdier (1993).
18 Some caution is in order: There is uncertainty about the size of the effect; there 
are unexplained differences between the returns on education for men and for 
women; and some evidence suggests that quality of education, rather than 
quantity, is the real driver of economic growth. See Sianesi and Van Reenen 
(2003) for a discussion of these issues, and of the econometrics involved.
19 See the National Center for Education Statistics’ Digest of Education Statis-
tics, at <https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d15/>, retrieved 6 August 2017.
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5.1  Meritocratic Hiring: Whetting the Intuition
None of the prevailing theories of distributive justice demands, categori-
cally, that the best-qualified applicant be hired. The utilitarian requires 
this only if it maximizes the general welfare. But it is conceptually pos-
sible and sometimes true in practice that the general welfare is served by 
hiring a less-qualified applicant on the basis of an irrelevant feature, like 
race (§5.9). A similar claim may be made against Rawls (see Arneson 
1999).
Libertarians, on the other hand, reject any constraints on how firm 
owners or their agents ought to behave when hiring. If owners/agents 
wish to hire a less-qualified person because he is a relative, or a friend, 
or a member of their preferred race, according to the libertarian there is 
nothing unjust about that.1
We should reject merely instrumental arguments for meritocratic hir-
ing. Justice demands that the best-qualified applicant be hired as an 
intrinsic matter. She deserves the job.
To bring out the intuition, let’s consider a context which will be famil-
iar to many readers: academic hiring. This context is beset by claims of 
injustice: Women claim that since a CV is regarded more highly when it 
has a male name on it than a female name, women face an unjust hurdle.2 
Men claim that, owing to strong pressure on committees to hire women, 
male candidates must have much stronger CVs than their female peers to 
be competitive for the very same job.3 Graduates of “unpedigreed” insti-
tutions wonder why, despite publications in top journals, they are passed 
over in favor of Ivy Leaguers who have produced nothing.4
Set aside the question of whether these claims are true or not to note 
that none of them is an objection to merit-based hiring. In fact, it’s just 
the opposite: All of these claims are objections to the justness of the job 
market made on the grounds of merit. The female candidate says that 
she’s the better philosopher but is denied the job owing to implicit bias; 
the male candidate says that, despite being more meritorious, he loses 
out because of affirmative action; and the unpedigreed candidate argues 
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(correctly—see, e.g. Burris 2004) that the publication record, not pedi-
gree, is a better proxy for merit.
Indeed, there is an inevitability to accepting merit as our distributive 
criterion. My friends on the left typically respond to my call for merito-
cratic hiring like this: “Tom, don’t you know that minority applicants are 
at a disadvantage, since hiring committees don’t prize the unique qualities 
that they possess?” Perhaps so. But what if we repaired that distortion? 
What if committees had a better definition of “merit”? They continue: 
“There would still be problems of implicit bias—committees uncon-
sciously regard minority applicants as inferior to white applicants.” Fine, 
but what if that distortion were repaired as well? What if we continued 
in that vein? What will ultimately satisfy us? The answer, it is agreed all 
around, is merit.
Consider another real-world example. In 2003, firefighters in New 
Haven, Connecticut took a civil service examination for promotion to 
Captain and Lieutenant. Ten white firefighters were found eligible for 
promotion to Lieutenant. Seven white firefighters and two Hispanic 
firefighters were found eligible for promotion to Captain. No African-
American firefighters were found eligible. The City of New Haven refused 
to certify the exam results as a result. The white and Hispanic firefighters 
sued, and, after appeal, the Supreme Court ruled in their favor (Ricci v. 
DeStefano).
Let us analyze the case from the meritocratic point-of-view. To begin 
with, the white and Hispanic firefighters have a plausible moral objection 
to the city’s action. We can imagine being one of those firefighters, having 
studied hard and competed in a fair examination in pursuit of promotion. 
Yet after coming out on top, we are told that the job is not ours after 
all—because of our race. A very natural reaction would be to throw up 
our hands at the injustice of it and ask: What does race have to do with 
anything? What else could I have done?
However, the existence of injustice is predicated on several things. First, 
was “merit” properly defined? If the exam was all that mattered for pro-
motion (it wasn’t), and, as things turned out, the winners were all rookies 
who happened to be expert test-takers, then our intuitions shift—perhaps 
the result is not just after all. But we do not dispute that merit is what 
counts; we only think that “merit” was misdefined.
Second, perhaps the test was not fair. If we find out that the exam’s 
essays were graded by white supremacists, then the “losers” are perfectly 
reasonable in their complaints. Why? Because they might in fact have 
been the more meritorious candidates, and their scores did not reflect 
their merit.
Indeed, although the question facing the courts was a legal, not a 
moral, one, supporters of the city’s decision frequently relied on merit-
based arguments: “Other firefighters spoke against certifying the test 
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results. They described the test questions as outdated or not relevant to 
firefighting practices” (Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009), pp. 7–8).
Even in these highly controversial cases involving race, there is some-
thing deeply compelling about recognizing a person’s merit. Again, this 
is typical: One finds that “anti-meritocratic” arguments are really argu-
ments for merit. The objectors want merit to be recognized; they just 
think that the extant process fails to do this.
Let us push things. Suppose that the African-American firefighters 
were in fact less meritorious, and that this was because they had been 
saddled with extra duties while white firefighters had time to study. Then 
the intuition shifts: An injustice has been done. We now know why. The 
white firefighters, despite being more meritorious, do not deserve their 
promotions. Equal opportunity was violated.
Finally, suppose that all of the firefighters had an equal opportunity 
to compete for the positions, and suppose that the white and Latino 
candidates did, indeed, win on the basis of their merit. Then they deserve 
those positions. One might still think that the city of New Haven has a 
legitimate worry. We can imagine the mayor saying something like this: 
“We simply can’t have a state-of-affairs in which a minority group which 
has faced discrimination and which continues to contend with serious 
social challenges is unrepresented in the civil service leadership. Maybe it 
is unjust for me to take a few jobs from more qualified white applicants 
and give them to less qualified African-American applicants. But I don’t 
have a choice. I have practical consequences to consider in making these 
judgments.”
Regardless of whether one is swayed by such an argument—I am not—
meritocratic theory explains how it gets made. To wit, one concedes that 
justice demands that the white and Hispanic applicants be hired, but then 
claims that there are overriding consequentialist considerations.
This view of the supremacy of merit is supported by empirical research. 
Although controversial from a legal point-of-view, affirmative action pro-
grams “designed to increase the number of black and minority students 
on college campuses” enjoy strong support with the public. (Republicans 
are almost evenly split in response to this question.)5
However, if polling questions make clear that these programs will 
violate meritocratic standards—that is, that they will provide an advan-
tage to less-qualified black or female applicants (rather than just, say, 
encouraging blacks or women to apply in the first place)—things change. 
When put in this way, these programs are overwhelmingly rejected—by 
Democrats, Independents, and Republicans.6
5.2  Why Should We Hire on the Basis of Merit?
In this section, I want to explore the core conceptual justification for 
the idea that the most meritorious candidate deserves the job. Later on 
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(§§5.5–5.8), I will advance other justifications for merit-based hiring: 
that it is a fair social framework; that it minimizes resentment in the labor 
market; that it provides second chances to people; and that it best satisfies 
fiduciary duties.
One might wonder how those justifications differ from the one given 
in this section. This is connected to an objection which has occasionally 
been leveled against desert itself (by, e.g. Lamont (1994)): Namely, that 
on its own, desert has no moral content; it is only a rhetorical tool, laid 
upon more fundamental moral notions.7 Thus, (the argument would go), 
what we should concern ourselves with is creating a fair social frame-
work, minimizing resentment, etc. Then, to say that people ought to get 
what they deserve is just to say that they ought to get what is required by 
the fair social framework, that which minimizes resentment, etc. There is 
no deeper sense of desert.
This is a mistake. The way to look at the admirable features of meritoc-
racy that I describe in §§5.5–5.8 is—in keeping with general justificatory 
structure of this book—as grounds to believe that the theory is correct. 
Just as it would be odd, a priori, if the true theory of justice were a disas-
ter from the point-of-view of efficiency, it would be odd if just hiring were 
widely regarded as unfair. Meritocracy avoids this fate.
So that is the strategy. One still wishes to have an answer to the ques-
tion, “What’s so special about merit?” Here I shall critically survey three 
answers which have been given and add two of my own.
First, the power of merit is sometimes put in terms of “appraising atti-
tudes”. The act of awarding the gold medal to the fastest runner is a kind 
of universal expression of an attitude we all feel—namely, admiration. 
And we express that attitude and others (gratitude, respect), when we 
award goods, including jobs, on the basis of merit. This view has an esti-
mable history, going back to Smith (1759).8 Indeed, some philosophers 
think these attitudes essential to the concept of desert; as Miller puts it, 
“if we did not adopt these attitudes towards one another, we would not 
and could not use the concept of desert” (1976: 89).
I find that view problematic. Imagine a society in which prevailing 
attitudes are reversed: Skill is shunned, stupidity is applauded; Justin 
Bieber is considered a virtuoso and Beethoven a rank amateur. One thing 
you might say about such a world is that, there, the inept and the stupid, 
and Justin Bieber, are deserving. That is a consequence I am unwilling to 
accept.9
Second, there is Aristotle’s argument (§1.2) for a natural fit between 
desert objects and merit. Michael Sandel argues along these lines: “Sup-
pose a Stradivarius violin is for up sale [sic], and a wealthy collector 
outbids Itzhak Perlman for it. The collector wants to display the violin in 
his living room. Wouldn’t we regard this as something of a loss, perhaps 
even an injustice—not because we think the auction is unfair, but because 
the outcome is unfitting?” (2009: 189).
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It does seem that there is injustice here which goes beyond the fact that 
the world will be deprived of good music if the collector gets the violin 
rather than Perlman, but I’m not sure how widely shared the natural fit 
intuition is.10
More promising is, third, the argument given by Sher (1987) (who finds 
the natural fit idea lacking), explaining the moral importance of merit-
based hiring by its connection to autonomous action:
When we hire by merit, we abstract from all facts about the applicants 
except their ability to perform well at the relevant tasks. . . . We treat 
them as agents whose purposeful acts can make a difference in the 
world. . . . Selecting by merit is a way of taking seriously the potential 
agency of both the successful and the unsuccessful applicants.
(p. 121)
The argument goes like this: A person is constituted by his traits and 
the choices he has made. Thus, when he sets his sights on a job and pre-
pares himself to do that job, he is, in a very real sense, changing his iden-
tity. If he is not judged on his merits then that autonomy is violated—he 
has lost control over the development of his life and, indeed, his identity.
I believe that is correct. The interested reader can consult Sher’s book 
for the detailed argument. Here I want to suggest two other possible 
grounds for merit-based hiring.
Let us consider criminal desert for a moment. What has happened when 
a person in the criminal context gets what he deserves? Two things, cer-
tainly. First, he has been convicted and punished for what he has done—not 
what someone else has done. This, recall, is the aboutness principle (§4.1): 
A person cannot deserve punishment on the basis of another’s crimes.
Second, the punishment must fit the crime. It is unjust to hang someone 
who jaywalked, and this is true no matter the consequences of that crime 
(imagine it caused a fatal car accident).
It always seems unjust to punish an innocent person, even in those 
cases in which it seems morally necessary. Consider H. J. McCloskey’s 
famous example:
Suppose that a sheriff were faced with the choice either of framing a 
Negro for a rape that had aroused hostility to the Negroes (a particu-
lar Negro generally being believed to be guilty but whom the sheriff 
knows not to be guilty)—and thus preventing serious anti-Negro 
riots which would probably lead to some loss of life and increased 
hatred of each other by whites and Negroes—or of hunting for the 
guilty person and thereby allowing the anti-Negro riots to occur. . . . 
In such a case the sheriff, if he were an extreme utilitarian, would 
appear to be committed to framing the Negro.
(1957: 468–69)
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Excepting hard-core Kantians, there comes a point for all of us at which 
utilitarian considerations control: If the consequences of failing to punish 
the innocent man are severe enough (imagine millions will die, somehow), 
we accede, morally, to the punishment. But we never view that as a just 
action. (A similar point was made in §2.2.)
The situation is analogous with distributive justice. Suppose we hire 
a less-qualified person in order to achieve some consequence (e.g. diver-
sity). When we do this, we sever the aboutness connection: No longer is 
the basis for awarding the job, in its entirety, the applicant’s character. 
This alone negates desert. Just as the innocent man cannot deserve pun-
ishment on the basis of another’s crimes, no applicant can deserve a job 
on the basis of other people’s performance (which, the argument goes, 
gets enhanced by diversity).
Similarly, when we select a person based on facts about him but which 
are unrelated to the job, we sever the fitness connection. It is unjust to 
hang someone because he jaywalked, no matter how wicked he be; and 
it is unjust to give a person a job when he is not the most meritorious 
applicant, no matter his other virtues.
If these considerations are correct, then the concept of desert—and, 
in particular, the aboutness and fitness principles—itself contains the 
grounding for distributing jobs on the basis of merit. And it does no good 
for the skeptic to try to push matters, asking why aboutness and fit are 
relevant. This is akin to asking why it is unjust to punish a person on the 
basis on another’s crimes. There is no “why”. This simply is our concept 
of justice and desert.
A final idea: While Sher’s argument for merit-based hiring may be inter-
preted as an appeal to the dignity of the potential recipients of jobs, it may 
also be that the conferrers of jobs find their dignity undermined when 
they deviate from merit-based hiring. It speaks well of a person when 
he recognizes that Beethoven is more meritorious than Bieber and acts 
accordingly, selecting the former for admission to the conservatory. And 
by advancing a system under which the distribution of scarce goods, like 
university slots, depends only on relevant facts about individuals’ charac-
ter, a person supports his own future potential to be treated with dignity.
5.3  How Do We Hire on the Basis of Merit?
I propose the following distributive rule:
(Meritocratic Hiring Principle) When hiring, it is unjust to discrimi-
nate against an applicant on grounds irrelevant from the point-of-
view of merit.
I shall elucidate this principle, which is the second of the three core fea-
tures of meritocracy (equal opportunity being the first), over the course of 
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this chapter. It may be understood easily enough. Its call for a strict focus 
on merit is simply a generalization of what we know to be true in specific 
cases. We know that it is unjust to deny an African-American man an 
office because of his race. We know that it is unjust to pass a woman over 
for a Nobel Prize on account of her gender and to give it to a less deserv-
ing man instead. Those are salient and obvious cases of injustice, but they 
are salient and obvious for contingent, historical reasons; not because race 
and gender have a special moral status. The world could have gone such 
that, say, brunettes faced prejudice that precluded their being judged on 
their merits. Or people with bushy eyebrows. Or whatever. What all these 
cases have in common is irrelevance from the point-of-view of merit.
But what, exactly, do we mean by “merit”? Here there is no single 
answer, since merit is clearly a contextual concept. What constitutes 
merit in a baseball player is quite different than what constitutes merit in 
a physicist. And even within those contexts, more fine-grained definitions 
may be found: What makes a third baseman meritorious is quite different 
from what makes a pitcher meritorious.
Nevertheless, once a context is fixed, it is usually plain what constitutes 
merit. Once a team decides it wants a third baseman, there is no dispute 
over what traits it should look for: quick reflexes and a powerful arm; 
hitting ability; discipline; an understanding of the game; and a first-rate 
work ethic.
Work ethic is almost always the most important element of merit.
Of course, there will be lively dispute about how these various elements 
of merit should be weighed. Notice that the meritocratic hiring principle 
does not constrain that debate. It is not unjust, although it might be quite 
stupid, for the team to make its decision purely on the basis of fielding 
prowess. That way of discriminating between prospects complies with 
the meritocratic hiring principle.
There will be other disputes: over, for example, the epistemic relevance 
of past performance and the use of proxies, like 60-m dash time. But 
these are not debates over the definition of merit; these are debates over 
whether some prospect is in fact meritorious.
Still, we need a practical way to define merit. In particular, compliance 
with the meritocratic hiring principle requires knowing which features of 
a person are irrelevant from the point-of-view of merit—so that we do 
not use them. I suggest the following heuristic: In a given hiring context, 
no applicant should be judged on the basis of a characteristic C if it is the 
case that a reasonable person, familiar with the hiring context, regards 
C as irrelevant from the point-of-view of merit. Put differently, hiring 
committees should only appeal to characteristics which all reasonable 
authorities believe are relevant from the point-of-view of merit.
So, when hiring a new faculty member, a physics department may con-
sider their applicants’ intelligence, pedagogical skill, creativity, etc.—for 
all reasonable people who are familiar with physics research and teaching 
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agree that these are relevant traits. But skin color, sexual preference, hob-
bies, appearance, political views, religious beliefs, and the like will fail to 
enjoy universal acclaim—and so they must be ignored.
This is a stringent rule. Some bona fide elements of merit are likely to be 
excluded. But history tells us that broadness in assessing merit, not nar-
rowness, is typically our sin—and so that is what we must guard against.
Once upon a time in the United States (and still, in some parts of the 
world) a homosexual applicant would have been denied a job owing to 
his sexual preference. And arguments were given for the relevance of 
sexual preference to merit. Some of these arguments would have been 
beyond the pale, even then (“God punishes those who employ sod-
omites”). But others would have won acclaim from some reasonable 
people (“homosexuality is a mental illness, and we do not want unstable 
people around students”). (N.B. homosexuality was not removed from 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders until 1987.) 
Of course, these arguments are now, rightly, regarded as unsound. And 
they would have been ruled out in the past, had committees obeyed the 
meritocratic hiring principle.
What guidance might the meritocratic hiring principle provide us now? 
Let us consider contemporary examples involving sexual behavior. Sup-
pose a firm is hiring, and has a prima facie best-qualified applicant whom 
it also knows: (1) enjoys bondage, or (2) is a former pornographic actor, 
or (3) has sex with kangaroos? Can any of that behavior, all of it weird 
and some of it arguably immoral, be held against the applicant?
No. The fact that behavior is weird carries no weight whatsoever. And 
when the moral dimensions of behavior are unclear, as they are here, we 
should be very skeptical that they speak to a person’s merits.
For (1) and (2), this is clear. I happen to think there’s nothing immoral 
about either of these behaviors. A reasonable person might; but that judg-
ment is inadmissible, as some reasonable people disagree. Facts (1) and 
(2) cannot justly be regarded as demerits.
Now, (3) is tougher because the case for immorality is stronger. (To 
avoid complications, assume the behavior is legal.) Nevertheless, I think 
we should remain committed to meritocratic hiring. That a person was 
convicted of theft is a good reason to believe that he lacks moral char-
acter. But we should not adduce sexual behavior as a demerit if doing so 
requires telling a complicated story that relies on propositions (about, e.g. 
the moral status of animals) of debatable truth.
One wonders how far such a principle should go. Should a former 
pornographer, open about her penchant for bondage, really be hired as a 
schoolteacher, to be put in front of innocent and impressionable children?
The answer is yes—if she is meritorious. That is the one and only thing 
that matters from the point-of-view of justice.
Now there will come a slew of objections: People with these sexual 
tastes are more likely to abuse children; no one with such a background 
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could possibly be a good role model; the aspiring teacher will try to incul-
cate promiscuity in the children; etc.
The rejoinder is simple: These are positive claims, and rationality 
requires that we believe positive claims only with sufficient evidence. The 
objector bears the burden of showing that these considerations are in fact 
true. Obviously no one wants a teacher who is abusive or promotes pro-
miscuity; obviously we want a teacher to be a good role model. No one 
disputes this. These are hugely important elements of merit. But treating 
people justly means not drawing unreasonable inferences about them on 
the basis of shoddy empirical claims.
Indeed, hiring schoolteachers who have, shall we say, a checkered 
past might be good in itself, as it would help children develop a respect 
for merit. We should like each young person to grow up confident that 
the personal choices she makes will not damage her ability to shape her 
life as she sees fit. Scenarios like these make us queasy precisely because 
we do not live in a meritocracy. When the world is a more just place, 
a schoolteacher’s pornographic past will no more disturb us than her 
stamp-collecting hobby.
5.4  Conceptual Complexities
I turn to the task of tidying up conceptual loose ends. To begin with, 
it should be clear that our justification for hiring the best-qualified is 
backwards-looking. Indeed, it must be, if it is to be a true desert principle 
(§4.7). It has the happy side-effect of being efficient (§5.11), but that is 
only a side-effect.
This is not a trivial point, since one sometimes finds arguments for 
“meritocratic” distributive schemes that are forward-looking. Norman 
Daniels (1978), for example, endorses a “Productive Job Assignment 
Principle” in which the “most qualified” applicant is the one who will 
maximize overall productivity. This may require denying jobs to best-
qualified applicants in a particular case:
Jack and Jill both want jobs A and B and each much prefers A to B. 
Jill can do either A or B better than Jack. But the situation S in which 
Jill performs B and Jack A is more productive than Jack doing B 
and Jill A (S′), even when we include the effects on productivity of 
Jill’s lesser satisfaction. The PJAP selects S, not S′, because it is attuned 
to macroproductivity, not microproductivity, considerations.
(p. 210)
This is a consequentialist justification; as Daniels admits, it is not respon-
sive to desert. While the meritocratic theory of justice I endorse would be 
better from the point-of-view of efficiency than the status quo, it is not 
optimally efficient.
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Next, let us consider some remarks by Feinberg, who denies what I 
have argued to be true—namely, that desert “represents uniquely the 
claim of justice” (1963: 90). Feinberg adduces the following example:
[Consider a] contest between two leading candidates for the master-
ship of a Cambridge college. Candidate A is, on the whole, more 
fit for the function (considered simply as a function). He is a better 
administrator, a tireless worker, a clever money-raiser, and has a 
cooler head. . . . Candidate B is a rather older man, past his peak in 
all respects, but on the basis of his previous scholarly achievement 
much more distinguished than A and also better liked.
(p. 89)
Feinberg views this as a case of desert against desert on the grounds that 
the mastership can be regarded as either (1) a prize (in which case it 
would go to A) or (2) a reward (in which case it would go to B). If that 
were so, then both men deserve the job, and so (this seems to be the logic) 
we need another principle of justice to adjudicate between them—desert 
cannot not do so.
But this is not a case of desert versus desert; it is a case of desert basis 
versus desert basis. The fact that B is better-liked and more scholarly are 
decisive for determining B’s deserts in some contexts (e.g. the awarding 
of emeritus status), but A seems to be more meritorious here, and that 
carries the day. Jobs are not rewards, nor are they prizes. They have a 
unique ontological status and they must be filled on the basis of merit. 
We need not look outside of desert to answer these questions of justice.
That said, we can conjure up a scenario under which B has a non-merit 
desert basis that is just so powerful that it overcomes A’s merit. Suppose B 
is a biologist who has discovered a cure for a worldwide pandemic, sav-
ing millions of lives. In this case, perhaps B, despite being a tiny bit less 
meritorious than A—qua college master—deserves the job. I’ll concede 
that (§4.2). But even in these absurd cases matters cannot be pushed far: 
If B would be a significantly worse college master than A, then nothing B 
had done, no matter how noble, could render him deserving of the job.
There is, however, one good reason why we should not be too quick to 
dismiss non-merit desert bases. This is the possibility that, for some jobs, 
gradations in excellence do not exist. For some jobs, many applicants 
may be equally meritorious.11 When that is so, we should appeal to a 
non-merit desert basis to decide who ought to get the job.
Suppose, by way of illustration, that we work for the postal service and 
must hire a new mailman. Candidate A is a high school graduate who 
spent the summer volunteering in a soup kitchen. Candidate B graduated 
alongside A, but spent his summer lounging on the beach. When it comes 
to the job, they are equally meritorious (each can sort mail with equal 
efficiency, each can deliver it at the same pace, etc.) We are simply unable 
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to discriminate between them on the basis of merit. Therefore, we turn to 
a non-merit desert basis as a tie-breaker, and hire A because of his charity 
work. He deserves the job more than B does.
Finally, although I have put things in terms of “hiring” to this point, 
the principle applies more broadly—to, for example, graduate school 
admissions. It is morally wrong to choose applicant A over better-qual-
ified applicant B because A is white and B is black. It is morally wrong 
to choose C, who is transgender, over better-qualified D in the name of 
diversity. And so on.
College admissions is the trickiest case, as evidenced by the hot public 
debate and litigation over affirmative action. It is interesting that even as 
we are divided over this issue, most of us both (1) support special consid-
eration for and extra resources to black high schoolers, and (2) oppose 
any affirmative action at the graduate school level. Why the asymmetry?
Meritocratic theory explains things. High school is plainly part of 
an equal opportunity framework, and graduate school is plainly not. 
Because the mean black child is disadvantaged relative to the mean white 
child, providing extra consideration to black children levels the playing 
field. That is required by justice (§4.3). And because we are talking about 
children and not adults, Formal EO is inapplicable.
In contrast, when it comes to graduate school, we are talking about 
adults in competition for a resource (viz. graduate education) which is 
plainly not part of equal opportunity. And so violations of meritocratic 
“hiring” here disturb our sense of justice and violate it theoretically.
College admissions is difficult because it lies at the middle ground. 
Are 20-year-olds children or adults? Is a college education necessary for 
a citizen to be able to develop a plan-of-life for herself and then embark 
upon it, or not? That is, is it part of equal opportunity?
These are contingent questions, and so what justice demands of us 
in practice in this respect depends on facts about how our economy is 
operating. The more having a college degree is a de facto requirement 
for being competitive in the labor market—as increasingly seems to be 
the case—the more we may be able to support violations of Formal EO 
in college admissions. I’ll discuss affirmative action more in §9.2, but 
my own view is that, if this positive analysis is correct, the government 
should simply treat college education like it should treat high school edu-
cation: with robust public investment providing quality schooling to all, 
regardless of family circumstances.
5.5  Meritocracy Is a Fair Social Framework
I have not talked about “fairness” to avoid complicating things. As best 
I can tell, justice and fairness are one and the same thing conceptually.
But I do wish, here, to put a few things in terms of fairness, by which 
I shall mean the sentiment expressed by a people toward the distributive 
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system it lives under. It is important that we feel that the process by which 
jobs and other social goods get assigned is right/just/fair—however you 
want to put it—if only, as I have said (§2.3), because this indicates that 
our distributive choices were wise.
We begin with the premise that jobs are central to people’s plans-of-
life. While not universally true, it is very nearly so—especially now, in the 
aftermath of women’s liberation. One’s career, and the various jobs which 
comprise it, are central to one’s identity.
The problem is, of course, that jobs are scarce—and so one person’s 
ability to fulfill his plan-of-life comes at the cost of another’s. This is rec-
ognized all-around, and is a source of sadness in the world. Although we 
may never be able to give all people all the jobs that they want, we can, 
now, provide a fair competitive framework. This is what meritocracy does.
Citizens in a meritocracy consider which jobs are necessary to pursue 
meaning in the world as they see it. They assess the costs, risks, and trade-
offs involved. They come to an understanding of what they must do to 
achieve the things that they want. And they develop their plans-of-life 
accordingly, as they desire. And then they achieve these plans-of-life, or 
they do not, on the basis of their merit.
This fair structure does not exist in other competitive frameworks. 
When Rose, the most meritorious applicant for an academic job (in 
philosophy, say), loses out to Billy because of cronyism, racial discrimi-
nation, pedigree, or another factor irrelevant from the point-of-view of 
merit, this is bad. It is bad because it is unjust. It is bad because the uni-
versity is getting an inferior academic (§5.8). But it is also bad because 
the costs that Rose incurred and the trade-offs that she made earlier in her 
career, which contributed to her merit now, went for naught.
In making herself a meritorious philosopher, Rose gave up many 
things: rewarding experiences, to include, perhaps, romantic relation-
ships; travel; hobbies; and more. She gave these things up willingly, 
because what was important to her was becoming the best philosopher 
that she could be. And she has become the best philosopher, but yet now 
finds her plan-of-life frustrated by a person—Billy—who did not have to 
make these sacrifices. Billy thus “double dips” socially, enjoying the ben-
efits of (1) the job and (2) the experiences that should have been sacrificed 
for (1) (and which Rose did sacrifice).
Of course, there are no guarantees: Rose might have inaccurately reck-
oned what it would take to achieve her goal. She might have worked too 
little or invested too much. But at least in those cases the responsibility 
falls on Rose alone. Any society that takes personal responsibility seri-
ously, which meritocracy does (§6.9), must have this as a feature of the 
competitive framework. When distributive decisions are made strictly on 
the basis of merit, a person’s ability to receive these distributions is lim-
ited only by her willingness and her ability to make herself meritorious in 
the appropriate way. And when a person has confidence that distributive 
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decisions will in fact be made meritocratically, she can accurately assess 
the risks and trade-offs involved, and plan her life accordingly.
This is important because, as Sher puts it, “choosing among options 
in light of their consequences is just what living a life is” (2017: 90).12 
Autonomy requires that those consequences in fact obtain. If the com-
petitive framework functions as it currently does—with nepotism, race, 
physical appearance, and countless other non-merit factors playing a role 
in hiring, depending on owners’ tastes—then autonomy is undermined by 
the protean nature of distributive decisions. In a meritocracy, there is no 
ambiguity: Merit, and only merit, is what counts.
Compare meritocracy with egalitarian and libertarian approaches. 
Egalitarians are happy to violate any stable norm of hiring in order to, for 
example, produce a workforce with a particular gender or racial makeup. 
Under such a system, fairness and personal responsibility are violated in 
two ways. First, a person can control her destiny only to the extent to 
which doing so does not interfere with the moment’s social planning. 
Rose may form a plan-of-life that includes holding some job, and she may 
make the investments and sacrifices necessary to excel in that job; but she 
may not get it if, at the moment of distribution, Rose does not possess the 
characteristics, irrelevant from the point-of-view of merit, that the social 
planner deems important. Second, an unmeritorious applicant, who has 
failed to responsibly prepare himself to discharge the duties of the job, 
may nonetheless get it—if that serves demographic goals.
Libertarianism also violates personal responsibility, as I will argue at 
length in §6.9. Our contemporary economy is replete with examples: 
intelligent and industrious young people unable to find jobs because they 
lack family influence; our cultural emphasis on pedigree and networking; 
and the exorbitant salaries paid to “supermanagers”, whose compensa-
tion vastly exceeds their performance.
Now, it is true that non-meritocratic societies can provide a framework 
within which citizens can rationally develop and pursue plans-of-life. In 
a society ruled by cronyism, for example, a citizen who wants some job 
knows how he can pursue it: flatter the right people and make the right 
connections. This cronyistic framework might be “fair” in the limited 
sense that everyone is judged along a single measure (viz. the ability to 
curry favor), which is known to all. But note an important difference 
between these systems and meritocracy: Only in a meritocracy is a per-
son’s ability to fulfill his plan-of-life in his own hands. If Tony lives in 
Cronyville, he can set a goal for himself and then pursue it in the prevail-
ing, cronyistic way. But at the end of the day, other people are going to 
make the decision about whether Tony reaches his goal or not. In a meri-
tocracy, Tony makes that decision for himself, by doing what is necessary 
to get the things that he wants.
Later on (§6.5) I shall address this issue at length, but I’ll just note 
here that a meritocracy would not put most jobs off-limits to most 
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people, or segregate society into classes based on IQ, or produce any 
other dystopian results. To be sure, some people are born smarter than 
others; some people have a natural diligence while others must con-
sciously apply themselves; some are charming, others shy. We all have 
our strengths and our weaknesses. But if we begin our adult lives having 
enjoyed Fair EO, then nearly all of us can, with sufficient effort, obtain 
most jobs.
It is true, of course, that for any given citizen there are jobs that, even in 
a meritocracy, are unavailable to him. I could not have been a basketball 
player, or a fashion model, or a jockey—no matter how hard I had tried. 
Maybe most people cannot be university professors. So what? That is 
not grounds for moral worry; a society in which citizens have a reason-
able range of jobs available to them suffices. As Sher puts it, “it is merely 
perverse for someone to remain deeply upset over his inability to become 
a professional athlete when he is perfectly capable of making a successful 
career in education or business” (1987: 32).
Indeed, an economy in which every citizen had a substantive shot to 
serve in every job would be nightmarish: People who lacked hand-eye 
coordination could fly passenger jets; those who suffered from palsy 
could become neurosurgeons; and so on. Put aside the huge efficiency 
losses associated with such an economy—it institutionalizes a nasty form 
of individualism, where the needs of the community are totally subordi-
nated to the egos of citizens. Better to have a society in which each citizen 
makes an honest reckoning of her strengths and weaknesses, eliminates 
some potential professions accordingly, finds a job for which she is well-
suited, and enjoys a satisfying career while making a contribution to our 
collective economic life.
There is nothing desirable about a framework that provides jobs to 
people who are unsuited to them. Such a framework unjustly harms the 
plan-of-life of another (viz. the most meritorious applicant), and is absurd 
from an efficiency standpoint. And I think we all know this to be true. We 
do not think it unjust that our distributive system bars those with Down 
syndrome from becoming commercial airline pilots.
Moreover, we do not treat the severely disabled with dignity when we 
push them into roles which they cannot satisfy given their more limited 
merits. Dignity is not a result of obtaining the “best” job that one can; 
it comes from having a job to do and doing it well. When we see some-
one with Down syndrome bagging groceries, we do not say: “What a 
horrible injustice, that he must bag groceries.” My response, at least, is 
just the opposite. I think it is laudable. We have a man who is making 
a contribution to our collective economic life. That is more than can be 
said for many able-bodied men. He is making some money on his own 
and enjoying a degree of independence. He is finding real meaning in the 
face of extraordinary challenge. To denigrate the economic structure that 
enables such a life is to denigrate the life itself.
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5.6  Meritocracy Minimizes Resentment
So long as there is scarcity there will be sadness. By definition, some 
people’s desires will go unfulfilled. And there may be other lamentable 
emotions, too: envy of those who have more and pity for those with less. 
But there need not be resentment—and in a meritocracy there will not be.
Resentment is morally-laden anger. It arises “in response to a certain 
kind of threat: that is, an unjustified, intentional injury, harm, or insult to 
oneself, or those with whom one identifies closely” (MacLachlan 2010: 
425). In this way, while resentment is an unpleasant emotion, it is also an 
eminently reasonable one.
Some philosophers, like Jeffrie Murphy, even exalt resentment on the 
grounds that it provides the motivation for combatting injustice:
What are the values defended by resentment . . . ? I would suggest 
three: self-respect, self-defense, and respect for the moral order. . . . 
Just as indignation or guilt over the mistreatment of others stands 
as emotional testimony that we care about them and their rights, so 
does resentment stand as emotional testimony that we care about 
ourselves and our rights.
(2003: 19)
I think that is basically correct, and it suggests that while we should 
not try to eliminate resentment, exactly, we should welcome a social order 
that does that as a side-effect. That would be evidence that an important 
moral sensor—our capacity to feel resentment—is picking up on less and 
less injustice in the world.
Meritocratic hiring minimizes resentment. When we lose out on a job 
to another on meritocratic grounds, our capacity to sympathize with the 
successful candidate is undiminished; we bear her no ill-will. We put our-
selves in her shoes, understand that we competed on equal terms for the 
position, and accept that she is simply better equipped to do the job than 
we are. We recognize that she is the more deserving applicant and that the 
communities to which the office has a fiduciary duty (§5.8) benefit more 
from her selection.
Meritocracy fosters social cohesion through competitive processes that 
do not generate resentment. Indeed, there can be dignity in loss—so long 
as it comes after a competition, on a level playing field, against a more 
meritorious peer. How many Olympic silver medalists have felt resent-
ment towards the winners? I would wager very few.
Other hiring norms do generate resentment. If Smith is on the academic 
job market, and he knows that he is the most meritorious applicant for a 
job, but he does not get it owing to his race, or his gender, or the advan-
tage of an insider candidate, or his lack of pedigree, etc., then Smith does 
feel resentful—as he should.
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Anti-meritocratic hiring also generates resentment among winners. The 
knowledge that one has obtained a benefit despite not deserving it on the 
basis of merit undermines one’s ability to enjoy the thing. One cannot 
take pride in an “achievement” that reflects no credit to oneself, and that 
came at the cost of another.
Indeed, this is precisely what happens with affirmative action programs 
that violate meritocratic standards (§9.2): They reduce self-confidence 
and increase anxiety among those who benefit from them. These are gen-
erally blacks or women, but the same result holds when the beneficiaries 
are a socially dominant group, like white men (e.g. if they enjoy prefer-
ence for nursing jobs). (See, e.g. Leslie, Mayer, and Kravitz 2014.)
Resentment undermines social cohesion and, if widespread enough, 
threatens the distributive system itself. Each one of us participates in 
shared economic life in order to enjoy a level of welfare unattainable 
on our own, in the state of nature. Even when we advance incompatible 
interests we are bound by this common tie. And as reasonable beings we 
can accept that distributive decisions may not work out in our favor every 
time; we recognize these shortcomings as inevitable parts of a system 
which is, in the large, in our interest.
A resentful person does not feel this way. He regards the system as 
illegitimate. He no longer views himself as working cooperatively with 
good-willed peers; his peers are now his enemies, and the system is their 
tool of violence again him.
Every distributive system has winners and losers, and each of us will 
be both of these from time to time. But a distributive system need not 
have resentful losers (nor resentful winners, for that matter). If we are to 
work together, sharing in the benefits and the burdens of economic life, 
we need a distributive system whose decisions we can respect even when 
they don’t go our way. Meritocracy provides this.
5.7  On the Importance of Second Chances
A person’s plan-of-life may be disrupted as easily from within as from 
without. All of us make mistakes, and some of these do us professional 
injury. Some errors in judgment put our very careers in jeopardy—as is 
the case when a person commits a serious crime.
I think that we should like to live under a distributive system that 
recognizes this plain fact: that any of us might, at any time, err, and that 
even the most upright among us avoids this fate only by dint of fortune, 
at least in part. A just distributive system will, therefore, allow people to 
recover from their missteps. Meritocracy provides this to the maximum 
(non-ideal) extent possible.
This is for two reasons. First, meritocracy minimizes the use of proxies 
when determining merit (§5.9). A person’s criminal history is relevant in 
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hiring only to the extent to which it is a useful proxy for merit, which is 
far less than its actual use suggests.
Second, the meritocratic hiring principle prevents hiring committees 
from denying jobs to best-qualified applicants on grounds of taste. Con-
sider a case in which a job applicant has a criminal history which, it is 
agreed all around, is of no relevance to the desired position. Example: A 
man who committed a victimless crime—drug possession or solicitation 
of a prostitute, say—applies for a job as a salesman.
Suppose, despite being the most meritorious applicant for the job, the 
hiring committee rejects him owing to his criminal past. According to the 
meritocrat, this denial is unjust, to be proscribed by law.
This call to hire the best-qualified former criminal is not obvious. To be 
sure, some justifications for rejecting the call are implausible on their face: 
“People who commit crimes are inherently evil, and should be shunned.” 
But an employer may have a sensible, taste-based objection: “Whether 
it’s reasonable or not, our other workers will be made uncomfortable by 
having a criminal in their midst; if we employ this man, their productivity 
will suffer.”
To the meritocrat, neither of these justifications holds water. Whether 
this hire will cause owners, workers, or customers discomfort is irrel-
evant. The effect of the hire on the firm’s bottom line is irrelevant.
One might object by claiming that past criminality always serves an 
informational function—since an important feature of any job is compli-
ance with the law. Past criminality suggests that this element of merit is 
lacking.
But this objection should not sway us. One reason is pragmatic; as I 
noted in §5.3, we should be cautious about accepting tortuous justifica-
tions like these. Almost always they are used as cover for anti-merito-
cratic bias.
Additionally, plausible arguments might be given in favor of criminal 
history: A willingness to commit a (non-violent) crime suggests confi-
dence, maybe; or an ability to connect with customers whom law-abiders 
cannot reach; or a certain worldly wisdom. The possible arguments here 
are endless. And I think they are all ultimately bad ones, just like the 
argument for using criminal history as a demerit. If you are involved in 
hiring, rely only on those features of a candidate that are plainly relevant 
from the point-of-view of merit. If you do that, then you will have done 
what justice requires.
This is not to say that there is no professional cost to criminality. There 
is the loss of human capital which one suffers (generally as a result of 
prison time), and meritocracy poses no objection to that loss. (A merito-
crat might, of course, object to unreasonable sentences on grounds inde-
pendent of economic justice.)
What is unjust on the meritocratic approach are the so-called “ collateral 
consequences” of conviction that impinge on the distributive sphere. 
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Jones committed a crime, suffered criminal and civil sanctions as a result, 
and thereby society and his victims were made whole. While incarcer-
ated, he was unable to invest in his plan-of-life: He was unable to pursue 
education, develop skills, gain work experience, and so on. It is not unjust 
that his plan-of-life was stunted in this way. But since, ex hypothesi, 
criminal justice was meted out, there is no residual of injustice which 
the distributive system must address. Therefore, it is an injustice to deny 
Jones a job now if he is the best-qualified applicant.
5.8  Fulfilling Fiduciary Duties
One interesting feature of hiring is that those making hiring decisions 
often have moral duties to third parties. HR departments are the agents 
of company directors, and they must hire with stockholders’ interests in 
mind. University search committees must choose new professors with an 
eye towards their students, who have a reasonable expectation of compe-
tent teaching. And so on. I’ll call these fiduciary duties of hiring, although 
I do not mean this in the strong sense of “fiduciary”: Search committees 
do not act entirely on the behalf of students, but they are accountable, to 
a degree, to them.
The major lesson of this chapter is that we act unjustly when we dis-
criminate on grounds irrelevant from the point-of-view of merit. The 
injustice is done primarily to the meritorious applicant who deserved the 
job, although we also treat the less meritorious applicant, who got the job, 
unjustly—and perhaps ourselves as well. Here I point out that violations 
of meritocratic hiring often do an injustice to another party: namely, the 
community that would have benefited from the selection of the more 
meritorious applicant.
Shareholders of the widget factory will receive the greatest return if 
their HR department hires the best widget maker; not the most attractive 
one, nor the whitest, nor the person with whom it has a personal con-
nection. In the academic context, insofar as teaching is a component of 
the job (i.e. insofar as there is a fiduciary duty to students which must 
be discharged in this particular hire), students will learn the most from a 
meritorious teacher. And so on. This is all obvious (although complicated, 
marginally, by the problem of taste discrimination—§5.9).
Michael Walzer has commented on this idea, in fact arguing against 
desert-based hiring on grounds of fiduciary duties (note that Walzer’s 
concern is “offices”, which are a subset of jobs as I construe them). Wal-
zer says that
an office . . . cannot be deserved because it belongs to the people who 
are served by it, and they or their agents are free (within limits . . .) 
to make any choice they please. Search committees are unlike juries 
in that their members look forward as well as back: they make 
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predictions about the candidate’s future performances, and they also 
express preferences about how the office should be filled.
(1983: 136)
A few things to say about this. First, there is an ambiguity present. Saying 
that an office “belongs” to those whom it serves suggests a libertarian 
ownership relation. But in most hiring contexts, that is too strong. Con-
sider a teaching college that has a new tenure-track line: This office serves 
students at the college, but it does not “belong” to them in any strong 
sense of ownership. The correct relationship is the weaker fiduciary one 
I described.
Second, the meritocrat agrees with Walzer that search committees have 
latitude in determining how merit will be defined (§5.3). This is especially 
true for senior positions, in which hiring is less about filling an opera-
tional need and more about shaping policy. It is perfectly legitimate for 
the fellows of a college to decide that they want their new master to focus 
on fundraising rather than research, and thus to consider fundraising skill 
as an element of merit.
The meritocrat’s point is that committees do not have carte blanche 
here. Their discretion is less than Walzer suggests. Committees must 
comport themselves in accordance with the meritocratic hiring principle. 
The owners of a bank may not rely on facts about applicants’ “racial 
purity”; voters may not incorporate race into their candidate selections; 
a medical practice hiring a new doctor may not take into account her bra 
size. And so on.
In addition, Walzer’s concern about the need to “look forward” in 
hiring does not imperil desert-based theories grounded in merit (see also 
Miller 1992). Merit both looks backwards to determine who deserves 
the job, and forwards—by putting superior performers into positions of 
responsibility, so that their performance can redound to the benefit of the 
community.
5.9  Just and Unjust Discrimination
I consider three complications to meritocratic hiring. I begin with the 
problem of taste discrimination, first explored by Gary Becker (1957). 
Becker observed that a rational firm will pay less to equally qualified 
black employees (e.g.), and perhaps not hire them at all, if there is some 
disamenity value to their employment. While the people actually doing 
the hiring may not be racists, there is racial animus somewhere which 
results in discrimination against blacks.
For example, if some of the firm’s employees are racist, then the 
firm’s managers may rationally prefer a less-qualified white applicant 
to a more-qualified black applicant: Having blacks in the firm induces a 
productivity loss in the racist employees. Or, if customers are racist, then 
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they may patronize the firm less when it hires blacks, decreasing revenue. 
Accordingly, these prejudices get reflected in the labor market, in hiring 
and wages.
The meritocratic response to this form of discrimination is clear. Con-
siderations of taste cannot justify race-based discrimination. The firm’s 
bottom line must be subordinated to the demands of justice, which 
include hiring the better-qualified black applicant (and paying him com-
mensurate with his skill). This is especially unproblematic when one 
remembers that those who will suffer from the “inefficiency” of hiring 
blacks are precisely those who act unjustly in the first place: customers 
(who must contend with the higher prices their racism produces) and firm 
employees (whose jobs are put at risk because their firm is less profitable).
It is true that some non-racists may be harmed as well (e.g. the firm’s 
non-racist employees). This is an unfortunate side-effect, but it is not suf-
ficiently important to impugn the meritocratic hiring principle. An anal-
ogy would be a firm that knowingly sells a harmful product, gets caught, 
and goes out of business as a result. Not all the firm’s employees were 
complicit, and it is unfortunate that those employees must suffer, but that 
doesn’t change things: The firm should be eliminated.
Now, taste discrimination is unsustainable in competitive markets 
(non-racist firms hire labor at lower cost and push the racist firms out of 
the market). More serious is the problem of statistical discrimination.13 
This is the use of facts about the distribution of ability within a group, 
like a racial group, to assess the ability of a particular applicant who 
belongs to that group.14
A rational firm hires the applicant with the highest expected produc-
tivity. Applicants send signals of their productivity (in the form of CVs, 
interviews, letters of reference, etc.) to firms. But these signals are noisy. 
When there is noise, knowledge of the distribution of ability within the 
group (both the mean and the variance) will be used by a rational firm to 
judge the applicant’s expected productivity.
The critical point about statistical discrimination is that there is no 
racial animus, anywhere: The firm is doing its level best to determine 
who the best-qualified applicant is. Moreover, statistical discrimination is 
unavoidable in real-world hiring contexts. Every feature of an applicant’s 
CV is really just a proxy for what the firm actually cares about, which 
is productivity in one form or another. Past performance is hugely cor-
related with future success but is no guarantee; prizes are suggestive of 
merit, but only suggestive; letters of reference are useful but imperfect. 
To ask a firm to not rely on proxies is to ask that it give up the goal of 
merit-based hiring—which it cannot justly do.
What should our rules be for using proxies? First, in those cases in 
which they are unnecessary, we should not use them. Suppose that we are 
judging a bodybuilding competition. We all agree that Serge is aestheti-
cally superior to Lou. We then see that Serge trains at Elite Gym and that 
116 A Meritocratic Theory of Economic Justice
Lou trains at Superelite Gym. We also all agree that bodybuilders from 
Superelite Gym are, on average, aesthetically superior to bodybuilders 
from Elite Gym. It is obvious that that fact ought to play no role in our 
decision about who should get the trophy. And this irrelevance has noth-
ing to do with the value of the proxy: The proxy is accurate, telling us 
something meaningful—that Lou belongs to a class which is, on average, 
more meritorious than the class to which Serge belongs. But in this case 
there is simply no need to resort to a proxy; it would be unjust to do so.
When it comes to more common hiring contexts, in which proxies 
cannot be avoided, we must take care to (1) prefer more accurate proxies 
to less accurate proxies, and (2) weight our proxies appropriately. This 
might seem obvious, but in fact these rules are violated all the time in 
the real world. Academic hiring provides a perfect example: Not only is 
pedigree granted more weight than is warranted by its proxy value, it is 
often used as a litmus test to categorically exclude applicants who do not 
possess it. As Val Burris puts it,
the evidence on academic hiring . . . shows that the most prestigious 
departments hire almost exclusively from the graduates of similarly 
prestigious departments to an extent that exceeds anything that can 
be explained by the meritocratic application of universalistic stan-
dards regarding past or potential scholarly productivity.
(2004: 244)
This is because
there is little evidence of any independent effect of the prestige of 
one’s PhD-granting department upon productivity, either at the pred-
octoral stage or later in the academic career. The strongest predictors 
of postdoctoral productivity are predoctoral productivity (publica-
tions and/or citations) and how quickly candidates complete the 
doctorate.
(p. 241)15
It is unclear, the extent to which reliance on pedigree is a form of crony-
ism (which Burris suspects), rather than a good-faith misuse of a proxy. I 
imagine it is a bit of both. But we have a responsibility to combat it either 
way: a responsibility to meritorious and unpedigreed applicants, who are 
not given what they deserve; to the communities to whom we have fidu-
ciary responsibilities, which are being subjected to inferior research and 
teaching; and to our own intellectual culture—which is being degraded 
by an elitism unconnected to merit.
Next, there is the question of whether family-owned business may vio-
late the meritocratic hiring principle on grounds of familial loyalty. They 
might do this either by explicitly choosing a less-qualified family member 
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out of the pool of applicants, or by failing to advertise the job, thus mak-
ing the family member the most meritorious by default.
To answer this question, we must first distinguish between family-
owned businesses like Walmart (51 percent of which is owned by the 
Walton family), and family-owned businesses like the little hardware 
store on the corner. The case for an exception to the meritocratic hiring 
principle is stronger for businesses of the latter type. This is because they 
have more in common with hobbies than economic enterprises; they are 
less obviously part of our collective economic life. The all-important 
profit motive is sometimes missing; families may even maintain unprofit-
able businesses if they have the external means to do so. Family-owned 
businesses regard their customers, whom they may know personally, as 
more than merely sources of revenue. And family-owned businesses often 
operate informally, without standard practices or business plans.
Imagine a man who to decides to open a music store, Guitararama, 
in his retirement. He wants to play music with his friends, support local 
musicians, and, perhaps, make a little money on the side. He needs an 
employee, and so he hires his brother. Has he acted unjustly?
It seems to me that he has not. His store is best regarded as a hobby. 
The man is not making employment decisions with an eye toward prof-
its. He cares little for market supply, demand, or pricing. He has few 
customers. He provides little tax revenue. None of these considerations is 
dispositive, but they are suggestive.
Suppose Guitararama grows. New locations open, hundreds of employ-
ees are hired, there are lawyers and accountants, and the chain becomes 
an important part of the local economy. Now the meritocratic hiring 
principle applies. If the man hires a less-qualified family member, then he 
acts unjustly.
Of course it will be asked: Where is the precise cut-off? The answer is 
that there is no precise cut-off. Like so many concepts (how much hair 
must a man lose before he is bald?), this one is vague. We tend to know 
these things when we see them.
Note also that as firms get bigger and bigger, fiduciary duties (§5.8) 
become stronger and stronger. When Guitararama is a single store, devia-
tions from merit-based hiring have little effect on stakeholders; when it is 
a large chain this is no longer true.
It is important to note that just because a person acts unjustly in hir-
ing, by showing preference to a family member or a friend, that does not 
mean that he is deeply morally blameworthy. A comparison may be useful. 
Imagine you have a brother, whom you love, and who you know has com-
mitted a serious crime. He comes to you to ask your help in concealing his 
crime from the police. You do this; you do not turn him in, you help him 
dispose of evidence.
The intuition is that you have not done anything too morally blamewor-
thy. I think this is correct. Indeed, your loyalty may even be admirable. But 
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we would not say that what you are doing is just. No: Your brother com-
mitted a crime, he hurt another person, and he deserves to be punished. 
Your actions, however noble they be, come at the expense of justice.
The same is true when it comes to hiring. Loyalty to family and 
friends is to be expected. This means, positively, that perhaps we cannot 
completely eradicate nepotism in hiring. But we can diminish it, and we 
should. And it means, normatively, that we will never be too hard on 
people when they fail to be purely disinterested employers, and show 
some preference toward a spouse, sibling, or friend.
But our concern is what justice demands of us—so that we can arrange 
our institutions accordingly. And justice demands that we not deviate 
from merit-based hiring (except, as discussed, when it comes to small 
family firms).
One can get a sense of the badness of nepotism by trying to sympathize 
with the perspective of the person who will lose out because of it. One 
can easily say, “I know my spouse, I know how hard she’ll work, what 
a good job she’ll do.” But another applicant’s spouse can tell the exact 
same story. And another applicant is in deep need. Another has overcome 
adversity. Still another is heartbroken, and could use a bit of good news. 
The potential arguments here are innumerable. The only way to resolve 
them, doing justice to all, is to focus on merit.
5.10  The Curious Case of Political Competence
Political offices involve distinct moral complications. Chief among these 
is the idea, endorsed by many (although not by me—see Mulligan Manu-
script), that it is important that our politicians reflect the preferences of 
those who elect them. If so, then merit alone cannot be the only thing rel-
evant to just political selection. It would be unjust to select any politician, 
no matter how competent he be, if his policy preferences were different 
from those that prevailed in the electorate.
I do not wish to wade into that issue, but instead to say a few words 
about the political lessons which can be drawn from the argument I have 
given.16
To begin with, the key difference between (1) the 99 percent of jobs 
which we have concerned ourselves with and (2) political offices has to 
do with the potential collision between justice and efficiency that merito-
cratic hiring may produce. Justice is the most important moral concern, 
but because its satisfaction may come at the cost of consequences that we 
deem morally important, it is possible that we might be morally obligated 
to act unjustly.
Recall the thought experiment of §5.2: We could obtain an excellent 
consequence—namely, saving many lives—by hanging an innocent man. 
If the number of potential lives saved gets big enough, the action becomes 
morally permissible, maybe obligatory. But the intuition about justice 
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remains unchanged: It is always unjust to hang an innocent man, no mat-
ter the consequences.
This divergence is rare in actual practice for two reasons. Reason one: 
Since justice is a matter of giving people what they deserve on the basis 
of their merit, doing justice to applicants normally produces the best con-
sequences. Reason two: In the cases in which justice leads to suboptimal 
consequences (e.g. in cases of taste discrimination), the suboptimality is 
small. We are not justified in overriding the meritocratic hiring principle.
But when it comes to political jobs, reason two no longer holds. Politi-
cal jobs are especially sensitive to the justice/efficiency distinction, owing 
to the power they have and the number of people they affect. For exam-
ple, suppose candidate A is plainly more meritorious than candidate B. 
But A is hated by a foreign despot; if he is elected, war is likely to result. 
In this case, justice requires that A be elected, in accordance with the 
meritocratic hiring principle; however, justice gets trumped by the moral 
importance of avoiding war.
Nevertheless, the heuristic remains a good one: Select political leaders 
purely on the basis of their merit. That is just, and it fulfills our fiduciary 
duties to our fellow citizens. Indeed, compliance with this rule is probably 
more important now than it has ever been, in light of the politics of 2016.
Question: Do American voters obey the meritocratic hiring principle? 
Answer: No. Whole classes of people are excluded from public office on 
grounds irrelevant from the point-of-view of merit. If you are an atheist, a 
Muslim, or a homosexual, high-level political positions are de facto unat-
tainable to you, regardless of your merits. About half of Americans would 
not vote for an atheist presidential candidate; 42 percent would not vote 
for a Muslim; and 32 percent would not vote for a homosexual. Given 
that the popular vote margin has not exceeded 9 percent in the last 32 
years, these prejudices are fatal to the political hopes of members of these 
classes (or at least those who are unwilling to lie about their character).17
The United States is hardly worse than other countries in this regard 
and better than most, but it is neither just nor to the advantage of the 
political community to exclude a candidate based on her reasonable reli-
gious views or sexual preference. Odd that political philosophy remains 
silent about this injustice, shrugging its shoulders when the democratic 
polis exercises its discriminatory will. The meritocrat objects. Reasonable 
religious views, sexual preference, race, gender—what have you—are all 
irrelevant from the point-of-view of merit and must be ignored. This is 
true whether we are talking about a widget maker or a president.
Some might say that this is question-begging. After all, aren’t the Amer-
ican people asserting that homosexuality, the Islamic faith, and atheism 
are in fact demerits? That is, can’t we view the contemporary political 
process as a way to determine who is, in fact, the most meritorious can-
didate? We cannot. While we might regard our democratic politics as 
epistemically valuable (see, e.g. Landemore 2012), or as uniquely just 
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(Estlund 2008), it is not a method for identifying merit. There is nothing 
like a reasonable consensus that atheism, Islam, and homosexuality are 
demerits (if anything, there is reasonable consensus that they are not), 
and so they must be ignored. Thus, the many Americans who, during the 
2008 and 2012 election cycles, regarded Obama’s race as a demerit or 
even a dispositive reason to vote against him, acted unjustly.18
Just as some people are systematically and irrationally excluded from 
politics, others are provided with advantages which unjustly help them 
attain these offices. The result is inferior political and economic out-
comes. Research has shown, for example, that real-world electoral results 
are more closely correlated with voter evaluations of candidates’ beauty 
than their evaluations of intelligence, competence, likability, or trustwor-
thiness.19 Even if it were true that beauty is correlated with something 
relevant, like competence, that’s not what’s going on: “Voters favor good-
looking candidates either because they enjoy watching them, or because 
good-looking politicians are more successful in social interaction” (Berg-
gren, Jordahl, and Poutvaara 2010: 15). (This bias is related to the ubiq-
uitous “beauty premium”, to be discussed in §6.4.)
No surprise, then, that voters lament the low quality of their politi-
cians: They do not select them with an eye toward merit.
If we want better people in government, we must change the incentives 
facing aspiring politicians. There is a reason that meritorious people do not 
seek public office. They know that any flaw, mistake, salacious detail, etc. 
in their past will be investigated, uncovered, and then gleefully ridiculed by 
a hypocritical public, egged on by talk radio and television networks which 
are simultaneously the least accurate and most popular ways for people to 
“inform” themselves about politics. As Gibbon says, “the most worthless 
of mankind are not afraid to condemn in others the same disorders which 
they allow in themselves; and can readily discover some nice difference in 
age, character, or station, to justify the partial distinction” (1776: 180).
It is because a person deserves to lead us that she suffers from these 
“flaws”: Any life full enough to qualify a person for high office will 
include features that the public wrongly regards as defects. How often 
have we bemoaned some politician’s past impropriety, and thought that, 
if only she had not done this thing, she would be perfect? That is not how 
life works: Excellence is achieved only by dint of failure and stupidity 
along the way. These are the causes of merit, not its competitors. Perhaps 
we feel this deep down, as evidenced by our greater willingness to forgive 
a person of high merit than one of low merit for the very same infraction.
I am reminded of a photo taken at the funeral of former French Presi-
dent François Mitterand. Standing in front of his coffin is his wife of 51 
years, his mistress, and his illegitimate daughter. Between the women 
there is a sense of, not approval exactly, but understanding and respect: 
for a meritorious man, who, like all men and of course all women, was 
flawed. This is the proper sentiment to be shown toward our leaders. It 
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is not to approve of the conduct. It is to acknowledge that something 
discomfiting is to be found in the life of every politician.
And if politicians’ infidelities should not concern us, and I think that 
they should not, then surely those features of a person which have no 
moral baggage whatsoever ought to be excluded from consideration as 
well. Religious views, sexual orientation, and the like simply have no 
place in our political discussions or at the ballot box.
5.11  The Justice/Efficiency “Trade-Off”, Part 2
Unlike the economic gains that equal opportunity (§4.8) produces, which 
are not obvious, the common sense idea that meritocratic hiring is efficient 
is indeed what theory and evidence tell us. The one exception has to do 
with taste discrimination, but, as I have argued, that should not detain us.
The many ways in which our actual economy violates meritocratic 
norms, and the damaging economic effects thereof, will be discussed at 
length in the next chapter. As just one example of the gains we might 
expect by conforming to the meritocratic hiring principle, Hsieh et al. 
(2013) estimate that 15–20 percent of the growth in per capita output 
since 1960 is attributable to the reduction of anti-meritocratic discrimi-
nation against blacks and women.
The market, driven by the profit motive, is a powerful force for elimi-
nating racism, sexism, and other forms of anti-meritocratic bias. But his-
tory tells us that it is insufficient. The government has a role in regulating 
labor market conduct. For example, unlike taste discrimination, statisti-
cal discrimination cannot be competed out of the marketplace, and it may 
be inefficient. Perfectly rational statistical discrimination against blacks 
may lead blacks to underinvest in their education, and the social cost of 
that may exceed the benefits to firms (Lundberg and Startz 1983).20 If the 
government can address this negative externality without impinging on 
the meritocratic hiring principle, it ought to do so.
Finally, note that the considerations adduced in this chapter suggest 
that there is something to Rawls’s (1971) claim that natural talents are a 
common asset. But it is not exactly that these talents are a common asset; 
taken literally, that is clearly false. Instead, when these talents are put to 
economic use, they redound to the benefit of the entire economic com-
munity. When you hire on the basis of merit, you do justice to applicants, 
maximize your own profits, and create value for others in the market-
place. In a meritocracy, our talents, natural or otherwise, are harnessed 
towards the common good by putting the right people in the right jobs.21
Notes
 1 See, e.g. Narveson (1993) and Nozick (1974).
 2 See Steinpreis, Anders, and Ritzke (1999).
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 3 On women’s advantage on the academic job market, see, e.g. Dicey Jennings 
et al. (2015) and Williams and Ceci (2015).
 4 The research on the anti-meritocratic role of pedigree in academic hiring is 
extensive; see, e.g. Burris (2004); Clauset, Arbesman, and Larremore (2015); 
Jacobs (1999, 2004); and McGinnis and Long (1997).
 5 Pew Research Center. 2014. Public strongly backs affirmative action pro-
grams on campus. URL = <www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/04/22/
public-strongly-backs-affirmative-action-programs-on-campus/>, retrieved 7 
August 2017.
 6 Gallup. 2013. In U.S., most reject considering race in college admissions. URL = 
<www.gallup.com/poll/163655/reject-considering-race-college-admissions.
aspx>, retrieved 7 August 2017. See also Longoria (2009).
 7 Olsaretti rightly argues that if desert is to serve as a principle of distributive 
justice, it cannot “be parasitic on an independently formulated conception of 
justice” (2004: 18).
 8 See also Feinberg (1963); Miller (1976); Pojman (1999); Scheffler (1992); and 
Sidgwick (1874).
 9 Feldman (2016: 53–7) offers other reasons for rejecting the appraising atti-
tudes account.
10 I agree with Feinberg when he says, “I am not sure how, if at all, these judg-
ments of moral appropriateness are to be verified; but I suspect that they 
resemble certain aesthetic judgments—for example, that crimson and orange 
are clashing colors” (1963: 92).
11 This possibility is raised by Daniels (1978) and Walzer (1983).
12 Sher also says, correctly, that “because actions do foreclose options, it follows 
that any agent who exerts a sustained effort is making an important sequence 
of allocative decisions. In diligently pursuing his goal, he is investing a major 
portion of his scarce time and energy in his goal’s achievement. . . . Since our 
lives are constituted by our actions, our time and energy are thus the very stuff 
of which we fashion our lives. Hence, any agent who devotes a major portion 
of his time and energy to achieving a goal is quite literally making that goal a 
part of himself” (1987: 61).
13 See especially Aigner and Cain (1977); Arrow (1973); and Phelps (1972).
14 I discuss statistical discrimination in detail in my 2017.
15 See also Baldi (1995); Clauset, Arbesman, and Larremore (2015); Keith and 
Babchuk (1998); Jacobs (1999, 2004); McGinnis and Long (1997); and 
Oprisko, Dobbs, and DiGrazia (2013).
16 I discuss matters related to merit in politics in my 2015 and Forthcoming.
17 Gallup. 2012. Atheists, Muslims see most bias as presidential candidates. 
URL = <www.gallup.com/poll/155285/atheists-muslims-bias-presidential-
candidates.aspx>, retrieved 9 August 2017. These data are a few years old. I 
suspect the situation has improved. Further improvement is needed.
18 “Anti-African-American racism appears to have been an important compo-
nent of the 2008 election, perhaps considerably reducing Obama’s share of 
the vote” (Pasek et al. 2009: 982). See also Piston (2010).
19 See Banducci et al. (2008) and Berggren, Jordahl, and Poutvaara (2010).
20 See also Lundberg and Startz (2000) and Schwab (1986).
21 Cf. Goldman (1977).
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6.1  Money in a Meritocracy
How should money be distributed? Any theory of economic justice must 
answer this question.
We shall concentrate on the distribution of income and largely ignore 
wealth. This is possible because the intergenerational transfer of wealth is 
proscribed, or at least severely limited, in a meritocracy (§8.4). Therefore, 
one’s wealth is merely the stock of one’s accrued income (minus what 
is spent on consumables). There is an outstanding question—whether 
the income received through an investment of deserved income is itself 
deserved—but I delay analysis of that until §8.5. (It is deserved.)
We shall also use “income” capaciously, to mean more than wage 
income. These days, benefits are an important part of remuneration, and 
they must be included in any discussion of just distribution.
I hope that the reader already has the sense that, in a meritocracy, 
income would be distributed very differently from how it actually is, 
and how it would be under other distributive approaches. Clearly, 
any desert-based distributive system is inegalitarian. Neither a strict 
egalitarian distribution (where each citizen gets the same income) nor 
an economy structured around Rawls’s difference principle (where 
unequal incomes are permitted insofar as that maximally benefits the 
least-advantaged class) respond to desert. Strict egalitarianism would 
only respond appropriately to desert if we were all equally deserving, 
which we are not, and Rawls’s theory would permit a hugely undeserv-
ing person to receive a large share of income if that happened to benefit 
the poorest citizens. The meritocrat regards both principles as unjust.
Less obvious but equally important is the observation that unrestrained 
markets also fail to give economic agents what they deserve. There is 
no shortage of contemporary examples: exorbitant compensation pack-
ages given to mediocre executives; talented young people unable to find 
jobs because they lack family connections; and the increasing reliance 
on certifications and pedigree when more accurate proxies for merit are 
available.
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These features of our contemporary economy are also worrying from 
the point-of-view of efficiency. We all have reason to prefer an economy 
that is responsive to merit, but that connection, always imperfect, is now 
badly frayed. Undeserving citizens are extracting enormous economic 
rents, capturing a larger and larger share of national income. This income 
has no effect on their welfare since they are so rich already. And since 
their income exceeds their merit, they are unable to invest it efficiently.
Things would be different in a meritocracy. Workers would concen-
trate on improving their human capital because this would be the factor 
relevant to compensation—not pedigree or personal relationships. The 
distribution of income would reflect the deserts of workers—which are 
unequal, to be sure, but not as unequal as our markets suggest. And 
through its regulatory authority, a meritocratic government intervenes, 
where necessary and when it can do so effectively, to maintain the meri-
tocratic pattern. These matters will be discussed in due course.
I shall not defend the private ownership of real capital. Implicit in this 
book is the idea that people can spend their deserved income by investing 
in firms. That is, I shall assume that the meritocratic ideal is better real-
ized under capitalism than socialism. A meritocratic argument to prefer 
socialism might be given, but I shall not undertake that task.
As for the choice of an economic system, I shall assume that we are 
using markets, and not central planning, to arrange economic activity. 
This is important, for the non-ideal reasons discussed in §2.4: A theory 
of justice must be feasible, and central planning seems incapable of sus-
taining prosperity.
That said, unlike libertarianism, which is conceptually wedded to mar-
kets, it is possible that a just, merit-responsive economy could be realized 
by central planning—if one day faster computers and more sophisticated 
economic models permit economic decisions to be more effectively made 
that way. But this is not the case now, for the reasons that Hayek (1945) 
gives, and as evidenced by central planning’s history of failure.
6.2  Determining the Desert Basis
Clearly, the just distribution of income must have something to do with 
merit. However, it cannot be that one deserves income on the basis 
of merit simpliciter. Merit is contextual, and so claims like “Wilbur 
deserves an income of $50,000 on the basis of his intelligence” are at least 
underdescribed. Wilbur’s intelligence cannot ground his economic deserts 
if it is not engaged economically.
If Wilbur is a pediatrician by day and at night plays virtuoso banjo in 
a purely private capacity, then figuring out how much Wilbur deserves 
is a matter of looking at his merits qua doctor. Even if Wilbur is the fin-
est banjo player in the world, if he is not putting those merits to use in 
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competition for scarce income, then they are irrelevant to distributive jus-
tice. (Just as the world’s best widget maker deserves the job at the widget 
factory only if he has actually applied for it.) When Wilbur change profes-
sions, sending a demo tape to a record studio, is when his just economic 
reward begins to turn on his musical merits.
Desert-based distribution has been unpopular, but some work has been 
done and three possible desert bases have emerged in the literature. First, 
some philosophers say that income is deserved on the basis of the costs 
that one has incurred.1 For example, if some profession requires expen-
sive education, then workers in that profession deserve to be paid more; 
if working conditions are unpleasant, then those doing that work deserve 
a premium; and so on.
Whether this is in fact a desertist distributive principle is unclear. It’s 
perhaps better understood as a form of egalitarianism—and a necessary 
one at that, as even strict egalitarians will want to incorporate these 
considerations. Indeed, if the currency of justice is welfare rather than 
resources this follows directly. And actual economies respond to these 
conditions in precisely this way, providing compensating differentials to 
workers who bear unusual costs (and paying less to workers who enjoy 
unusual benefits).
As one example of why this putative desert basis is problematic, con-
sider a racist who accepts a job where he must work alongside blacks. He 
suffers psychic harm as a result. We do not think that he deserves extra 
income for this.
The second possible basis for deserved income, which I also reject, 
is effort.2 I do not dispute that deserved income closely tracks effort; 
but this is because effort is an element of merit in almost every context. 
Indeed, it is almost always the most important element of merit.
It matters, though, that our economic efforts create value in the mar-
ketplace. Efforts to produce products that no one wants, no matter how 
intense these be, do not make a person deserving of economic reward (as 
some effort-inclined theorists, like Sadurski (1985), recognize).
More seriously, much of our expenditure of effort is aimed at reduc-
ing future efforts. We work hard now to accomplish a task, but also to 
develop our human capital so that similar tasks may be accomplished in 
the future with less effort. This is ubiquitous. Yet if we simply recognized 
effort, then the person who had invested in his human capital in this way 
would earn less for the same activity as someone who did not make the 
investment. But as we have seen, giving a person what he deserves means 
respecting his choices to develop his life as he sees fit—and it is wrong to 
punish a person who chose to invest and pay the concomitant opportu-
nity costs.
It might be possible to develop an effort-based theory that could 
sum up past efforts along with the proximate effort to determine the 
ground for economic reward. But, in any case, that will not work for the 
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meritocrat, who holds that human capital derived from genetic advantage 
is a legitimate ground for desert.
This brings us to the third proposed basis: economic contribution.3 
Among desert theorists, this has been considered the most plausible, 
and has been analyzed in a small but lively debate in the philosophical 
literature.4
Why does making an economic contribution render one deserving? 
Some say that there is value in satisfying others’ preferences, and desert-
claims derive their force, instrumentally, in that way:
Contemporary desert-principles all share the value of raising the 
standard of living—collectively, “the social product”. Under each 
principle, only activity directed at raising the social product will serve 
as a basis for deserving income. The concept of desert itself does not 
yield this value of raising the social product; it is a value societies 
hold independently. Hence, desert-principles identifying desert-bases 
tied to socially productive activity (productivity, compensation, and 
effort all being examples of such bases) do not do so because the 
concept of desert requires this.
(Lamont and Favor 2016)
This is too quick. Consider, for example, teleological arguments for desert, 
a la Aristotle (§1.2): Why does the best flute player deserve the best flute? 
Because that is what flutes are for: to be played well. A similar argument 
might be made here: The point of economic life is to enrich ourselves 
collectively—and so those riches should be distributed to the economic 
agents who best fulfill this end. There is a natural fit between economic 
contribution and economic reward. That is an analysis under which the 
concept of desert itself yields economic contribution as the basis.
Whatever one thinks about that, the lesson of the empirical literature 
surveyed in Chapter 3 is that contribution is what drives our pre-theoreti-
cal judgments about distributive justice. Recall that this is the core idea of 
equity theory: What we get out of an enterprise should be commensurate 
with what we put into it.
Miller has things close to right when he says that
people deserve the rewards of economic activity for their achieve-
ment, for the contribution they make to the welfare of others by 
providing goods and services that others want. Effort matters here 
only because it counts, along with talent and choice, as a factor in 
determining what a person achieves.
(1999: 184)
But there is a missing element to this account of the desert basis: merit. 
Consider the following two cases:
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(1) The CEO of company A is a highly meritorious woman. She always 
makes the rational decision when it comes to the management 
of her company. She is a brilliant businesswoman and a tireless 
worker. Due to unforeseeable events, A fails.
(2) The CEO of company B is terrible: She is stupid, a menace to her 
employees, and thoughtless when it comes to corporate decision-
making. Nevertheless, by sheer dumb luck, and despite her misman-
agement, B thrives.
Who deserves a higher salary, the CEO of A or the CEO of B? It’s the 
former. She did everything we want a CEO to do; if we were to hire one 
of the two, we’d choose her; and none of her company’s problems was 
attributable to her leadership.
Yet if brute contribution were all we cared about, regardless of its con-
nection to merit, we would say that the CEO of B is the deserving one. 
After all, her company was successful while A folded. That is wrong, 
since, ex hypothesi, the CEO of A has all the laudable character traits—
and the possession and application of those traits is the essence of desert. 
Moreover, rewarding B would incentivize the wrong type of behavior. An 
efficient economy responds to merit.
So the meritocratic desert basis, for the purpose of income, appears to be 
meritorious contributions to the economy. To reinforce the point, let us con-
sider a case in which merits are equal but contributions differ. Imagine that 
Mary and Rachel are equally meritorious, and they set up lemonade stands 
of equal quality on two different streets. Mary sells a lot of lemonade and 
Rachel very little. We might be inclined to think that Mary deserves a greater 
income than Rachel even though their merits are, ex hypothesi, equal.
What we are responding to in this case, though, is an intuition that 
Mary has done something right that Rachel has not: Mary has exercised 
foresight in selecting a location for her business. And this foresight is 
precisely what makes for a good businesswoman; foresight is an element 
of merit which Mary has in greater measure than Rachel.
If Mary’s and Rachel’s merits were truly equal, and if we knew this—if 
we knew, from a god’s eye view, that the only reason that Mary’s lem-
onade stand thrived while Rachel’s foundered was pure luck—then we 
would say, it seems to me, that Mary and Rachel deserve the same income.
What about a case in which a person, Tiffany, makes a contribution for 
reasons unconnected to her merit? Is there anything wrong with her being 
rewarded with some extra income i?
Maybe, maybe not. I am asserting only that Tiffany does not deserve 
i; that is, she has no claim of justice on i. This is not the same thing as 
saying that it is unjust that Tiffany has i. And it is possible that we could 
have good reason to reward Tiffany (perhaps to send a signal to other 
producers).
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These assignments are only viable, however, if they do not tread on 
another’s just deserts. We should protect Tiffany’s undeserved possession 
of i if it is socially useful to do so—but not at the cost of Zelda, who is 
deserving.
6.3  What Is the Deserved Income?
Consider a community garden which must be tended throughout the 
growing season. When the vegetables are harvested, they are distributed 
to those who did the tending, in proportion to their tending. The fact that 
Tyler worked the hardest of everyone, insofar as that work was unpro-
ductive, is irrelevant; Tyler does not deserve more vegetables for tirelessly 
weeding an unplanted plot. (Again, for gardens as for economies, contri-
bution and effort are highly correlated.)
It is tempting to think that there is a similarly obvious sense of “con-
tribution” when it comes to economic life. Indeed, one might think that 
markets naturally remunerate people for their contributions. Consider 
a simple economy, competitive and closed. Goods and services are pro-
duced in order to satisfy people’s wants. People contribute to production 
with their labor. Total output is equal to total compensation, and each 
person’s income is equal to the additional output that he provides. This is 
his marginal value product (MVP).
That ideal markets are naturally just in this way—that marginal value 
product is a good measure of economic contribution—is a view that has 
been defended over the years, most famously by John Bates Clark (1899) 
and recently by Mankiw (2013). And I think that it is basically correct: 
If the market one is participating in is appropriately ideal (e.g. perfectly 
competitive), and one’s income is equal to one’s MVP, then one is getting 
one’s just deserts.
The big problem for this view is that our economy is not “appropri-
ately ideal”, which raises the question of how far marginal productivity 
theory can take us normatively. The literature has gotten tangled up on 
this point: One often finds arguments “against” the justness of MVP that 
are in fact arguments that individuals are not being paid their MVP owing 
to market failure.
When thinking about how to measure contribution, the right strategy 
is not to try to give a precise definition of “contribution”. Similar to the 
strategy of Chapter 5, it is more effective to say what contribution is not. 
We shall see that we can get quite far in the direction of justice through 
this negative strategy.
In the next section, I shall talk about aspects of contemporary compen-
sation which are clearly undeserved—that is, which clearly do not reflect 
bona fide meritorious contributions. But I do want to comment here on 
some broad worries about using MVP to measure contribution.
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First, there is the possibility of non-constant returns to scale. If returns 
to scale are decreasing, then there is a residual of national income left over 
after everyone is paid his MVP. And it certainly seems like there are just 
and unjust ways this residual might be distributed. In the case of increasing 
returns to scale, national income is insufficient to pay everyone his MVP.
This does not seem to be a serious barrier to income-based-on-con-
tribution, since, if returns to scale are not constant, we could pay each 
citizen in proportion to his MVP. That seems like the straightforward 
solution, and Roemer and Silvestre (1993) have proven there is a general 
equilibrium solution for decreasing returns to scale—labor income in 
proportion to labor contribution and capital income in proportion to 
capital contribution. The resulting allocation is Pareto efficient.
A second question is whether it is fair to say that labor’s marginal prod-
uct reflects the contribution of labor, and labor alone. That may seem 
dubious: If labor has no tools to work with, it cannot produce anything at 
all. Don’t owners of existing factors of production, like capital and land, 
contribute to the output produced by that final worker?
Some have considered this challenge a show-stopper:
Neither J.B. Clark nor any subsequent supporter of [MVP-based dis-
tribution] has been able to show how the specific product of the mar-
ginal unit of labour can be distinguished from the specific products 
of the other factors that act in conjunction with the marginal unit 
of labour. Unless and until this distinction can be made, [marginal 
productivity theory] must remain devoid of any normative relevance 
within the context of a contributor theory.
(Pullen 2010: 55)
But there is a way to disentangle contributions in situations like this one. 
This is by calculating each economic agent’s Shapley value and paying 
him accordingly. Suppose, by way of illustration, that we have a capital-
ist, c, who provides the tools necessary for production. We also have two 
homogenous workers, w1 and w2. The tools can produce nothing on their 
own. The workers, without the tools, can produce nothing. But with the 
help of the capitalist, the first worker can produce $10 worth of product, 
and the second worker, $7 worth of product. So the three decide to work 
together, and thus produce $17 to allocate among them. Now how do we 
say who contributed what?
Lloyd Shapley (1953) suggests that we pay each his average marginal 
contribution, where the average is taken over all the possible ways in 
which this coalition of three may be built up. One way it can be built up 
is with c entering first, followed by w1, followed by w2. Here, c’s mar-
ginal contribution is $0, as described, w1’s is $10, and w2’s is $7. Another 
possible order is w1 followed by w2 followed by c—and in that case, c’s 
marginal product is the entire $17. There are six possibilities:
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MVP of c MVP of w1 MVP of w2
c followed by w1 followed by w2: 0 10 7
c followed by w2 followed by w1: 0 7 10
w1 followed by c followed by w2: 10 0 7
w1 followed by w2 followed by c: 17 0 0
w2 followed by w1 followed by c: 17 0 0
w2 followed by c followed by w1: 10 7 0
Total: $54 $24 $24
Average marginal contribution: $9 $4 $4
The capitalist deserves $9, and each worker, $4.
Two things are interesting about Shapley value. First, it is the only way to 
solve these problems of entangled contributions such that three axioms are 
satisfied: (1) All of the output is distributed (i.e. the allocation is efficient); 
(2) identical individuals receive the same share of output; and (3) individu-
als who contribute nothing receive nothing. (There is one additional, tech-
nical axiom.) These are simple, uncontroversial, and alluring conditions.
Second, notice that the axioms don’t make any reference to MVP at all! 
Rather, MVP arises naturally, as a normatively important quantity, out 
of the axioms. Perhaps this suggests that MVP is more than just a handy 
tool for disentangling questions about joint production.
The final complication is this: MVP is paid to factors of production, 
not to people. And so it is conceptually possible for an owner of a factor 
of production to be enriched while making no contribution himself.
But in a meritocracy, operating under equal opportunity, there is one 
way to own factors of production: namely, by investing one’s deserved 
income in them. Therefore, the MVP of capital (e.g.) does reflect its own-
ers’ economic contributions—namely, those contributions that they made 
in the past, which provided them the income necessary to own the capital. 
In a society lacking equal opportunity, on the other hand, there need be 
no connection—a layabout who inherits wealth can invest it without ever 
making an economic contribution himself.
The meritocrat recognizes that “economic contribution” should include 
the contribution made by capital (see §8.5). And the meritocrat believes that 
some capital income is deserved. But just like not all labor income is deserved 
(e.g. one does not deserve the income one obtains through rent-seeking), not 
all capital income is deserved. One does not deserve the income generated by 
an inheritance, for example. (Indeed, one does not deserve the inheritance 
itself; and for this reason, and because it is incompatible with a meritocratic 
framework for society, inheritance should be confiscated—§8.4.)
We should not be swayed by those who believe that moralizing market 
outcomes is a fool’s errand. They are unduly pessimistic. Arneson (2015), 
for example, says that
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there is no remotely sensible notion of individual desert that varies 
with the benefits that people gain from their economic production. 
This is not any defect of markets; there is no reason to expect them to 
somehow distribute benefits according to any common-sense norms 
of desert.
But contribution is a common sense norm of desert (indeed, from 
Chapter 3 we know that it is the common sense norm of desert), and it 
does vary, in ideal markets, with income. There are no a priori impedi-
ments to relying on a contribution norm.5
Now, actual markets do not distribute income in accordance with des-
ert, but this is reason to intervene into markets in the name of establishing 
a more just pattern. It is not reason to give up on the dream of desert-
based distribution. Indeed, the various forms of divergence between real-
world market remuneration and desert are really forms of market failure.
Consider, for example, that in the real world, often workers who do 
the same task for a firm are regarded as interchangeable, despite differ-
ences in merit. They are all paid the same amount—namely, what the firm 
thinks the marginal worker among them can produce—but this has the 
effect of giving meritorious workers in the group less than they deserve, 
and unmeritorious workers more. This is understood intuitively by any 
working person with a sense of desert, who wonders why he is being paid 
the same as the lazy idiot down the hall.
The biggest problem, which we turn now to consider, is that our econ-
omy is sodden with economic rents—payments to individuals above and 
beyond their meritorious contributions. We encounter examples of this all 
the time: Dick Fuld, the former CEO of Lehman Brothers, was paid half a 
billion dollars to drive his storied firm into the ground and help crash the 
American economy. No merit, no contribution, but a large reward.
6.4  Economic Rents are Undeserved
Classically, economic rents were regarded as “free gifts of nature”: income 
that required no merit (effort, skill, etc.) to obtain. Unimproved land is 
the archetypical source of rent: Its owner may, purely by virtue of its 
scarcity, gain an income from it (hence the term, “rent”). As Smith says,
as soon as the land of any country has all become private property, 
the landlords, like all other men, love to reap where they never 
sowed, and demand a rent even for its natural produce. The wood of 
the forest, the grass of the field, and all the natural fruits of the earth, 
which, when land was in common, cost the labourer only the trouble 
of gathering them, come, even to him, to have an additional price 
fixed upon them. He must then pay for the licence to gather them; 
and must give up to the landlord a portion of what his labour either 
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collects or produces. This portion, or, what comes to the same thing, 
the price of this portion, constitutes the rent of land.
(1784: 74–5)
Nowadays, economic rents are understood more broadly, typically 
defined as returns to factors of production in excess of what is necessary 
to maintain them in economic use (the land is just there, producing its 
bounty, whether you pay its owner or not).
In one way or another, economic rents arise out of a lack of competi-
tion. They are, thus, necessarily connected to imperfect markets. That this 
might have relevance for the meritocratic ideal has been pointed out by 
Franzini et al.: “Meritocracy requires competition. If competition is lack-
ing, then, the concentration of earnings is not justifiable in meritocratic 
terms. As super-earnings are incompatible with competition, by the same 
token, they are incompatible with meritocracy” (2016: 64).
This is well-illustrated by the first kind of rent we will consider, which 
are the massive, undeserved incomes earned by so-called “superstars” 
(Rosen 1981). In some markets, small differences in merit can lead to 
huge differences in income, contrary to both justice and the market ideal.
Consider the legions of singers who are slightly less talented than Katy 
Perry (or who have slightly less sex appeal than she, or whatever). These 
singers don’t have slightly fewer fans than Perry, they have almost no 
fans, and they make almost no money. Remuneration is not proportional 
to merit. The situation arises because (1) there are a lack of substitutes for 
Perry (if they existed, they would compete against each other and drive 
remuneration down until it matched merit), and (2) musicians like Perry 
can reach customers at low marginal cost.
Or compare major league baseball players (mean annual salary: $5 
million) with players at the AAA level, many of whom earn less than a 
poverty-level wage. The difference is explained via the superstar effect. 
Obviously, the average major leaguer is not 100 times better than the 
average AAA player.
Is such a difference just? No, because the difference in remuneration 
does not reflect a difference in merit. Rents are not obtained on the basis 
of merit, but on the basis of facts about others—namely, the non-existence 
of competitors. Superstars are rich because they are monopolists. Rents 
cannot, conceptually, be deserved—they are not about the desert subject.
These examples illustrate why desert cannot be grounded in contribu-
tion simpliciter. Observe that superstars’ incomes do reflect their con-
tributions: Katy Perry satisfies consumers’ preferences much more than 
non-superstar musicians do. Therefore, a pure contribution theorist must 
maintain that superstars’ incomes are deserved in full. Not so for the 
meritocrat, who requires that contributions be tied to merit. The differ-
ence in merit between superstars and non-superstars is small, and so the 
just income difference is small as well.
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How prevalent are rents in our economy? Dean Baker (2016) finds 
that four classes of rent (copyright/patent protection, the finance indus-
try, corporate executive compensation, and anti-competitive practices 
in professional sectors), not exhaustive of all possible rents, comprise 
between 6.2 and 8.5 percent of GDP. According to Baker, these rents are 
the principal cause of the redistribution of income into the top 1 percent 
of earners which we have seen since 1980. Bell and Van Reenen (2014) 
obtain similar results, arguing that most of the recent income gains of 
the top 1 percent have gone to bankers, and that a large part of these are 
rents. Bivens and Mishel (2013) conclude the same.
So some economists have fretted over the increasing prevalence of rents 
in our economy, but they have been driven by concern about the ineffi-
ciencies associated with rents, or their contribution to inequality (Stiglitz 
2012). The real reason they should concern us is that they are undeserved, 
and therefore unjust.
Economic rents arise when workers gain control over their own pay. 
Bebchuk and Fried (2004) find that CEOs are able to do this by exerting 
influence over their boards, a practice obviously incompatible with the 
competitive ideal of directors driving the hardest bargain they can on 
behalf of shareholders. As just one example of many that Bebchuk and 
Fried adduce, former Mattel CEO Jill Barad was simultaneously fired and 
paid a “golden goodbye” of $7.5 million plus early vesting of options. 
Payments like this are incompatible with profit-maximizing behavior, as 
the board had the ability to retain or fire Barad as it saw fit. The golden 
goodbye was a rent. Barad did not deserve that money.
Similarly, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2000, 2001) find that CEOs 
are rewarded equally for performance and for luck: For every 1 per-
cent increase in accounting return, CEO pay increases by 2 percent—
regardless whether that return was due to talent or to luck. Any CEO 
remuneration that arises through luck is a rent.
Next, consider the “beauty premium”, first investigated by Hamermesh 
and Biddle (1994), who found that ugly men make 9 percent less, and 
handsome men 5 percent more, for the same work. Unless one is a fashion 
model, appearance is not a productive characteristic. It is simply an advan-
tage on the job market—and so beauty premiums are rents. Obviously, 
intuitively, if surgeon X is better looking than surgeon Y, but the two are 
equal in surgical skill, then X does not deserve to be paid more than Y.
Finally, there is the class of rents that are contingent on the existence of 
government. Firms sometimes find it profitable to spend money lobbying 
for a favorable regulatory environment rather than engaging in produc-
tive activity. Attempts to obtain advantages like these fall under the head-
ing “rent-seeking” and are another source of undeserved income. While 
rent-seeking can be profitable, it does not add to society’s stock of goods 
and services and so cannot ground desert.
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Rent-seeking illustrates why merit alone cannot serve as the basis for 
deserved income: Effective rent-seeking requires hard work and skill. 
Deserved income must be grounded in the confluence of merit and 
contribution.
I conclude this discussion of rent with a lesson and a warning. The 
lesson is that here as elsewhere, meritocratic justice naturally gives rise 
to the proper economic incentives. All of the incomes just discussed may 
be confiscated without deadweight loss. We will be better off if our cor-
porate officers focus their talents on producing goods and services rather 
than pursuing undeserved income.
Henry George is maybe the most famous enemy of rents, and his words 
are prescient:
When all rent is taken by taxation for the needs of the community, 
then will the equality ordained by nature be achieved. No citizen will 
have an advantage over any other citizen save as is given by his indus-
try, skill, and intelligence; and each will obtain what he fairly earns. 
Then, but not till then, will labour get its full reward, and capital its 
natural return.
(1886: 299)
The warning is this: We have established that rents are not justly held 
and that they are prevalent. This does not, on its own, justify government 
intervention into our markets. There are reasonable cases to be made that 
(1) in the long term, the market will eliminate rents on its own and, (2) in 
the short term, the market will do a better job of eliminating rents than 
any regulator can.
These are, of course, positive claims. I am sympathetic to (1), but that 
provides little consolation to us and to coming generations, which must 
suffer under an unjust and inefficient economy. And the dynamism of the 
market will always produce novel opportunities for rent extraction. So 
we should like to encourage the market along, if we can. But can we do 
that? Or is (2) true?
My view is that there are sensible and empirically well-supported 
policy steps which can be taken. I detail these in Chapter 8.
6.5  What Would a Meritocratic Economy Look Like?
How unequal would a meritocracy be, in terms of income and wealth? 
Would desirable jobs be disproportionately held by a single race or gen-
der? What is the distributional effect of establishing equal opportunity? 
These questions are especially relevant given that “meritocracy” con-
notes, for some, a highly stratified society dominated by an elite class. 
That connotation is wrong. It is worth explaining why.
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To be sure, we must accept the positive results of accepting meritoc-
racy’s principles, no matter what those turn out to be. If it turns out that 
equal opportunity, merit-based hiring, and income-through-meritorious 
contribution lead to wealth and influence concentrated in the hands of 
white men, that is just. The same is true if the elite class is black women, 
or transgendered Asians, or anyone else. We must be blind to everything 
but merit. John Bunzel expressed this sentiment three decades ago, and 
it still holds true:
We need to remind ourselves, especially at a time when some people 
seem intent on dividing us all into special groupings based on race or 
sex or ethnic background, that there is no such thing as black justice 
or brown justice or female justice. There is only Justice. Justice wears 
her blindfold that she may recognize no favorites, but she holds a 
scale in which merit is weighed.
(1983: 184)
In any case, a meritocracy would be highly egalitarian by contemporary 
standards. As best I can tell, it would be more egalitarian than the most 
egalitarian countries today (e.g. the Scandinavian states).
I stress that there is nothing intrinsically objectionable about inequal-
ity. But it can be a sign that meritocratic values are being violated, 
as is the case in the United States today, where the bottom 50 percent of 
Americans receives the same share of national income as the top 0.1 per-
cent. Of course, people do work more or less than each other, and they 
are different in merit—and they should be compensated, unequally, for 
these differences. But they are not so different as our economy would 
suggest.
Why would the distribution of income and wealth be flatter in a 
meritocracy? There are a few reasons. First, equal opportunity requires 
the total, or near-total, confiscation of wealth between generations. The 
only wealth inequalities in a meritocracy are those produced within a 
generation, through differences in deserved income, and perhaps small 
gifts (§8.4).
The distribution of income would also be egalitarian by our stan-
dards. This is primarily because (1) the extraction of economic rents 
is curbed, and rent extraction happens at the top of the income dis-
tribution; and (2) equal opportunity is by definition human capital-
flattening—and in a meritocracy, human capital essentially determines 
income.
In a meritocracy, income inequalities exist to the extent to which (1) 
earnings-relevant traits are genetically determined, and (2) adults make 
different choices about work, leisure, and investment in their human 
capital. (There are other relevant choices, such as the choice whether or 
not to commit crimes.)
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We must confront a touchy question: How much do genetics influ-
ence a person’s earnings? We have data on this, and it shows that there 
is indeed an influence—but a small one. For example, in an attempt to 
explain the large correlation we find between individuals’ wealth and 
their parents’ wealth, Black et al. (2015) compared the wealth of adoptees 
to that of both their biological parents and their adoptive parents. They 
found that “even before any inheritance has occurred, wealth of adopted 
children is more closely related to the wealth of their adoptive parents 
than to that of their biological parents” (p. 4), and that “innate ability 
is only a small factor” (p. 22) in the intergenerational wealth correla-
tion. Bowles, Gintis, and Groves (2005); Mazumder (2005); and Piketty 
(2000) reach similar conclusions.
The most plausible means by which one’s genetics influence one’s earn-
ings is intelligence, since intelligence is partly genetically determined and 
almost universally useful. Yet IQ is weakly correlated with earnings; Tarmo 
Strenze (2007), in a meta-analysis, estimates the correlation between intel-
ligence and income to be 0.2. Moreover, that figure does not distinguish 
between IQ genetically derived and IQ environmentally derived. Under 
equal opportunity, the correlation would be weaker still.
With each passing year, I am increasingly convinced that—setting dif-
ferences in opportunity aside—the single biggest determinant of success 
across contexts is brute hard work. And this is precisely what research 
tells us is true. Björklund, Jäntti, and Roemer (2012) seek to identify the 
determinants of income in Sweden—a country that approximates the 
equal opportunity ideal fairly well. They find that the most important 
determinant, by far, is effort—explaining 76 percent of income inequal-
ity. The second most important determinant is IQ, back at 13 percent. 
And the third, parental income, accounts for 8 percent of the inequality. 
Parental education, family structure, number of siblings, and body mass 
index each explain less than 2 percent of inequality. (Note, however, that 
“effort” is used in the residual, Roemerian way (§4.4 n. 8), and thus 
could include some natural traits not controlled for in the study. Perhaps 
creativity, insofar as it is unconnected to IQ, is an example here.)
The American situation is worse—parental wealth controls here. The 
important point is that the egalitarian’s worry about achievement being 
a slave to genetics is misplaced. Given equal opportunity, economic out-
comes do not turn on genetic facts. Hufe et al. (Forthcoming) carry out 
the most careful analysis of the causes of American income inequality. 
They find that Roemerian circumstances, including natural traits, explain 
43.5 percent of the inequality. When natural traits are excluded, as I think 
they should be, that figure drops to 40.7 percent. There is little difference.
Caution is always in order when it comes to empirical analyses like 
these, drawn as they are from imperfect (although surprisingly good) 
datasets. The normative structure of meritocracy is what it is, and in time 
we shall see what the real-world ramifications are.
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Next, I wish to address a worry which I suspect is prevalent, but which 
is rarely aired. Some worry that even equal opportunity would not elimi-
nate racial stratification. Whether they are aware of it or not, these people 
are committed to the view that racial differences in earnings-relevant 
traits, like IQ, must be genetically determined to a large degree.
All scholars agree that there are IQ differences between races (e.g. there 
is a 1-standard deviation difference in IQ between the mean white and the 
mean black). What is not known is the extent to which these differences are 
genetically determined. We simply have no good answer to this question 
yet, and intellectual honesty requires that we accept that it is possible that 
genetics plays a role, even a dominant one, in determining IQ. (See Rushton 
and Jensen 2005 for a summary of the research on racial IQ differences.)
But I do not think that this prospect should trouble anyone. First, 
as described, the influence of IQ on economic success appears to be 
modest. Second, the only reason we find such a possibility troubling is 
our contingent history of discrimination toward blacks, and the racism 
which persists to this day. Were that eliminated—and it would be in a 
meritocracy—we would not fret about any correlations between race and 
IQ. After all, there is a correlation between height and IQ, apparently 
genetically determined (Silventoinen et al. 2006), and it bothers no one. 
The reason it bothers no one is that there is no discrimination against 
short people. Short people are judged on their merits—they do not suffer 
unwarranted statistical discrimination; they face no animus in the work-
place; etc. That is, any individual short person who “breaks the mold” is 
judged fairly—that is, he is judged on the basis of his merit.
It is also vital to keep in mind that the “heritability of IQ”, which is typi-
cally what is discussed, is categorically different than the extent to which IQ 
is genetically determined. A trait may be ~100 percent heritable but ~0 per-
cent genetically determined. Heritability is a measure of the variation within 
a group which is attributable to genetic difference—nothing more. Imagine 
a group of people who are raised in identical environments. For this group, 
IQ is ~100 percent heritable: Given that they are raised in identical environ-
ments, any differences in IQ must be due to genetics. It may still be the case 
that environment determines their IQ—if the environment is good, they 
have similar high IQs. If it is poor, they have similar low IQs. This is why the 
heritability of IQ can be low in children and high in adults, as it actually is.
So despite its ubiquity, heritability is simply not a useful datum when 
talking about equal opportunity, economic justice, the possibility of dis-
parate racial results, and so on. It is a red herring, which, as Feldman et 
al. put it, is used
to release us from any obligation to search for and supply those con-
ditions that may enhance the lives of each member of our society. . . . 
Heritability has no bearing on socioeconomic inequality and what to 
do about it.
(2000: 76)6
On the Distribution of Income 141
I note that meritocratic measures to combat wrongful discrimination 
(i.e. violations of Formal EO) will also benefit groups that are typically 
regarded as the victims of injustice, such as racial minorities. My view is 
that claims of discrimination are overblown, and that affirmative action, 
as it is currently practiced, is unjust (§9.2). But, in any case, a meritocracy 
actively combats implicit bias, explicit racism, and other forms of anti-
meritocratic discrimination.
6.6  On Solidarity
Roemer has challenged me on my distributive rule, claiming that merito-
cratic inequality would undermine economic solidarity. (This possibility 
has been raised in the literature—see, e.g. Cohen 2009.) He has provided 
a nice example of why solidarity is an important public good: Imagine 
that workers at some firm start doing precisely what is required of them 
by their contracts, no less and no more. They obey all regulations to the 
letter, they refuse all overtime, and so on. (I.e. they “work-to-rule”.) The 
effect of this strict contractual compliance is that production grinds to a 
halt. This possibility cannot be eliminated by better contracts; it is impos-
sible to write a contract that perfectly describes the requirements of any 
job. Thus, a productive economy must have social solidarity. Workers 
must be willing to go above and beyond their contracts.
I agree that solidarity is essential. But this objection to meritocracy is 
unsound for two reasons. First, even if it were true that inequality per se 
undermines solidarity, as I have explained, a meritocracy would not reach 
that standard of inequality.
Second, this objection mistakes the symptom of a loss of solidarity for 
its cause. When we see a loss of solidarity we may see major inequality, 
but this is because there is solidarity in a meritocracy, and a meritocracy 
happens to be not very unequal.
A lesson of Chapter 3 is that human beings have little affection for 
equal treatment; we find it distasteful. We do not want to participate in 
an egalitarian economy. Equity theory tells us that we want to participate 
in an economy in which our rewards are balanced against our contribu-
tions. Since we want to make unequal economic contributions, we want 
unequal economic rewards, too. We feel that we and our fellow workers 
are being treated fairly when our economy is meritocratic. It is the meri-
tocratic ethos, not the egalitarian one, which unites people.
6.7  The Myth of Neutrality
Let us return to the issue of perfectionism, touched on in §2.5. In the 
neoclassical conception of the market, there is no notion of some prefer-
ences being superior to others. Preferences are taken as exogenous, and 
the market regarded as valuable for its ability to satisfy these preferences 
without waste. There is simply no way to talk about the quality of the 
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preferences themselves; a market for Justin Bieber’s music that produces 
$10 million in consumer surplus is just as good as a market for Beethoven 
that produces $10 million in surplus.
The major normative approaches find this unproblematic. Libertarians 
don’t care what products are being bought and sold, so long as they are 
being bought and sold freely. Utilitarians point out that people are made 
happier by Bieber rather than Beethoven (and so in that instrumental sense, 
Bieber’s music is better than Beethoven’s). And egalitarians tend to be loath 
to impugn the tastes of some citizens as inferior. Indeed, for many, talk 
about the “quality” of preferences is worse than wrong—it is incoherent.
The purpose of this section is to explain why questions of value cannot 
be avoided, to show that they are relevant to justice, and to argue that 
meritocratic theory fruitfully addresses them. Note that while the con-
siderations I raise are not incompatible with the neoclassical approach, 
they are also not currently accommodated within it. We consider three 
problems of value: those of false beliefs, endogenous preferences, and 
depraved tastes.
The problem of false beliefs may be illustrated simply. Suppose that a 
pharmaceutical company puts a drug on the market which it claims extends 
the human lifespan. But the drug does not do this; in fact it is toxic. Here 
the “value” of the drug is high, reflecting individuals’ expressed prefer-
ences. But this is not the sort of value that we typically have in mind, and 
plausibly this company ought not to profit from its sales.
Put differently, there can be a divergence between (1) the degree to 
which consumers believe that some good satisfies their preferences and 
(2) the degree to which it actually does. This divergence can come as a 
result of brute bad luck (rational and competent consumers couldn’t have 
known of the drug’s dangers), or failure on the part of market partici-
pants (the drug company lied, or consumers desired something that they 
knew, or should have known, would hurt them).7
One question is whether the government could satisfy consumers’ fully-
informed preferences better than consumers can themselves. And here I 
agree with the libertarian: Such a thing is not possible given current tech-
nology. (Although note that “nudging”—subtle, unobtrusive behavioral 
modifications via the choice architecture—seeks to do precisely this.)
But suppose one day it becomes possible: Would we endorse interven-
tion into markets then? Would we think it more just, if we could ensure 
that a company is richly rewarded for producing a vaccine that actually 
saves people’s lives, rather than one that harms them owing to their false 
beliefs? It seems to me that we would endorse that intervention, and we 
would regard that remuneration as more just. Libertarianism cannot 
arrive at this conclusion.
Next is the problem of endogenous preferences. We say that markets 
are valuable because they efficiently satisfy consumers’ preferences. How-
ever, there is a circularity in such a justification, since it is the market 
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itself that creates these preferences, at least to a large degree. Affinity for 
Justin Bieber’s music is not God-given; it is inculcated in consumers by the 
market. Indeed, it is the raison d’être of the advertising industry to shape 
preferences in this way.
Efforts have been made to incorporate preference formation into eco-
nomic theory,8 but economists continue to treat preferences as unproblem-
atically exogenous. This will not do, and not only because it undermines 
the moral justification for markets.
More seriously, the endogenous preference problem exacerbates false 
beliefs. Suppose a few people hold false beliefs about preference satisfac-
tion and make bad market decisions as a result. Upon seeing this, other 
people conclude, wrongly, that they may satisfy their similar preferences 
in the same way. So they enter the market, and the problem snowballs. 
Demand creates its own demand.
As an example, consider the “gluten-free” industry, which is a multi-
billion-dollar one. We all want to be healthy, but some believe that vari-
ous ailments, from depression to constipation to autism, are caused by 
what the author of the New York Times best seller, Wheat Belly, calls 
the “chronic, perfect poison” of gluten. Celebrities have jumped on the 
gluten-free bandwagon, friends have commended the “benefits” of going 
gluten-free to each other, and so on. It is all untrue—like homeopathy 
and GMO scaremongering—but it is natural, perhaps even rational, for 
individuals to form beliefs about the efficacy of these products by looking 
at the market demand for them.
This is a problem. Sick people are buying products which will not heal 
them. R&D money is being wasted on projects which any meritorious 
observer already knows to be fruitless. Respect for truth, expert opinion, 
and the scientific method are being undermined.
The important point here is that it is impossible for government to 
remain indifferent about the preferences of its citizens. That is the myth 
of neutrality. Every decision—to regulate or not to regulate, to tax or 
refrain from taxing—shapes preferences. Even the most liberal govern-
ments, whether they admit it or not, must make some decision about 
which preferences are good and which are bad.
The libertarian response here is that preferences created through active 
government intervention are different from those the market would 
produce, were it left alone. That is true, but it is a bad reply. First, it is 
an instance of the naturalistic fallacy. Because something is natural does 
not make it good. Second, it violates a fundamental principle of rational 
choice: Not doing A and thereby letting B happen is no different than 
actively choosing B rather than A.
The third problem of value is that of depraved tastes. Imagine a 
society in which there is some hated minority race. The hatred is irra-
tional; people are simply racists. Sammy, a television producer, develops 
a program in which members of the minority are publicly ridiculed. 
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Given prevailing, racist opinion, the program is wildly successful, making 
Sammy a rich man.
Isn’t there something unjust about Sammy’s wealth? Isn’t he selling a 
product that is simply inferior? I think so, but it is hard to explain that 
injustice with current conceptual tools. Attempts to accommodate the 
intuition by appealing to meta-preferences, or fully-informed preferences 
(maybe if people really knew the harm done by the program, they would 
not enjoy watching it) will not work, since the question may simply be 
pushed: Suppose fully-informed people really do prefer, all the way down, 
to watch this program. What then?
I don’t think that the diagnosis of injustice changes even if we imagine that 
the minorities have become so inured to their suffering that they now enjoy 
the abuse that they receive. Suppose Sammy’s product makes everybody 
happy—what would we say about the economy then? I would insist that 
this economy is unjust. It is producing products of intrinsically low value.
If we wish to stay within the neoclassical framework—and I think that 
we should—we must address depraved tastes and questions of preference 
formation through a subjective approach to value.
This is possible. But we must attack the problem obliquely. The possi-
bility of directly inculcating good preferences and identifying good prod-
ucts is a fool’s errand. This is not just because of a lack of information. 
Questions about what we should and should not desire, what things are 
good and what things are bad, are the deepest of the human experience. 
We will not solve them soon.
Meritocracy suggests a second strategy. Rather than try to enumerate 
the correct preferences, we pursue them indirectly, through a focus on 
merit. In a meritocracy, the resources which stimulate demand and which 
determine production are put in the hands of meritorious people. This 
is the optimal way to ensure that consumers have good preferences, and 
that our products are high quality ones.
Every decision about consumption and investment affects preference 
formation. If all the world’s wealth were held by people of low moral and 
intellectual quality, they would invest it poorly (in, e.g. racist media com-
panies or producers of homeopathic drugs), and they would consume bad 
products (e.g. Sammy’s program). In time, other economic agents would 
follow suit, and our economy would be an unhappy one.
On the other extreme, a radical egalitarian distribution of wealth 
would essentially turn preference formation into a popularity contest. 
Each individual would have an equal say about which firms would pros-
per, and which products bought and sold.
In this way, income and preferences are tightly bound up. Economists 
have long known that income gets determined by people’s preferences 
(decisions about leisure, work, and consumption determine which alloca-
tions are Pareto efficient). What is interesting, and novel, is that things go 
in the other direction, too: Preferences are determined, in part, by income.
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Why would a meritocratic distribution be ideal? I’ll give an argument 
by analogy. Think of investment and consumption in terms of voting. 
When a person spends $1 on a homeopathic drug, it is a vote for an 
economy in which people desire these drugs and they get bought and 
sold. When a person spends $2, this is two votes for such an economy. 
And so on. The distribution of wealth determines the number of votes an 
economic agent has, and, thereby, his influence.
The question to ask, then, is: What distribution of votes maximizes 
the probability that the right preferences and products, whatever they be, 
obtain? Is it an elitist distribution, in which a handful of people have all 
the wealth and, therefore, all the votes? Or is it a democratic distribu-
tion, in which wealth is shared equally so that each citizen has the same 
influence?
The answer to both questions is “no”. An optimal voting system 
distributes votes to people in proportion to their merit. We know this 
formally: A group seeking to maximize the probability that a correct 
outcome obtains will weight each member’s vote in proportion to (the 
log-odds of) his competence.9 It is reasonable to suppose that something 
similar is at work within the market structure.
To reiterate: Preferences are formed by market decisions. The number 
of these market decisions a person may make is determined by his wealth. 
When a person’s income exceeds his merit, the process by which value is 
pursued is not optimal; he exerts too much influence over this process. 
When a person’s income is less than his merit, he exerts too little influ-
ence. When income reflects merit, he contributes to the search for value 
in the optimal way.
We cannot say what the right preferences and the good products are. 
What we can say is what sort of economy is likely to form and produce 
these. This is a meritocratic economy. In a meritocracy, we are led to the 
correct preferences—whatever they be—even as the government refrains 
from making particular judgments about the wisdom of market decisions.
Teun Dekker has suggested something similar: “Even if one believes 
that there are objective answers to questions of value, one might still 
believe a democratic procedure to be preferable because it is more likely 
to arrive at correct judgements than using expert judges.” (2010: 319). 
That is the right idea, although, as we have seen, a “democratic proce-
dure”, under which each individual, regardless of his merit, exerts the 
same influence, is not optimal.
6.8  Problems With Libertarian Economic Theory
Unlike the egalitarian’s objection to desert—which is focused and Raw-
lsian (and to be addressed in Chapter 7)—the libertarian’s reasons for 
opposing meritocracy, and desert-based justice generally, are diffuse. 
Although libertarianism and meritocracy have some things in common, 
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like an affection for markets, there are a number of incompatibilities 
between the two theories.10
Meritocracy, like all desert-based theories, is patterned and historical, 
to use Nozick’s terminology. It is “patterned” because it “specifies that 
a distribution is to vary along with some natural dimension” (Nozick 
1974: 156). It is historical because we must have knowledge of the past 
in order to judge the justness of the distribution now (i.e. we must know 
what meritorious contributions a person has made).
It is important that our distributive theories be historical. Most people 
would not find plausible any theory of justice that does not appeal to 
historical information about the persons to whom we are distributing. 
Eric Mack (2014) gives an example: Imagine that we are choosing from 
a number of potential distributions, and some of the people to whom 
we are distributing were involved in “slavery-like exploitation”. This 
information would doubtless influence our judgments about justice, yet it 
plays no role in non-historical (i.e. “end state”) theories. (Mack correctly 
notes that desert-based theories do not suffer from this flaw.)
I say five things against libertarianism in this section. First, I respond 
to Nozick’s famous “Wilt Chamberlain” thought experiment, in which 
we are challenged to explain how injustice could possibly result from an 
initially just distribution of resources followed by seemingly unproblem-
atic free choices. Second, I explain the limits of government interference 
in the name of protecting the desert-based pattern of distribution. Third, 
against Hayek, I explain why recognizing desert need not come at the 
expense of creating value. Fourth, I argue, also against Hayek, that a 
meritocratic economy is practical. And fifth, I respond to the idea that a 
meritocracy is undesirable because it leaves the poorly-off without good 
excuses for their socioeconomic position.
Nozick invites us to imagine a world in which our favorite patterned 
theory of justice is realized (1974: 160–4). The distribution of wealth in 
this world, D1, is ex hypothesi just. We now suppose that basketball fans 
develop an interest in watching Wilt Chamberlain play. Each fan volun-
tarily pays a quarter more in ticket price to watch Wilt. These quarters 
are given to Wilt, who, at the end of the season, ends up with a much 
larger share of wealth than anyone else. We now have a final distribution 
D2 which has deviated from the putatively just pattern—but only as a 
result of the free choices of everyone involved. Nozick asks: “Is this new 
distribution D2, unjust? If so, why?” (p. 161).
For the desert theorist, D2 is not necessarily unjust. We cannot answer 
the question of whether D2 is just or not without further information. We 
need to know if the market activity led to Wilt having the relevant desert 
bases in appropriately larger measure. D2, is just if and only if that is the 
case—and not because it flowed from D1 through free exchanges.
So the justness of the scenario will turn on the desert basis chosen. For 
the meritocrat, D2 is indeed unjust, because Wilt’s contribution (i.e. the 
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value he created for his fans, in the form of entertainment), did not come 
with an increase in merit. If, on the other hand, Wilt responded to the 
fans’ support by becoming a better basketball player, then his additional 
remuneration is deserved.
There is nothing outlandish about this case: Athletes are prime exam-
ples of the “superstar” phenomenon discussed in §6.4. The real-life Wilt 
was handsomely paid, because of his merit as an athlete, to be sure, but 
also because of his monopoly power. Nozick suggests as much in his 
example: Wilt would have played basketball for his D1 salary—and so 
the extra money he made at D2 was a rent. The meritocratic argument 
for confiscating rents applies.
As Barbara Fried has pointed out, Nozick sneakily conflates two senses 
of free exchange in his example; “transfer by gift and by exchange, which 
Nozick casually treats as posing identical problems in entitlement theory, 
raise completely different problems” (1995: 240). In the former case, 
which provides Nozick with the intuition he wants to harness, the moral 
consideration is whether a person who owns something fully may give it 
away however he desires. But in the latter case, which is the one relevant 
to economic distribution, the question is whether we come to own, in 
the first place, the economic rents which we may extract. The meritocrat 
denies this: Ownership comes only to the extent to which meritorious 
contributions were made. The fans can gift their deserved income to Wilt 
if they like.
The meritocrat wants to enforce a pattern of distribution. But it is a 
limited one, confined to the intragenerational distribution of income. If 
an adult wishes to give away some of his deserved income, there is no bar-
rier to his doing so. These gifts would not disrupt any pattern, since there 
is no call to enforce a pattern of wealth within a generation.
I note that most people don’t agree with Nozick about the justness of 
Wilt’s wealth at D2; Konow tests the case (using Michael Jordan as the 
example), and finds that 76 percent of people view Wilt’s earnings at D2 
as unfair, “cast[ing] doubt on broad support for Nozick’s minimal role 
for wealth redistribution” (Konow 2003: 1207).
Consider the following variant on Nozick’s thought experiment: Again 
we start with an initially just distribution D1. This time, though, the fans 
ignore Wilt and develop an interest in the team’s wacky waterboy, Bonzo. 
The fans find Bonzo’s sideline antics amusing; his lack of coordination 
endearing; and his ribald comments hilarious. The fans freely decide that 
what is important to them when they attend games is not to see high 
quality basketball being played but to be entertained by Bonzo. Man-
agement calls Wilt into a meeting. “Wilt, we appreciate your excellent 
performance on our team. You have done much for this franchise and the 
sport of basketball. We now offer you a free choice. As you know, there 
is huge market interest in Bonzo. As a result, he will be replacing you at 
center and will be paid accordingly. Although you will not be playing 
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basketball for us anymore, you will be responsible for discharging the 
duties of waterboy, at $10,000 a year. Accept these terms or be released.”
In this case, we have an initially just distribution of wealth and a final 
distribution that resulted from Nozickian principles of free exchange; 
no one was coerced to make the exchanges that they did, no one was 
defrauded, no one was stolen from. People made Nozickian-legitimate 
choices in the free market. Therefore, according to Nozick’s theory, the 
final distribution D2 is just. It seems to me that that cannot be right. Wilt 
has a legitimate cause for moral complaint. He is right to be upset that his 
path-of-life, his financial security, and his happiness have been frustrated 
by the inanity of the masses, as expressed through the free market.
Note, too, the damage done to Wilt’s liberty in this case. Wilt decided 
to take advantage of his natural talents and devote himself, through years 
of hard work, to excellence in basketball. His plan-of-life centered on 
this devotion, and he had a reasonable expectation that it would not be 
frustrated by the whims of the basketball-watching public. But now Wilt, 
who has done nothing wrong and everything right, finds his professional 
and financial futures frustrated.
Mack says that “to enjoy liberty . . . is to be free of disruptions caused 
by other persons in the ongoing activities which constitute one’s life” 
(1978: 184). That seems right to me, and it also seems right to say that 
Wilt suffers just such a disruption. Now, it is true that a meritocracy 
would frustrate the liberty of the public to watch Bonzo at center. But 
given that somebody’s liberty must be frustrated, we ought to prefer frus-
trating the liberty of the public, which has badly erred, rather than the 
liberty of Wilt, who is excellent.
There is a common sense distinction between conforming one’s plan-
of-life to the reasonable preferences of others, as expressed through the 
market—which we all must do to some degree and which is in no way 
objectionable—and being forced to subjugate yourself to the tastes of 
others, no matter how depraved, to secure a livelihood.
For this reason, there is something disharmonious—downright col-
lectivist—about libertarian affection for unrestrained markets. Ayn Rand 
laments that “the man at the bottom . . . contributes nothing to those 
above him, but receives the bonus of all of their brains” (1961: 186), 
but in fact just the opposite is true: Those men at the bottom determine 
demand and thereby wield control over the economic futures of meritori-
ous people. In a meritocracy, rewards reflect merit, and the excellent do 
not have to degrade themselves in the pursuit of their well-being.
In a meritocracy, economic benefits reflect merit, but under laissez-faire, 
they are received in proportion to popularity. Meritorious people who pro-
duce high quality goods and services receive the economic rewards that they 
deserve only when the marketplace recognizes the value of their products. 
But when that does not happen—when merit and popularity come apart—
then economic reward falls not on the meritorious but on the popular.
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The libertarian cannot have things both ways: We can reward excel-
lence, whether or not that excellence is recognized by the market; or we 
can allow unfettered economic exchanges, in which case popularity will 
wholly determine whose lives go well and whose go poorly.
The libertarian might say that desert-based justice leads us down a dan-
gerous path. If the state has a role in ensuring that income is distributed in 
accordance with desert, why not extend this to other goods, like romantic 
relationships? If that were to follow then any desert-based theory would 
fail by reductio; none of us wants the government meddling in private 
affairs in that way. This is a typical libertarian worry: The idea of bureau-
crats telling us whom to love, venerate, and associate with is terrifying.
But this objection should not sway us. To begin with, the state already 
does affect access to these private goods. Relationships, esteem, and pop-
ularity depend in large and lamentable part on one’s wealth. Sometimes 
these goods can be bought outright, but often the connections are subtle: 
Wealth is considered attractive in a mate, people associate with those who 
can provide expensive experiences, and so on. The state cannot remain 
neutral, though it can pretend to be.
It is interesting that throughout Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Nozick uses 
highly meritorious characters to elicit the intuitions he desires. He chose 
Wilt Chamberlain, after all—arguably the greatest basketball player of all 
time—and not Bonzo the waterboy, thus avoiding the potential intuition 
change that comes when free exchanges redound to the undeserving. Or 
consider this objection, made by Nozick against equal opportunity: “If 
the woman who later became my wife rejected another suitor (whom she 
otherwise would have married) for me, partially because (I leave aside my 
lovable nature) of my keen intelligence and good looks, neither of which 
did I earn, would the rejected less intelligent and less handsome suitor 
have a legitimate complaint about unfairness?” (p. 237).
That is right as far as it goes, but it is again an example of a Nozickian 
thought experiment that avoids conflict with desert. A better question to 
ask is this: What if Barbara rejected Nozick in favor of a less deserving 
suitor? Imagine that Nozick, with his famous good looks and obvious 
brilliance, fell in love with Barbara at the same time that a man of lesser 
merit did. Owing to unequal opportunity to pursue her, Barbara decided 
on the less deserving man instead (suppose Nozick had to work full-time 
while the other man took her on fancy dates enabled by his trust fund). My 
intuition is that Nozick has a legitimate complaint about injustice. And it’s 
not that Barbara did something unjust, or that she isn’t morally allowed to 
choose whomever she desires when it comes to marriage. What is unjust 
is that for some people, the good things in life are closed off to them for 
reasons irrelevant from the point-of-view of merit. And when I say that 
the man is “less deserving” than Nozick, I don’t mean less deserving as 
determined by a bureaucrat—I mean less deserving by Barbara’s own 
lights. Under equal opportunity, she would have chosen Nozick instead.
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In short, this objection parodies meritocracy. Any plausible distributive 
system includes liberal protections against government overreach. Any 
moral ideal becomes risible if taken to the extreme. Meritocracy is fully 
compatible with robust freedom for its citizens; indeed, as I shall argue in 
the next section, if freedom is construed in its positive sense, meritocracy 
provides more of it than libertarianism does.
The third libertarian objection is associated with Hayek (1960, 1976). 
Hayek observes, correctly, that markets can fail to track merit or desert,11 
and he claims that this is a good thing. According to Hayek, “we do not 
wish people to earn a maximum of merit but to achieve a maximum of 
usefulness at a minimum of pain and sacrifice and therefore a minimum 
of merit” (1960: 96). In this way, Hayek suggests, giving a person what 
she deserved would come at the cost of her ability to create value for oth-
ers in the marketplace.
In reply, I note that even if our normative goal were the maximization 
of the surplus, as Hayek suggests, meritocratic regulation is justified on 
those grounds: Economic rents are inefficient, as are negative externalities 
like pollution (§8.3).
Hayek is right that remuneration based on market demand serves an 
important purpose, signaling firms to move from one line of production 
to another in a socially useful way. But that is not true universally; it is 
true only insofar as none of the considerations raised in §6.7 hold. It is 
a bad thing when firms invest our scarce resources in the development, 
production, and distribution of homeopathic “remedies”.12
Moreover, we cannot only concern ourselves with sending useful eco-
nomic signals. We must also incentivize the sort of character that posi-
tively impacts an economy. Hayek argues that producers of demand 
products should be rewarded because that’s good for productivity. But 
demand is only good for productivity when it’s demand for a quality 
product, and high quality products are produced by high quality people. 
One important feature of markets is the way that they reward innovation, 
efficiency, and effort. But when markets work poorly, individuals’ talents 
go unrecognized and reward redounds not to the meritorious but rather 
to those with the right family or social connections. These are market 
failures, to be dealt with through regulation.
The next libertarian objection is a wholly positive one: that no fea-
sible institutional structure could effectively promote desert within an 
economy, at least while avoiding unacceptable harms to efficiency.
If that is the libertarian’s reason for opposing meritocracy, then he 
has already conceded a great deal to me. If the libertarian believes that 
in an ideal world people are rewarded because they deserve to be, then 
he accepts my principal conclusion. Of course, libertarians who are 
attracted to Nozickian entitlement theory cannot accept this.
In any event, there is nothing infeasible about the institutional struc-
tures for which meritocracy calls. Quite the opposite, one of the strengths 
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of this approach to justice, I have argued, is that it is attainable from pres-
ent circumstances. Meritocracy is largely compatible with free markets, 
and where it is not, the required regulation is straightforward. Many 
meritocratic policies, such as Pigovian taxes (§8.3), have been developed 
in detail and endorsed by experts right, left, and center.
Hayek and other libertarians parody the meritocratic ideal by suggest-
ing that there would have to be some kind of centralized and omniscient 
“merit czar”, who knows exactly what each citizen deserves and distrib-
utes income accordingly. No one thinks that we should have such a czar, 
and no such czar is necessary. Meritocrats believe that limits should be 
put on executive compensation, especially when executive performance 
is poor; that people who destroy social value, not create it (e.g. producers 
of negative externalities) should not benefit from that destruction; that 
anti-discrimination laws are justified; and that the state should spend 
money to promote the education and health of children born to poor 
or inattentive parents. None of these policies is infeasible, none requires 
central planning, none is oppressive.13
The final objection to meritocracy I consider here was also lodged, as 
best I can tell, by Hayek. The objection is this: In a meritocracy, disad-
vantaged citizens have no good excuse for their inferior socioeconomic 
position. If people truly got what they deserved, then those on the bottom 
rungs could not in good conscience blame their hardship on the vagaries 
of the market or bad luck. They would have no choice but to confront the 
hard fact that they failed. Hayek regards the market’s inattention to des-
ert as a sort of psychological salve. For him and for others inclined to this 
objection, desert’s demand that each person make an honest reckoning of 
the reasons for his place in society is far from a strength. As Schaar puts 
it, a meritocracy “leaves the losers with no external justification for their 
failures, and no amount of trying can erase the large element of cruelty 
from any social doctrine which does that” (1967: 234).
This objection has no force, and indeed strikes me as an especially 
cynical way of looking at things. That a political order lends itself to self-
delusion is a weakness, not a strength. It is neither unreasonable nor cruel 
to expect each adult citizen to take responsibility for his past actions and 
inactions, his merits and demerits, and his successes and failures. If we 
are to take personal responsibility seriously (§6.9), then we cannot fret 
over the unreasonable reactions of those who have suffered at their own 
hands. All plausible political arrangements have winners and losers. That 
is an unfortunate fact of scarcity. And maybe it is inevitable that the los-
ers will be upset about their place in society. But surely it is preferable to 
have an economic arrangement in which those at the bottom are there by 
their own making. If Alice and Billy are both “losers”, but Alice’s status 
is due to her being lazy and evil, and Billy’s is due to racial prejudice, 
surely we ought to be more concerned with correcting Billy’s undeserved 
disadvantage, no matter how upset Alice is. Given that we do not live in 
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a world of plenty, and that no matter what political order we endorse, 
somebody is going to be upset, we ought to prefer a system in which the 
bottom rung is populated with Alices rather than Billys.
Think of it this way: If the Yankees, after losing the World Series 
to the Mets after seven fair-and-square games managed by honest and 
competent umpires, were to complain about the unfairness of the result 
and the injustice of their runner-up status, we would have little sympa-
thy. We would tell them to suck it up and try harder next time. That the 
Yankees might, as a matter of brute fact, be angry about their loss is not 
particularly interesting, and of no moral importance. That anger would 
be unreasonable. It is the role of psychologists, not philosophers, to say 
how to placate sore losers.
6.9  Positive Liberty and Personal Responsibility
It is widely assumed that libertarianism best promotes the value of liberty. 
This is correct if liberty is interpreted in its negative sense, as the absence 
of interference. If you dismantle the government, you maximize negative 
liberty (setting aside that private interference would increase as public 
interference decreases).
But liberty may be interpreted in a positive way, too—as the ability to 
shape one’s life as one sees fit. Positive liberty is closely connected to the 
concept of autonomy, and endorsed by thinkers as diverse as Kant, Marx, 
and J. S. Mill.
South Sudan is a paragon of negative liberty: The nascent government 
has put few constraints on its citizens and even these it lacks the power 
to enforce. A South Sudanese can in theory do anything he wants; his 
government will not trouble him. But, of course, he can do nothing at all 
with his life, in part because his government is so impotent. He cannot 
travel; there is no infrastructure. He cannot pursue a profession; there is 
no economy. He has only one path-of-life available to him: fending off 
famine, disease, and war. He lacks positive liberty.
The idea that we should like to live in a maximally free society is 
appealing, but imprecise. It is imprecise, one, because it does not make 
clear whether the freedom at issue is negative or positive. And these may 
be at odds. (I’ll use “liberty” and “freedom” interchangeably.)
Two, the connection between individual freedom and social freedom is 
ambiguous. Suppose there are 10 people in world A. One of them has 92 
paths-of-life open to him; the other nine have a single path-of-life open. 
In world B, there are also 10 people, each of whom has 10 paths-of-life 
available. Is A “freer” than B? (Since there are a total of 101 paths-of-
life open in A, compared to 100 in world B?) It seems to me not, but the 
answer is not obvious. We have to make a judgment about how social 
freedom turns on individual freedoms.
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For these reasons, we should not be too quick to concede the banner 
of liberty to the libertarian. I believe that a meritocracy would provide 
more positive liberty to its citizens than a libertarian state would. The 
most important reason is that, in a meritocracy, no citizen has paths-
of-life walled off because of birth into disadvantage. This follows from 
equal opportunity. The only paths-of-life that an individual citizen cannot 
pursue are those for which he is disqualified by virtue of genetics or free 
choice. And surely it is not a violation of liberty when a path-of-life is 
walled off owing to free choice.
It should be plain that many people today, even in prosperous countries 
like the United States, lack positive liberty. If you are born black in inner 
city America, into a broken home and amidst a culture of violence, you 
are hugely limited in your prospects—no matter your natural merits. The 
same is true for the children of the white rural poor, who face under-
funded schools and broken local economies.
Now it is true that establishing equal opportunity might decrease the 
positive liberties of some citizens—most notably, the rich, who are, prima 
facie, on the losing end of the relevant redistributive policies (but see the 
efficiency benefits of these policies—§4.8). But this does not seem like a 
problem, especially if a flatter distribution of individual freedoms is better 
from the point-of-view of freedom writ large.
Of course, unlimited positive liberty is impossible; as Isaiah Berlin 
reminds us, “that we cannot have everything is a necessary, not a contin-
gent, truth” (1969: 170). All we can do is try to provide as much of it in 
our society as is possible. And when liberties are constrained because of 
scarcity, all we can do is try to live with that without resentment.
In this way, meritocracy is freer than either Nozick’s nighwatchman 
state or a laissez-faire economy. I conjecture that a society that (1) takes 
initial human capital endowments as given, (2) provides equal oppor-
tunity to all, and then (3) distributes scarce social goods on the basis 
of merit alone maximizes social freedom. Proving that requires some 
consensus about what we mean by “social freedom”, so I leave it as a 
conjecture for now.
All that said, libertarians are correct that, no matter how we construe 
liberty, history has shown it to be best-promoted by market economies. 
It is almost incomprehensible, how much more positive liberty we have 
now than we did 200 years ago. This is true of the poorest and the richest 
among us. But it is a logical error to think that this implies that positive 
liberty is maximized in an unregulated economy without redistribution. 
We are so much freer now than we used to be because we are so much 
richer now. Freedom turns importantly on economic output, but it is 
not tantamount to output. And, in any case, meritocratic redistribution 
should increase output. Thus, to the extent to which freedom is a result of 
economic growth, libertarians ought to support this redistribution. And 
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they do not (see, e.g. Hayek’s (1976) and Nozick’s (1974) opposition to 
equal opportunity).
Next: It has often been thought that desert is closely connected to the 
concept of responsibility (see, e.g. Sadurski 1985), and a meritocratic 
economy cultivates an ethos of personal responsibility.
Equal opportunity ensures that no one has a poor life forced upon him 
for reasons outside of his control. Individuals gets jobs only if they have 
prepared themselves responsibly (i.e. developed the relevant merits). And 
when people do get rich in a meritocracy, it is because they developed and 
applied those merits. People are held to account for the uncompensated 
costs that they impose on others (§8.3). And so on.
It is no surprise that as the meritocratic framework of our country has 
been dismantled since 1980, we have seen a decline in personal responsi-
bility. Conservatives attack liberals for irresponsibility: for using abortion 
as a form of birth control; for funneling money to “welfare queens”; for 
buying homes that they could not afford and then demanding bailouts. 
Now, some of this is silly—but there is truth here too.
On the other hand, liberals attack conservatives: for failing to take 
care of the climate; for launching stupid wars and having others fight 
them; and for funding their own consumption on the backs of future 
generations (because about half the national debt is held by foreigners, 
young Americans will be saddled with the debt payments but they will 
not inherit the bonds).
Again we have normative agreement—personal responsibility is mor-
ally important—which gets masked by discord over positive matters.
I have concentrated on the ways in which our economy promotes 
 irresponsible conduct. To egalitarians, this will already be obvious. My hope 
here is that I can convince some libertarians that their attraction to free 
markets is motivated more by considerations of desert, efficiency, and per-
sonal responsibility than distinctly libertarian values. In the face of other 
economic arrangements that have been tried, free markets seem to best 
recognize personal responsibility, drawing distinctions of merit which other 
systems do not. It is natural but false to suppose that if taken to extreme lais-
sez-faire, markets will best promote personal responsibility. They will not.
Joshua Preiss discusses the clash between libertarian theory and per-
sonal responsibility at length in an excellent recent article, noting that
in the political and economic status quo, preferred libertarian policies 
. . . undermine the ethic of personal responsibility that Americans 
from across the ideological spectrum value and many conservatives 
and libertarians celebrate. In the present American context, those 
who value personal responsibility (libertarian or otherwise) must 
reserve a central place for policies that mitigate opportunity and 
distributive inequalities.
(2017: 622)14
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This is correct.
It seems to me that something like the following has happened within the 
distributive justice debate: (1) People pre-theoretically like the “meritocratic 
ideal”—unequal outcomes; achievement-based-on-merit; an emphasis on 
personal responsibility. (2) They seek a principled justification for this senti-
ment. (3) They believe that libertarianism provides it, in part because they 
judge, correctly, that egalitarianism is hopelessly at odds with the ideal. And 
so (4) they endorse libertarian public policies—even as these are precisely the 
wrong ones for pursuing the ideal they found compelling in the first place.
6.10  On the Possibility of a Social Safety Net
As best we can tell (§3.2), when people think about the morality of an 
economy, they have three ideals in mind: justice, efficiency, and need (by 
which they mean keeping citizens above a distributive floor). In theory, 
these three ideals might come into conflict. We know that justice is the 
most important of the three, followed by need, followed by efficiency—
but that does not mean that justice simply trumps need and efficiency, and 
need simply trumps efficiency. It means that the three will receive different 
weights when the possibility of trading them off against each other arises.
In this section, I consider the possibility of maintaining a social safety 
net in a meritocracy. Unlike efficiency, which is promoted by meritocratic 
justice in a somewhat obvious way, the question of trade-offs between 
justice and need must be addressed, and the extent of the meritocratic 
social safety net made clear.15
To begin with, it should be clear that, in a meritocracy, all children (i.e. 
everyone younger than the age of moral agency, whatever we decide that 
to be), is caught by a robust safety net. This is not an additional concep-
tual idea, nor would it require public policies beyond those demanded by 
justice. This is simply part and parcel of equal opportunity. Ensuring that 
all children have their basic needs met—food, education, health, etc.—is 
necessary, but not sufficient, for equal opportunity.
So considerations of need proper are restricted to adults. Who might be 
in need in a meritocracy? Two classes of people. The first class contains 
those citizens who are unable to provide themselves with a minimal level 
of welfare. This includes citizens who were seriously disabled from birth, 
those who were in accidents, those who were injured in war, etc.
The second class contains those citizens who choose not to provide 
themselves with a minimal level of welfare. While in theory this includes 
citizens who literally choose not to work and would starve without public 
aid, this class is really composed of citizens who made past choices such 
that now they cannot provide for themselves. For example, the choice to 
use narcotics imprudently may, in time, render one addicted and unable 
to provide for oneself. We might call the first class the “deserving poor” 
and the second class the “undeserving poor”.
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I stress that we are assuming, as I think that we should, that the com-
mon intuition is correct: It is morally good for a state to provide a social 
safety net to its citizens. I would keep even deeply undeserving people 
out of the gutter—if that could be done at no cost. But of course there is 
a cost. So the real question confronting us is whom we actually have an 
obligation to help in light of opportunity costs.
Let us address the undeserving poor first. Suppose that Gary, a career 
criminal, is unemployed owing to drug addiction. He has hurt innocent 
people over the course of his life. He has been put through rehab before, 
on the public dime. And now he will die without X dollars of public aid.
We must remember that when we decide to give Gary those X dollars, 
we decide not to improve the welfare of terminally ill children; we decide 
not to fight climate change, or fund a cure for cancer; we decide not to 
support equal opportunity. Public aid for Gary runs afoul of the Singer 
Test (§2.3). That is, a theory that requires that we choose Gary over those 
terminally ill children is likely wrong. In contrast, a theory that requires 
that we help Tyler, a good man badly injured in a car accident, does not 
have that visceral implausibility. (I stress that this is a metatheoretical 
point. It might well be that morality requires that we help the children 
rather than Tyler. But we would not recoil at a theory that instructed us 
to choose Tyler over them.)
We are under no moral obligation to help Gary. Indeed, if providing aid 
to him comes at the cost of one of the worthy causes just described, we 
are morally required not to help him. Morality requires that we let him 
die. Until we enter a post-scarcity era, a person who has enjoyed genuine 
equal opportunity and squandered that opportunity has no moral entitle-
ment to resources that could go to unambiguously noble causes. If this 
seems harsh, it is only because we so often fail to keep opportunity costs 
in mind.
Now, when we think of actual Garys—that is, people like Gary, whom 
we know—the intuition is not so strong. This is because equal opportu-
nity is badly lacking in the actual world. It is rare that we can say with 
any confidence that an actual person, in dire straits, is really there by his 
own making.
Arneson (1997) argues for a wide-scope safety net in part on these 
grounds: that claims about citizens’ irresponsibility get undermined by 
the possibility of unfortunate contingencies in their past. That I don’t 
dispute. But what we are trying to get at is how a just, meritocratic soci-
ety ought to treat Gary. In such a society, he would have enjoyed equal 
opportunity and been judged on his merits.
The real-world justifiability of a strong safety net, protecting people 
like Gary, will therefore turn on the degree to which a society is just. A 
just society, still grappling with scarcity, must not extend aid to Gary. In 
an unjust society, in which equal opportunity and meritocratic discrimi-
nation are lacking, the case for aiding Gary is stronger. Of course, even 
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here that aid would have to be balanced against the other good these 
resources could do (like the establishment of justice).
One might think that this example, which involves criminality, skirts 
a tougher question: What about the virtuous but non-contributing? Sup-
pose Dave does not have a nasty bone in his body, but he also has zero 
desire to work. He collects welfare, spends his days at the park, and sur-
vives on public support.
This changes nothing. As far as the social safety net goes, Gary and 
Dave should be treated the same. The only reason that a safety net is 
available in the first place is because so many of us are willing to sacrifice 
our leisure and work instead. This is why we do not live in a Hobbesian 
nightmare. Dave’s unwillingness to make the sacrifices that make all this 
possible excludes him from public aid.
Let us turn to the other class of adult citizens, the deserving poor. I 
note that the intuition here is very different. Suppose Tyler, an everyday 
member of the American workforce, gets in an accident that renders 
him unable to work. We are contemplating providing him with a public 
income. We bring the Singer Test to mind and ask: Is that acceptable in 
light of the opportunity costs? To my mind, the answer is “yes”: Helping 
Tyler is not beyond the pale.
To summarize: All children in a meritocracy are protected by a social 
safety net. Not only does this not conflict with justice, it is required by 
justice. In addition, children cannot have done anything to make them-
selves undeserving—since they are not yet moral agents. Conceptually, 
there can be no conflict between justice and need for this part of society.
The safety net also extends to the deserving poor. When we help an 
individual who, because of disability, unemployment, etc. is unable to 
achieve a basic level of welfare on his own merits, that does not conflict 
with justice. Justice is about desert, and in particular it is about matching 
citizens’ income with their meritorious contributions to the economy. The 
disabled and unemployed (etc.) stand outside of this structure.
The safety net does not extend to the undeserving poor. When a person 
is capable of making an economic contribution but refuses to do so, that 
does create a deviation from the just pattern of distribution. This person 
deserves nothing (because he made no contribution but could have), 
yet the safety net provides him with income (either cash or an in-kind 
benefit).
It is also important to limit the social safety net for communitarian 
reasons. We want to cultivate an ethos of personal responsibility, and 
that is obviously undermined when irresponsibility gets rewarded. We 
also want to cultivate solidarity and a sense of shared sacrifice, and when 
able-bodied people do not work those values are undermined.
Finally, while we will always be faced with the question of what to do 
with the undeserving poor, the problem will be far less acute in a meri-
tocracy than it actually is. The efficiency gains and positive externalities 
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associated with equal opportunity will redound to those in danger of fall-
ing into this class. More human capital means less chance of struggling 
to find employment and a better ability to deal with life’s travails. In a 
meritocracy, citizens do not get stuck in a cycle of criminality, because 
there are no “collateral consequences” of conviction (§5.7). When a 
person commits a crime and pays his debt to society the matter is put 
to rest—from that moment on, he will be judged on his merits. And if 
merit percolates into politics, more sensible public policies will result. 
It is becoming clear that much of the want in America has been caused 
or perpetuated by the drug war. Meritorious people across the political 
spectrum have been warning us of this for years.
6.11  The Justice/Efficiency “Trade-Off”, Part 3
An economy structured around the principles outlined in this chapter will 
approach maximal productivity for the following reasons.
First, whenever remuneration and contribution come apart, there exists 
an incentive to engage in activity that does not create value in the mar-
ketplace. This is precisely what is happening in America today: Labor is 
being diverted into industries in which unproductive enterprise and rent-
seeking are most prevalent—consulting, finance, and law. These fields are 
especially attractive to the most skilled and highly-educated among us, 
a natural consequence of the fact that rent extraction is easiest and most 
common at the top of the income distribution.
I do not mean to suggest that the aforementioned industries are unim-
portant. They are vital to a well-functioning economy, and meritorious 
firms and people in them should be handsomely rewarded. In recent years, 
however, these industries have seen a mammoth divergence between 
remuneration and value-added. Consider, for example, the extraordinary 
incomes of hedge fund managers, most of whom run what are essentially 
professional gambling outfits. Most hedge funds fail, and those that 
survive deliver truly mediocre performance to their clients: Their “dollar-
weighted returns are reliably lower than the return on the Standard & 
Poor’s (S&P) 500 index” (Dichev and Yu 2011: 248). The hedge funds 
that do enjoy success—in the sense of generating good returns for their 
investors—do it by exploiting technical inefficiencies in markets. They 
extract rents.
Second, whenever remuneration and merit come apart, there is a dis-
incentive for people to acquire human capital. As anyone in the labor 
market these days knows, personal connections are critical to finding a 
job. We go to conferences to network; websites like LinkedIn facilitate 
connections; and professional certifications (many of which have been 
introduced, unprompted, by the private sector) flourish. It is in an indi-
vidual’s interest to spend his time and money networking, getting certi-
fied, etc.—but these activities provide no human capital growth. They just 
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give people an interpersonal advantage in the labor market. Resources 
spent in this way are wasted; they could be put toward productive enter-
prise, but they are not.
Similarly, if you are CEO, and your salary depends on good relations 
with the compensation committee and not merit, you will rationally 
develop that relationship rather than become a more competent execu-
tive. There is economic waste on the part of the firm (which pays more to 
the rent-extracting CEO than it needs to keep her employed), and on the 
part of the executive (she doesn’t develop her merits, because that is not 
in her interest). This is why we know that if “today’s executives . . . were 
paid less there would be no loss of productivity or output” (Mishel and 
Davis 2015: 9). Productivity and output would increase if we attacked 
these anti-meritocratic features of our economy.
Nevertheless, government can only do so much. More important is a 
cultural change: Greater concern for merit; greater attention to actual 
performance; and less interest in race, pedigree, and rough proxies for 
merit.
Third, as discussed in §§6.7–6.8, in a meritocracy capital accrues to 
those who are best able to make wise decisions about its investment—
meritorious people. Capital is not distributed among citizens equally. 
That would give some citizens more capital than they could make efficient 
use of, and some less (as it gives some citizens more than they deserve, 
and some less).
Similarly, unrestricted capital transfers, permitted under laissez-faire, 
are undesirable. Some transfers that the libertarian finds unproblem-
atic—for example, inheritance—put capital in the hands of those with the 
right family or friends, rather than in the hands of those who can invest 
it wisely. Whatever we might want to say about how justly egalitarian-
ism or libertarianism treats individual citizens, both theories protect 
economic inefficiencies.
Fourth, there are a variety of technical reasons to prefer a meritocratic 
income distribution. I’ll just mention one recent result here: In the setting 
of a public goods game,16 Nax et al. make the “astonishing finding” that 
meritocracy eliminates sentiments of unfairness among players and pro-
duces the efficient outcome:
The results of our study show that meritocracy can dissolve the 
fundamental tradeoff between efficiency and equality. Creating a 
public good does not necessarily generate inefficiencies, nor . . . 
requires the intervention of a central coercive power for their sup-
pression. Fairness preferences and suitable institutional settings, such 
as well-working merit-based matching mechanisms, can align agents’ 
incentives, and shift the system towards more cooperative and near-
efficient Nash equilibria.
(2015: 15)
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Notes
 1 See Ake (1975); Dick (1975); and Lamont (1997).
 2 See Milne (1986) and Sadurski (1985).
 3 See Miller (1976, 1989, 1999) and Riley (1989).
 4 See Dekker (2010); Hsieh (2000); Miller (1989); and Sheffrin (2013).
 5 There is arguably a technical complication involving the possibility of multi-
ple economic equilibria. In equilibrium theory at its most general, uniqueness 
is not guaranteed. However, it is not clear to me that this is of any normative 
interest. First, technical conditions may hold such that our economic equi-
librium is in fact unique. In which case, this consideration is moot. Second, 
the process by which the actual equilibrium is reached may trigger desert. 
For example, under a Walrasian tâtonnement process, individuals and firms 
choose how much of a commodity they wish to buy and sell at various prices. 
In that way, they exercise control over which equilibrium they arrive at. 
Third, we might simply average over equilibria. And fourth, this is a hyper-
abstraction. An eminently reasonable response is: “Yeah, maybe there are 
multiple equilibria ‘out there’, in some sense, but we’re in this equilibrium, 
and so we ought to be paid for our contributions here!”
 6 For useful discussions of heritability, genetic and environmental contributions 
to merit, etc., see Fishkin (2014).
 7 The distinction is sometimes put in terms of “ex ante preferences”—those 
formed under imperfect information—and “ex post preferences”, which 
are those a person would have, were he better-informed. For discussion, see 
Cowen (1993); Hausman and McPherson (1994); and Sen (1977).
 8 See, e.g. Bowles (1998); George (2004); Gintis (1972); and McPherson 
(1982).
 9 See Grofman, Owen, and Feld (1983) and Nitzan and Paroush (1982).
10 These issues discussed in this section are also addressed in my 2017.
11 Sidgwick (1874) noted this, too.
12 Hayek’s objection runs against a long tradition in classical liberal thought, 
beginning with Smith, which holds that markets are valuable because of their 
ability to promote excellent products and remunerate excellent producers—in 
short, because they cultivate merit. “For Smith it is almost a metaphysical 
requirement that markets reward virtuous behavior” (Herzog 2013: 88).
13 Cf. Schmidtz (2016): “[Hayek] thinks a merit czar would be intolerable. 
However, the nightmarish aspect of this vision has everything to do with the 
idea of central planning and nothing to do with the idea of merit. Anyone who 
takes merit seriously agrees with Hayek that it is imperative to decentralize 
evaluation. If Hayek is right that there is no place for a merit czar in a good 
society, then, contra Hayek, the implication is not that merit does not matter 
but precisely that merit does matter”.
14 Roemer (1995) makes a similar point.
15 I attend to the trade-off between justice and need in this section. But what is 
the relationship between efficiency and need? There is no simple answer to 
this question, but it is worth pointing out that some programs aimed at sat-
isfying citizens’ basic needs are efficiency-enhancing. People who are in des-
perate need do desperate things, and the cost of dissuading them from doing 
these things may be less than costs they would inflict. And there are other 
reasons, too, to think that need and efficiency are not terribly at odds; e.g. 
Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) show that unemployment insurance is (produc-
tively) efficient, increasing workers’ willingness to take on risky employment 
and nudging firms toward optimal capital investment.
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16 In these games, players secretly decide how much of their private wealth to 
donate to a central pot; this gets multiplied and then redistributed back to the 
players. The game-theoretic solution is to donate nothing at all, mimicking 
the classic public goods collective action problem.
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7.1  Rawls’s Influence on the Desert Debate
In Chapter 3, we saw just how entrenched desert is in people’s pre-
theoretical reasoning about justice. Philosophers have long been aware 
of this, and the danger that it poses to other approaches to justice. This 
is, perhaps, why Rawls engages in his wholesale, quasi-metaphysical 
rejection of desert: Unless can he show the concept to be uninstantiated, 
even incoherent, it will play a prominent role in the process of reflective 
equilibrium and affect our theories accordingly.
It is hard to overstate the influence that Rawls has had here. Many 
contemporary scholars believe that he pretty well killed off the concept 
of desert. That’s wrong, and my purpose in this chapter is to explain why.
Some philosophers have already replied directly to Rawls. And some of 
these replies, like those given by Sher and Alan Zaitchik (§7.3), I regard 
as sound.
Still other philosophers have tried to bypass the Rawlsian objection to 
desert. For example, Schmidtz says, “we are born into our natural and 
positional advantages by mere luck, and that which comes to us by mere 
luck cannot be deserved. This further aspect is what I reject” (2002: 778).
I shall end up disagreeing with Schmidtz in both respects. Pace Schmidtz, 
luck does indeed undermine desert. But, pace both Rawls and Schmidtz, 
we are not born into our natural advantages by mere luck.
Perhaps Rawls’s influence is related to the peculiarly American ten-
dency to abnegate responsibility for the course of one’s life and ascribe 
it to facts about one’s birth. As we have seen, this is justifiable in part: 
Because the power of hereditary wealth and influence is now so strong 
(and getting stronger—see Piketty 2014), the meritocratic ideal of equal 
opportunity and achievement based on merit lies in tatters. Still, our cul-
ture, and philosophers especially, push things too far. Other cultures find 
it odd; in Japan, for example,
the secret to success is considered to be hard work. Why does one stu-
dent get straight A’s in math, science, geometry, and language, while 
her best friend gets all C’s? In the United States, almost everybody 
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answers that question by saying that the all-A student is smarter. In 
Japan, almost nobody would answer that way. The reason some kids 
do well in school and others don’t is almost universally considered to 
be effort. If you work hard, you’ll get A’s; if you didn’t get A’s, you 
didn’t work hard enough. I’ve visited hundreds of Japanese class-
rooms over the years, and virtually every one has the word doryoku 
framed on the wall. The word means effort.
(Reid 2000: 135–6)
We have seen that, given equal opportunity, the Eastern sentiment is 
correct. Genetic differences do not control one’s socioeconomic future; 
indeed, they appear to have but a small influence (§6.5).
Rawls’s objection to desert is an interesting one, and we can see why it 
was lodged and why it has been so influential—namely, defects in equal 
opportunity. But, for reasons which I will now give, it ought to be rejected. 
I suspect, too, that were Rawls’s objection considered by thoughtful people 
living under robust equal opportunity, it would not be regarded as plausible.
7.2  Two Other Rawlsian Objections to Desert
While the objection I mean to rebut in this chapter is widely regarded as 
Rawls’s core critique of desert, Rawls’s actual views on desert are harder 
to pin down. His remarks in A Theory of Justice are unclear, and philoso-
phers have identified several lines of attack on desert in that work (see 
Scheffler 2000 for a survey of these). I wish to attend, briefly, to two of 
these alternative objections.
One objection which Rawls makes, but which will not work against 
meritocracy, is pragmatic. Rawls muses that even if people could deserve 
things, and even if a desert-based distributive scheme were immune to 
reasonable rejection, “moral worth would be utterly impracticable as a 
criterion when applied to questions of distributive justice. We might say: 
Only God could make those judgments.” (Rawls 2001: 73). Or simply:
(R-1) The idea of rewarding desert is impracticable.
(Rawls 1999: 274)
To the contrary, nothing is more practical than desert-based reward, as 
meritocracy construes it. Unlike Rawls’s own theory—the implementation 
of which remains hazy—I have made clear the ways in which our economy 
does and does not accord with the meritocratic ideal. And I shall discuss, 
in the third part of this book, the specific public policies that meritocracy 
requires. Moreover, even if it were sound, R-1 would only tell against 
virtue-based distribution, which no contemporary theorist (save, I believe, 
one—Kristjánsson (2003)) endorses. Just distribution does not require deep 
knowledge and analysis of moral virtue; it simply requires that we evaluate 
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individuals on their merit. What could be more practical than awarding the 
gold medal to the runner who, as best we can tell, was the fastest?
The second objection is the one that Rawls really may have had in 
mind, at least later in his life:
Moral desert . . . cannot be incorporated into a political conception 
of justice in view of the fact of reasonable pluralism. Having conflict-
ing conceptions of the good, citizens cannot agree on a comprehen-
sive doctrine to specify an idea of moral desert for political purposes.
(2001: 73)
Or:
(R-2) (1)  Our distributive system must be justified on grounds 
acceptable to all reasonable citizens.
  (2)  All desert-based distributive schemes are justified under 
comprehensive moral doctrines which some reasonable 
citizens will reject.
    THEREFORE, desert-based distributive schemes are unjustifiable.
Reply: Again setting aside the implausibility of distribution based on 
virtue, if any distributive system can surmount the hurdle of public jus-
tification, it’s meritocracy.1 Why? For one thing, if the original position 
is in fact the disinterested point-of-view which can command reasonable 
consensus, then that probably leads to meritocracy, in light of the evi-
dence cited in Chapter 3.
Moreover, meritocracy asks us to endorse intuitions about justice that 
are widely held, across lines of gender, class, and culture. Meritocracy 
includes robust equal opportunity. It proscribes all forms of anti-mer-
itocratic discrimination. It deals with the equity/efficiency trade-off. It 
reaches across ideological lines. It provides non-ideal guidance. If meri-
tocracy is not publicly justifiable, what could be?
7.3  Rawls against Desert
In any case, I am doing analysis, not history, here, and so I will not try to 
divine what Rawls really intended. The argument most commonly attrib-
uted to him, rightly or wrongly, and which has had such influence, is the 
one that the desert theorist must confront. It goes like this:
(R-3) (1) A person P deserves x on the basis of y only if P deserves y.
(2)  If y originated in fortunate family or social circumstances 
then it is not the case that P deserves y.
(3)  All putative desert bases originated in fortunate family or 
social circumstances.
 THEREFORE, P does not deserve x.
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Although R-3 is sometimes interpreted as an argument about free will 
and moral responsibility, that is unfair to Rawls, for to show that some 
political principle loses its force under hard determinism is not to accom-
plish too much.2 As political philosophers, we begin from a presumption 
of free will (§1.3) when we ask, “How should we arrange our economy in 
order to do justice to economic agents?” The question itself implies that 
we have some choice in the matter. Political philosophers need not show 
that their principles operate under hard determinism, just as they need 
not show that their principles operate if we are brains-in-vats. That we 
have free will, and that we are not brains-in-vats, are pragmatic presup-
positions of rational inquiry within the domain of political philosophy.
Moreover, if we think that there is something to the idea that our 
politics ought not be arranged on the basis of controversial philosophical 
doctrines—and Rawls (2005) certainly believed this—then any argument 
that relies on considerations of free will should not be regarded as a legiti-
mate objection to desert. The free will problem is a hotly contested one, 
even among professional philosophers (see Bourget and Chalmers 2014).
No: Rawls’s argument has the apparent power that it does because it 
seems that even if we have free will and there is a robust sense of moral 
responsibility, it’s still the case that all those things which we naïvely think 
make us deserving are themselves undeserved—to such a degree, in fact, 
that the concept of desert ends up uninstantiated.
Terence Tao may have deserved the Fields Medal on the basis of his 
work in number theory and analysis, and he may have deserved those 
accomplishments on the basis of his intelligence and his effort. But did 
Tao really deserve those things? Did he deserve to be a mathematical 
super-prodigy, with a mathematical ability at age seven greater than that 
of most adults?3 Rawls would say “no”:
We do not deserve our place in the distribution of native endow-
ments, any more than we deserve our initial starting place in society. 
That we deserve the superior character that enables us to make the 
effort to cultivate our abilities is also problematic; for such character 
depends in good part upon fortunate family and social circumstances 
in early life for which we can claim no credit.
(1999: 89)
According to R-3, all of our desert-claims can be traced back to bases 
which are matters of fortune; anything that is a matter of fortune is unde-
served; and therefore, since desert bases must themselves be deserved to 
make the desert-claim bona fide, no one deserves anything at all. If Rawls 
is right, then “the possibility of our being deserving ended with the Big 
Bang” (Schmidtz 2006: 35).
R-3 has been subjected to two principal criticisms. The first—given by 
Zaitchik (1977)—uses a Moorean strategy: While there may be a good 
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argument out there that much of what we think we deserve we in fact do 
not, R-3 says that we deserve nothing—and, worse, no matter what we 
do, we can never deserve anything at all. And that just seems wrong. If 
I bake an apple pie, surely I deserve a slice. On this criticism, any anti-
desert argument that rules out the possibility of anyone, anywhere, at any 
time, deserving anything, is unsound by reductio.
I take no stance on the soundness of such an approach here. Instead, 
I want to point out that it illuminates an important ambiguity in R-3. 
Consider the phrase “originated in”, found in premises (2) and (3). It is 
not clear if Rawls meant for this phrase to be understood categorically, 
as “originated wholly in”, or whether it is a more limited claim, akin to 
“originated partially in”.
If the former, then R-3 is unsound because premise (3) is false—you 
deserve a slice of pie, in part, because you decided to bake the thing—and 
that basis has nothing to do with “fortunate family and social circum-
stances”. If that were the right interpretation of R-3, then many—maybe 
all—of our desert-claims would be vindicated.
However, if “originated in” is understood in the latter, partial sense, 
then premise (2) is implausibly strong, equivalent to saying that any 
desert-claim that rests, even slightly, on “fortunate family and social cir-
cumstances” is totally neutralized. It may be a matter of fortunate social 
circumstances that I have an apple-picking friend and, thus, the ingredi-
ents for a pie. But to say that that contingency completely neutralizes my 
claim to deserve a slice of pie is absurd. It just means, perhaps, that he 
deserves one too.
The correct interpretation of R-3—the only interpretation that pre-
serves Rawls’s point—is that desert-claims lack moral force just to the 
extent to which their underlying desert bases are matters of fortune. The 
greater the role that fortune plays in these, the weaker the desert-claims 
are. And since, according to Rawls, either the proximate desert bases are 
wholly matters of fortune or are themselves grounded in bases that are 
wholly matters of fortune, desert-claims lack any moral force. This will 
be important later.
The second criticism leveled against R-3 is that premise (1) is false. This 
is the approach taken by Sher (1979, 1987). (Zaitchik suggests something 
similar.) Sher denies that desert bases must themselves be deserved, and 
the bases of those bases deserved, and so on, ad infinitum. Instead, the 
regress stops with certain bases—like effort—which are not so unequally 
distributed as to preclude the less-endowed from achieving on the basis 
of them. That suffices to recover desert.4
Still, many are not convinced—for even if one formulation of Rawls’s 
argument is unsuccessful, the intuition persists: It is unjust for one 
person to profit over another on the basis of things which—leave aside 
whether they are deserved or not—are really just matters of luck. Rawls 
raises this worry throughout A Theory of Justice: Our desert-claims 
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eventually end up resting on “fortunate family and social circumstances 
in early life” (1999: 89, my emphasis); or result from “historical and 
social fortune” (1999: 64, my emphasis) and “luck in the natural lot-
tery” (1999: 65, my emphasis); or are “arbitrary from a moral point of 
view” (1999: 63, my emphasis).
But this is false. Before explaining why, one preliminary is necessary. 
Note that a person may become meritorious, and thus putatively deserv-
ing, in one of three ways: (1) free choices, (2) social circumstances, and 
(3) genetics.
Factor (1), on its own, gives us no heartache. Suppose two identical 
twins, raised under similar conditions, both apply for a job at the widget 
factory. If one is more meritorious than the other because she decided to 
major in widgetology in college while her brother studied philosophy, 
then she plainly deserves the job.
Factor (2) is indeed problematic, as I have argued throughout this 
book. Inequalities of opportunity undermine desert. But this is not an 
argument against desert; it is an argument for equal opportunity. In a 
meritocracy, which operates under equal opportunity, (2) will not arise.
Rawls might have conceded all of this (recall that Fair EO is part of 
his second principle of justice), but it would not have vindicated desert in 
his eyes. Why? Because even if equal opportunity prevails, and even if a 
person’s choices to develop her merits are free ones, those merits—effort, 
intelligence, creativity, and so on—ultimate rest on getting “lucky” in the 
genetic lottery—factor (3).
This is Rawls’s crucial error. Our merit, insofar as it is genetically deter-
mined, is not a matter of luck. It is not lucky that Tom, Jr. and Lorraine 
happen to be my parents, nor is it lucky that I have the genetic code that 
I do. Tom, Jr. and Lorraine are the only parents that I could have, and my 
genetics are essential to me. These properties of a person are, in fact, as 
far from lucky as one can get: They are metaphysically necessary.
7.4  The Essentiality of Origin
In Naming and Necessity, Kripke poses the question,
could the Queen—could this woman herself—have been born of dif-
ferent parents from the parents from whom she actually came? . . . 
How could a person originating from different parents, from a totally 
different sperm and egg, be this very woman?
(1972: 112–13, emphasis in the original)
Kripke then explains why such a thing is not possible: While the Queen 
might have had a very different path of life than she did—she might 
have abdicated the throne and joined the circus—she could not have 
come from different (biological) parents, nor from different gametes. Put 
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differently, it is an essential property of the Queen that she has the bio-
logical origin that she actually does; in any possible world in which she 
exists, she has this origin.
And if a property is essential, then it is had not at all as a matter of luck. 
Bruce Springsteen actually has the property of not being an international 
trade agreement, and it is clear that this property is essential: There is 
no possible world in which Springsteen exists and is an international 
trade agreement. (To be sure, there are possible worlds in which there is 
an international trade agreement named “Bruce Springsteen”, and there 
are possible worlds, including the actual one for all I know, in which 
Springsteen is interested in international trade agreements. But there is 
no possible world in which Springsteen himself is an international trade 
agreement.) We can say that this couldn’t be otherwise, that the subjective 
probability that Springsteen is an international trade agreement is 0, and 
so on. In other words, however we want to define “luck”, Springsteen’s 
having this property is not a matter of it. Indeed, it seems that to ask “Is 
Bruce Springsteen lucky not to be an international trade agreement?” is 
to make something like a category mistake.
A number of properties have been proposed as essential, and biologi-
cal origin is the most common of these. Kripke’s argument is primarily 
(but not exclusively) intuitive, but a number of philosophers—includ-
ing Graeme Forbes (1985); Colin McGinn (1976); Harold Noonan 
(1983); and Nathan Salmon (1981)—have made it precise. I will not 
contribute to the defense of the essentiality of origin here but rather 
explore its ramifications for desert. That a person has, as a matter of 
metaphysical necessity, her origin in her actual parents, zygote, and 
gametes is widely accepted but not totally uncontroversial. So I must 
to some extent take it as an assumption of my argument. However, just 
as the essentiality of origin provides grounds to believe in the viability 
of desert, the latter may give us reason to think that Kripke’s idea is 
a sensible one.
7.5  What’s Wrong With Rawls
We are now in a position to identify the flaw in Rawls’s reasoning. Let us 
consider a concrete instance of R-3:
(R-3*) (1*)  A person P deserves x on the basis of y only if it is not 
the case that y originated in fortunate family and social 
circumstances.5
(2) Kristen won the tiara on the basis of her beauty.
(3) Kristen’s beauty originated in her parents.
(4)  Kristen’s beauty originated in fortunate family and social 
circumstances.
THEREFORE, Kristen does not deserve the tiara.
172 A Meritocratic Theory of Economic Justice
R-3* is unsound because premise (4) is false; Kristen’s beauty did not 
originate in fortunate circumstances but in metaphysically necessary ones: 
She is beautiful because she has the genetic code that she actually does, and 
it is an essential property of Kristen that she has this genetic code.
Accordingly, one cannot reduce Kristen’s desert-claim to the tiara to 
the claim that she was luckier in the natural lottery than the other con-
testants in the pageant. Kristen deserves the tiara simply because she is 
more beautiful than they are. Rawls wants us to look at Kristen, trace 
her superior beauty back to her genetics, say that her having those genet-
ics was a matter of luck, and then conclude that Kristen cannot deserve 
anything on the basis of her beauty. But that is to assert something that 
the essentiality of origin tells us is wrong. Kristen is not lucky to have had 
the parents that she did and to have received the genetic material to which 
her beauty is due; they are the only parents that she could have had, and 
the only genetic material which she could have received.
In contrast, consider the pageant contestant who is beautiful because 
of plastic surgery enabled by a bequest from a rich relative. In this case, 
there are some possible worlds in which that contestant receives the 
bequest and some in which she does not—and therefore it is a matter of 
luck that she is beautiful. That contestant may not deserve the tiara. But 
in R-3* we are talking about genetic beauty, and so it does not undermine 
Kristen’s desert-claim.
In evaluating real-world desert-claims, we must weigh (1) the degree 
to which a putative desert basis is genetically determined against (2) the 
degree to which it is due to social advantage. The claim to deserve is 
strengthened in proportion to (1) and weakened in proportion to (2). It 
is metaphysically necessary that I have the parents that I do, but it is not 
metaphysically necessary (just actually true) that I was raised by caring 
parents—I could have been switched at birth and raised by deadbeats. 
The traits that ground my desert-claims are to some extent genetically 
determined, and to some extent the results of being raised in a good home, 
with quality education, health care, etc. Only the former are metaphysi-
cally necessary, and therefore only the former falsify premise (3) of R-3.
This does not help Rawls. As I explained in §7.1, it is not true that if a 
desert-claim is to any extent due to fortune then that claim is bunk in its 
entirety. After all, one might just as easily say that if a desert-claim rests, 
to any extent, on a trait unrelated to fortune then that claim is bona fide 
in its entirety. That’s not plausible either. The correct answer is that our 
desert-claims are weakened just to the extent to which they rest on fortu-
nate traits. Desert, as a concept, survives.
These considerations shed light on linguistic oddities related to desert-
claims. Consider these sentences:
(1) What did Rory do to deserve the prize?
(2) Kirk doesn’t deserve the job.
(3) Dean, like all working people, deserves to earn a living wage.
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These sentences are perfectly intelligible. Even those who do not believe 
that working people deserve a living wage can understand what is being 
said. Now compare:
(4) Do you think that Luke deserves his character?
(5) Emily did nothing to deserve her efforts.
(6) Jess deserves to have different natural talents than he actually has.
In contrast to (1)-(3), these sentences are puzzling. Yet they or their kin 
are frequently used by Rawlsians when objecting to desert-claims. We 
should regard these objections as not just false but unintelligible for the 
reasons given: Effort, character, and the other traits that can ground des-
ert aren’t things that you have—they’re things that you are.6 While we can 
all understand the question “What did Rory do to deserve the prize?”, 
“what did Rory do to deserve her effort?” is puzzling; it is hard to see, 
conceptually, what Rory could do to make herself deserving of the efforts 
that she makes. Effort is not a benefit that is visited upon a person; it is 
an act of the will that stands a category apart from the more contestable 
desert bases. The linguistic strangeness of sentences like (4)-(6) is a reflec-
tion of metaphysical confusion on the part of those who utter them. It is 
simply not sensical to wonder what I did to deserve my essential proper-
ties; these are the very things that constitute my identity.
Sandel anticipates an argument like mine when he writes that “a per-
son’s natural endowments are somehow . . . more deeply constitutive of his 
identity than his socially conditioned abilities” (1982: 74). But Sandel goes 
on to reject the notion: “Even if some distinction between essential and 
merely accidental characteristics of the person is valid, there seems no obvi-
ous reason why it must correspond to the distinction between natural and 
social assets.” (p. 74). I have provided a straightforward, if not obvious, 
reason: The connection between essential characteristics of the person and 
natural “assets” is found in the essentiality of origin. Indeed, these should 
not properly be understood as an asset—as something one possesses—at 
all. Natural assets are essential properties and thus constitute that person.
Effort, perhaps the most commonly-cited desert basis, is the exercise of 
the will in the pursuit of some end. And this, the concentration of one’s 
consciousness on the matter at hand, is something so personal, unique to 
the individual, ineluctable and indescribable, that it constitutes a person 
as essentially as anything could. Some days I exert effort and some days 
I do not; like everyone, some days I am sedulous and others I am lazy. 
But my capacity to exert effort is unique to me and is an essential part of 
my personal identity. It is hard to see how there could be any conceptual 
space between this capacity of mine and my identity, and if that is so then 
the Rawlsian cannot criticize my deserts as they result from my efforts. 
For it is not due to fortune that I have the capacity to exert effort that I 
do—it is metaphysically necessary; it is a trait which I have in every pos-
sible world in which I exist.
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On the Rawlsian metaphysic, on the other hand, people have a robust 
identity totally independent of their traits. Rawls’s theory suggests that we 
could tinker with these traits at will, adding, subtracting, and modifying 
them, without losing the person they constitute. We take a man, make him 
born to other parents, change his intellectual capacities, replace his will 
with that of another, and so on, but we do not change the man himself. 
That picture of personal identity seems wrong to me and it always has. 
My essential properties are constitutive of me—they cannot be modified at 
will, I have them in every world in which I exist. It is for this reason that 
we ought not to lament our natural flaws; a person is a holistic whole, and 
his natural flaws constitute his identity just as his natural gifts do.
Rawls’s argument strips away so much of an individual’s character that 
it is no longer coherent to talk about what that individual does or does 
not deserve. Of course, there are good arguments out there that start, 
“You don’t deserve your X.” They are good arguments because they limit 
the X (to, e.g. inheritance). But X cannot be unlimited, as R-3 claims. 
After the point at which all non-essential properties of a person have been 
added to X, adding anything else undermines the existence of the “You”. 
The claim no longer makes sense.
Consider the important and obvious dividing line between (1) the 
establishment of equal opportunity through social policies like public 
education and anti-discrimination laws and (2) the establishment of equal 
opportunity through genetic modification. Why shouldn’t we insist, a 
Rawlsian might say, that the establishment of equal opportunity stretch 
back beyond the crib and into the womb? Assuming that the technology 
will one day be available to us, why not ensure that everyone is born with 
the same physical and mental traits?
Our intuition is that that would be an outrageous route to equal oppor-
tunity, while social policies like increased spending on public education 
are quite sensible. These intuitions are accurate. When person A grows 
up in an environment of privilege and wealth and B in an environment of 
poverty and crime, if we want to equalize opportunity for A and B, we 
can do so through social spending. We can’t do so through genetic modi-
fication—for if we do that then we haven’t equalized opportunity for A 
and B, we’ve destroyed A and B. Tinkering with the genes of a zygote is 
changing the person that it will one day be.
Although I have focused my criticism on Rawls, the point I make in 
this chapter has broader ramifications for the distributive justice debate. 
Ronald Dworkin, for example, argues that wealth differences that are 
“traceable to genetic luck” (2000: 92) are unfair. But we see now that 
there are no such wealth differences (since there is no genetic luck). The 
metaphysical defense of desert I present here affects not just the Rawlsian 
but the luck egalitarian as well.
Nicholas Rescher makes a similar point to mine in a discussion of so-
called “constitutive luck”:
Defending Desert From John Rawls  175
[A person’s] dispositions and talents are part of what makes her the 
individual she is; it is not something that chance happens to bring 
along and superadd to a preexisting identity. . . . With people there 
is no antecedent, identity-bereft individual who draws the lot at issue 
with a particular endowment. One has to be there to be lucky.
(1995: 30–1)7
These metaphysical considerations have been ignored with the desert 
debate.
As an aside, libertarians who ground their theories in self-ownership 
seem to make a similar mistake. What it means for a person to own some 
property is perfectly clear. But it is mystifying, what it means for a person 
to own himself. The ownership relation is thought to require two distinct 
entities.8 The City of New Orleans can own real estate and thereby gain 
some rights over it, but does the City of New Orleans own itself? What 
does that mean?
So self-ownership, too, suffers from a problem of degree. It can be said, 
perfectly coherently, that a person owns: real estate, personal property, 
perhaps even his body. But the idea cannot be carried to the ultimate con-
clusion that the libertarian needs—that a person owns himself entirely. In 
trying to do that, the libertarian undermines the existence of the subject 
of the ownership relation. Do you “own” your effort? Your intelligence? 
Your personality, fears, and desires? Do you own all those the things that 
make you, you? No: You are those things.
If we wish to talk about what people do or not do deserve, how to 
equalize opportunities among people, the liberties which we may pos-
sess, there must be an essential nugget of personhood upon which these 
notions operate. Otherwise, all this moral talk, prima facie meaningful, 
is in fact nonsense.
7.6  Some Conceptual Clarifications
My focus has been on showing that the Rawlsian rejection of desert 
simpliciter—that is, R-3—is a mistake. There are many metaphysical 
complexities that could be explored here, their ramifications for justice 
teased out. For example, it could be that personhood and essence are 
vague, in the sense that if P comes from a certain genetic code, then 
the greater the modifications made to that code, the more the resultant 
person is not P. That is, maybe there are gradations in personhood, tied 
to gradations in essence. That possibility would require thinking about 
whether we were grappling with a metaphysical or an epistemological 
issue; questions of thresholds; and all the other ground covered in the 
vagueness debate. (Even on that account, the argument I give would 
hold: There would just be another gradation to consider when determin-
ing deserts.)
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Another conceptual issue: Suppose that Hubert and Julian are applying 
for a job in a meritocracy. Hubert is more meritorious because Julian has 
a genetic “defect” which causes him to get sick more, thereby developing 
less human capital. Would it follow that government intervention, aimed 
at correcting Julian’s genetic disadvantage, is unjust?
It depends. To begin with, the right question to ask is not whether it 
would be unjust, but whether it’s true that this intervention is not required 
by justice. To answer this, we must know whether Julian’s condition is 
truly independent of environmental factors. If it is, then yes—justice does 
not require that the state offset it (again: this is not the same as saying 
that it would be unjust for the state to offset it).
But if Julian’s condition is partly due to environmental factors—as most 
“genetic diseases” are—then an ideal equal opportunity regime would 
offset it. This is because these conditions are not genetically determined 
but are predispositions. Contingencies in the actual world still determine 
whether one gets the disease or not. So equal opportunity could be applied 
while respecting the underlying person.
But we are moving away from what is relevant to distributive justice. 
I am developing a feasible theory of justice in this book, and as far as I 
can see, no political system could possibly have sufficient insight, or the 
resources, to establish equal opportunity on such a fine-grained level. 
Only if it were the case that Julian’s environmentally-derived condition 
were a common one, and could be offset through reasonable means 
(e.g. by adding some chemical to the water supply), would we actually 
have to worry about nullifying it. Similarly, an ideal equal opportunity 
regime would, I guess, offset any disadvantage arising when a child, say, 
stumbled across a copy of Mein Kampf in the library and developed some 
harmful racial attitudes. But if the establishment of justice—and not ideal 
speculation—is our goal, these details should not detain us.
I think, too, that there is something ugly about the idea that people 
who have a certain genetic profile (viz. a profile associated with economi-
cally disadvantageous phenotypes) need to “be repaired”. As discussed in 
§4.2, what is good, and noble, and of ultimate value is not the possession 
of merit but rather its pursuit, application, and celebration. As far as jus-
tice is concerned, the state should to be indifferent to the natural traits of 
its citizens. It has no justice-related reason to prefer a set of citizens with 
a certain genetic profile over another, and this is true even if the former’s 
traits are associated with economically advantageous phenotypes. Rawls 
himself puts the point well:
The natural distribution is neither just nor unjust; nor is it unjust that 
persons are born into society at some particular position. These are 
simply natural facts. What is just and unjust is the way that institu-
tions deal with these facts.
(1999: 87)
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A just state does not seek to genetically “perfect” its people. As we have 
seen, that would come at the cost of eradicating some persons who would 
otherwise exist. A just government takes its citizens as they are, respects 
their identities, provides them with equal opportunity, and judges them 
on their merit alone.
Nothing I have said precludes the possibility of major genetic interven-
tion to prevent people from being born with seriously disabling condi-
tions. If we could, through genetic modification, prevent the birth of 
those with Down syndrome, it might be morally acceptable for the state 
to do that. But that is not a matter of economic justice. And make no 
mistake: Modifying some genetic code in this way does not ensure that a 
person is not born with Down syndrome—it is to prevent the existence of 
a person with Down syndrome, and to replace him with another.
7.7  Considering an Objection
One way to respond to the argument that I have given is to concede that 
R-3 is facially unsound but maintain that Rawls’s rougher point still 
stands: It is as morally problematic to ground the distribution of social 
goods on bases that are metaphysically necessary as it to ground it on for-
tunate bases. On this objection, while I am right that features of a person, 
insofar as they are genetically derived, are not matters of fortune, they 
still not the sort of thing that can justify unequal distributive treatment.
Of course, such a response rests on a presumption of equal distribu-
tive treatment which might be contested. Set that aside. More important 
is that this objection, when it is precisely put, falls to the argument that 
I have given. This objection again tries to sneak bad metaphysics into 
distributive matters. Consider this argument, which might be given by 
the desert skeptic:
(R-4)  (1)  It is morally bad when some people are worse off than oth-
ers through no fault of their own.
(2)  It is not one’s fault, that one has a certain genetic endowment.
THEREFORE, it is morally bad when some people are worse 
off than others because of their genetic endowment.
This is a luck egalitarian argument in the Rawlsian spirit. And it is prima 
facie different than R-3. But upon inspection the difference is a linguistic, 
not a substantive one. Why? Because it again appeals to a bright-line dis-
tinction between identity and genetic endowment—and as we have seen, 
there is no such distinction. If you’re going to talk about what people 
ought to have, morally, you must grant that these people are constituted 
by some features. And so if your talk about justice is going to be coher-
ent, it cannot appeal to arguments that separate those features from the 
people who are supposed to “possess” them.
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Any precisification of R-4 is going to be faulty. Is it morally bad when 
some people are worse off than others through no choice of their own? 
Maybe, but P neither chose nor did not choose his capacity to exert effort 
(e.g.); he is that capacity, in part. R-4-style arguments cannot completely 
undermine the justness of desert-based distribution, although they have 
immense force for real-world purposes, since most of our economic 
inequalities arise from contingent, social facts (§6.5).
Similar replies may be given if “choice of their own” is replaced by 
“unearned”, “outside of their control”, etc. At risk of belaboring the point, 
to ask whether your efforts are unearned is to make a category error: 
Efforts are simply not members of the class of things which you can earn. 
You can earn money or prizes, but you can’t earn your efforts. And it’s simi-
larly confused to say “your efforts are outside of your control”; if there’s 
anything in the world which you do have control over, it’s your effort.
Maybe the Rawlsian objection is more persuasive if it is rephrased in 
this way: Fine, you can deserve things. Kristen deserves the tiara. But dis-
tributive justice is not like a beauty pageant. When it comes to pageants, 
it’s true that the deserving contestant has a moral claim on the tiara on 
the basis of her deserts, but you can’t generalize that moral judgment to 
broader economic life.
But why not? If we are so driven by desert considerations in all 
these particular cases—Kristen deserves the tiara, the murderer deserves 
prison, Jones deserves the job—why not think that a just economic sys-
tem promotes its realization? The typical strategy has been to show, in the 
Rawlsian spirit, that all these individual judgments are confused because 
the notion of desert is bunk. But that argument is erroneous. And so the 
burden of proof shifts back to the opponent of desert to explain why it 
should be ignored in distributive justice.
There are other responses: People seem to prefer desert-based distri-
bution, and that is an excellent reason to choose desert as the guiding 
principle for the system they must live under. You get a desert-responsive 
system out of reflective equilibrium. If Rawls is right about the justness 
of the original position, that may yield desert (§3.5). In short, once the 
egalitarian (or the libertarian) loses the conceptual battle and admits the 
possibility and coherence of a desert-based distributive system, Pandora’s 
box is opened. There are plausible arguments in favor of desert-based 
systems. This book is one such argument, for one such system.
There is yet another line that the desertist might take. In many aspects 
of life, we don’t require fault, or choice, or responsibility (etc.) to render a 
normative judgment. Julie lost the beauty pageant to Kristen because she 
is less beautiful. Let’s put metaphysical issues aside and stipulate that Julie 
was not responsible for being less beautiful. How many people would 
say that, on those grounds, Kristen ought not to get the tiara? I would 
wager very few. Responsibility does not affect our normative judgment. 
Similarly, we sometimes hold people criminally and civilly liable even if 
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they are not at fault—these are cases of strict liability—thinking that they 
ought to go to jail, or ought to pay compensation, despite being faultless.
Therefore, it is not clear why we must insist that one of these particular 
properties be fulfilled when deciding how we ought to distribute. To be 
sure, we want there to be a connection between individuals and their eco-
nomic outcomes. Desert includes this connection through the aboutness 
principle (§4.1). Moreover, it seems like we might conjure up scenarios in 
which protecting distributive differences on the basis of choice conflicts 
with protecting differences on the basis of fault (which conflicts with 
responsibility, etc.) Single-mindedly insisting that a distributive scheme 
be completely responsive to one of them is not plausible.
7.8  One Final Note
The argument that I have given in this chapter shows that natural traits 
are essential, can ground desert-claims, and may therefore be appealed 
to in justifying economic inequalities. The argument does not show that 
only natural traits are essential.
There is a case to be made that there are a small number of non-genetic 
traits that also qualify as essential. That is, some non-genetic traits may 
be so closely linked to personal identity that they, too, can undergird our 
desert-claims, and need not be neutralized under equal opportunity.
Obviously, parental wealth is not one of these. Nor is one’s hometown, 
nor one’s alma mater, etc.: I am a Tulane graduate, but I might have gone 
to UConn, or to Yale, or wherever—and in the possible worlds where I did 
I am still myself. What about my being a philosopher? This, too, is clearly 
contingent—I might never have left the Central Intelligence Agency, like I 
did, to pursue a PhD. But what about my being philosophical? Is there a 
possible world in which I am me and yet not philosophically-minded? Of a 
philosophical bent? It seems to me that there is not. My being philosophical is 
an essential property and thus can serve as a desert basis (if that were appro-
priate in some context). It is not a matter of fortune that I am philosophical.
For the purposes of making the responsibility cut, meritocracy should 
really be seen as a “Genetics+” theory: Genetics can ground desert-claims, 
and so can a few less obvious traits (i.e. the “+”). Now, for the purposes 
of my argument here, nothing turns on this consideration’s being correct: 
If it is, then it expands the class of desert bases to capture properties of a 
person which are essential yet unrelated to her biological origin.
I note that Brian Barry (1988) reaches a similar conclusion, but in a 
different way. He agrees with Rawls, erroneously, that “one’s parentage 
and all the rest are radically contingent in the sense that there is no purely 
logical reason why they should not have been other than they were” 
(pp. 40–1). But he goes on to claim that (1) some social factors, despite 
being contingent, are not “morally arbitrary”, and therefore (2) a fortiori, 
genetic factors are not morally arbitrary:
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If I am right in suggesting that not all differences in attainment that 
cannot be traced to differences in natural endowment are morally 
arbitrary, then the final move, drawing natural endowments into the 
net as well, necessarily falls with it.
(p. 42)
So it seems that one might arrive at the metaphysical conception of the 
self that meritocracy and desert require via several routes: my metaphysi-
cal argument, Barry’s argument in favor of morally relevant contingen-
cies, perhaps an appeal to common sense.
Enumerating the “+” traits would be a difficult metaphysical project. 
I’ll mention two things here. First, they might include some mild forms 
of family influence, thereby limiting the reach of equal opportunity into 
the family structure. But it is clear that the most salient and objectionable 
forms of family influence on a person—money, elite schooling, superior 
health care—are inessential.
Second, whatever the right definition of the “+” is, for practical pur-
poses it can be ignored, as any real-world equal opportunity regime will 
be imperfect. We are nowhere near to the point at which subtleties like 
these could be relevant to policymaking. Let us commit ourselves to 
ending the intergenerational passage of wealth and influence, providing 
quality education and health care to all children, and ensuring that there 
is sufficient social support, outside of school, for the children of broken 
homes. Once that is done, we can then think about what further equal 
opportunity measures, if any, might be necessary in the name of justice.
A final comment about the Rawlsian metaphysics, within which a per-
son may neither take credit nor be faulted for her economic outcomes. It 
is a good thing that it is incorrect, for it would be quite depressing if it 
were not. It would mean that when a person suffered a bad economic out-
come, it would not be a result of bad choices or squandered opportunity, 
but a result of a flaw inherent to herself. There is no dignity or solace in 
that realization, and little possibility of achieving a different outcome the 
next time around. That is to say, there is no hope. Happily, we have seen 
that this is not the case (§6.5). So long as there is equal opportunity, our 
destinies are in our own hands.
Notes
1 Public reason is arguably a fatally flawed theory because it leaves open the 
possibility that every political arrangement may be ruled out by a failure to 
command reasonable consensus. See Mulligan (2015).
2 Some philosophers (e.g. Clarke (2003); Pereboom (2014); and Waller (2011)) 
believe that determinism rules out the possibility of moral desert. See also Vil-
hauer (2009) for a discussion of this issue.
3 See Clements (1984).
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4 Lamont and Favor, in their article on “Distributive Justice” for the Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, regard the “strong form” of Rawls’s argument as 
“clearly refuted” by Sher and Zaitchik.
5 The revised premise (1*) is obtained by taking the contrapositive of R-3’s prem-
ise (2) and joining it to premise (1) via hypothetical syllogism.
6 Gestures along these lines are made by both Nozick (1974: 228) and Schmidtz 
(2006: 60).
7 See also Hurley (2003) and Williams (1973).
8 Feser (2005) has concluded, in a similar spirit to my argument, that the meta-
physics required by libertarian self-ownership has political implications which 
are unpalatable to the libertarian.
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8.1  How Have Scholars Thought about Taxation?
Philosophers interested in justice have not paid much attention to tax 
policy.1 This inattention has persisted even though (1) taxation has obvi-
ous normative features, (2) philosophers are increasingly convinced that 
non-ideal considerations are relevant to the theoretical debate about 
justice (§2.4), and (3) taxation is one of the most hotly debated parts of 
our politics. Part of what I hope to do here is encourage collaboration 
between normative experts in political philosophy and positive experts 
in economics. The design of a just and efficient tax policy cannot happen 
any other way.
It is easy to infer the tax policies of some theories of justice. The liber-
tarian answer to “who should be taxed?” is simple: nobody at all. If that 
is too quick, it is only slightly so; leading libertarians, like Nozick (1974) 
and Rothbard (1982), regard taxation as a form of de facto slavery on the 
grounds that one owns oneself and the product of one’s labors. While it is 
true that some left-libertarians, like John Tomasi (2012), make theoreti-
cal space for limited taxation, these are internecine distinctions of degree, 
not kind. For libertarians, when it comes to taxation, the overriding 
moral concern is ensuring that putative property rights are not violated.
The utilitarian also has a simple answer to the tax question: Do what-
ever maximizes the general utility. Somewhat surprisingly—at least from 
the point-of-view of a philosopher, in the midst of the fiery debate about 
distributive justice—economists have almost wholesale accepted utili-
tarianism as their normative framework. Indeed, this is the foundational 
assumption of optimal tax theory, pioneered by Mirrlees (1971): Make 
some assumptions about citizens’ utility functions and then treat taxation 
as a straightforward, positive problem of constrained optimization.
Why has utilitarianism had such outsized influence on tax policy? 
The answer, I think, is mundane: It is mathematically tractable. But the 
time has come to consider applying other normative approaches. After 
all, only 24 percent of philosophers are consequentialists of any stripe 
(Bourget and Chalmers 2014), and the average taxpayer is certainly not 
a utilitarian. Matthew Weinzierl (2014) finds little appetite for utilitarian 
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(or Rawlsian) taxation among leftist, centrist, rightist, and libertarian 
citizens alike. In light of this, economists should keep in mind Peter 
Drucker’s sensible warning: “There is surely nothing so useless as doing 
with great efficiency what should not be done at all” (1963: 54).
I am not the first person to have pointed this out. In an address to 
the Eastern Economic Association in 2010, Mankiw speculated that we 
might replace optimal tax theory with a “just deserts theory” that better 
reflected public preferences toward taxation.2 Unfortunately, Mankiw 
mangled the normative theory in the typical way: He wrongly regarded 
merit, effort, and reward-for-contribution as libertarian values. But 
Mankiw’s positive assessment turned out to be right: Steven Sheffrin 
(2013) recently surveyed citizens’ beliefs about justice and taxation, and 
found that a desert-based approach may better accord with these.
A quick aside. As anti-meritocratic as things are now, they may get 
worse. Piketty (2014) argues that, owing to lower population and eco-
nomic growth in the twenty-first century, inherited wealth will increas-
ingly dominate the economy and thereby undermine entrepreneurship 
and meritocratic values. In short, one’s success will turn even more on 
being born into wealth and even less on character or contributions. Pik-
etty’s remedy includes a global tax on wealth.
I mention this because I want the reader to notice something striking: 
Two economists who could not be less alike ideologically (Mankiw was 
a member of the George W. Bush administration; Piketty is the new hero 
of the left), both accede to a meritocratic normative background. That 
is, they both want a society where people get what they deserve; they 
just disagree about how to get there. Obviously, their disagreement is an 
important one within economics. But their agreement is more telling. For 
if we agree that a just society is a meritocracy, then although we may still 
disagree positively about how to approach it, we have discovered some-
thing of deep importance. Among other things, we have discovered that 
egalitarianism, libertarianism, and utilitarianism are wrong.
Over the course of this chapter I shall advance three meritocratic tax 
policies: taxes on rents, negative externalities, and inheritance. I have two 
preliminary remarks.
First, I want to note one significant exception to the prevailing focus on 
utility-maximizing taxation.3 To wit, Marc Fleurbaey and François Mani-
quet have modeled income taxation under two normative assumptions: 
(1) We ought to eliminate income inequalities arising out of different abilities 
to earn a wage; and (2) we ought to preserve inequalities arising due to indi-
vidual preferences regarding leisure and labor.4 This is in the desertist spirit, 
although it differs from the meritocratic approach in many ways (e.g. for the 
meritocrat, inequalities arising out of different abilities to earn a wage, where 
those abilities are grounded in natural traits, are unproblematic).
Fleurbaey and Maniquet’s main result is twofold. First, they show 
that, within their model, (1) and (2) are incompatible in the sense that 
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we cannot promote both without losing potential Pareto-improvements 
along the way. Second, at the level of implementation, no matter whether 
you give precedence to (1) or to (2), you end up with the same income 
tax policy, which has as a salient feature a 0 percent marginal tax rate 
for the lowest income citizens (Fleurbaey and Maniquet cannot rule out 
a negative bottom marginal tax rate).
I also note a result of Roemer et al. (2003), who investigate the extent 
to which income tax policy in 11 countries fulfill the goal of Roemer-
ian equal opportunity for income (§4.4). Nordic countries (Denmark, 
Norway, Sweden) all in fact taxed above the equal opportunity opti-
mum, reflecting extant equal opportunity in these countries (or even a 
further striving for equal outcomes). In contrast—and unsurprisingly—
the U.S. income tax rate would have had to more than double to reach 
the equal opportunity optimum. Roemer et al. calculate the efficiency 
cost of such a move to be 5 percent of national income. However, we 
can infer little from that figure, both because it is narrowly tailored to 
income taxation, and because some features unique to meritocracy, such 
as allowing natural traits to play a role in just outcomes, are efficiency- 
enhancing.5
The second and final point I wish to make in this section is this: It might 
be thought that meritocracy cannot be a guide to tax policy because 
I have failed to say (1) precisely how big the social safety net (§6.10) 
should be, and (2) precisely how we ought to weigh trade-offs between 
justice and efficiency (and justice and need, and efficiency and need).
All I do here is point out the low-hanging fruit. The policies I advance 
in this section tend to advance these goals simultaneously. Now, the 
inheritance tax proposal is more radical, and its efficiency impact less 
clear. This I will discuss in due course.
8.2  Taxing Economic Rents
We have seen (§6.4) that economic rents are undeserved. This has two 
important consequences for taxation. First, because the possessors of 
rents have no claim of justice to them, whether they should be confis-
cated by taxation and redistributed is a matter to be made on the basis 
of efficiency and need. Rent extraction happens at the top, and not the 
bottom, of the income distribution, so needs are not a concern. And rents 
are inefficient. So they should be confiscated.
Second, consider a simple economy, which has a just, meritocratic 
pattern of distribution. One day, J. D. is able to extract a rent. His total 
income now equals a deserved part plus the undeserved rent r. One con-
sequence, discussed above, is that r is a ripe target for confiscation. It is 
not unjust if the government taxes it away. Another consequence is that 
someone else, Veronica, is receiving r fewer dollars than she deserves.6 In 
this way, J. D.’s behavior produces two deviations from desert. J. D. gets 
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more than he deserves, and—perhaps more worrying—Veronica gets less 
than she deserves.
In this case, there is a simple policy solution: Tax away r dollars from 
J. D. and transfer it to Veronica. Taxing rents creates no harmful disincen-
tives; there is no deadweight loss; the full value of r may be transferred; 
and no third parties suffer deviations from desert as a result of this 
intervention.
Note that a claim of justice (i.e. a claim to deserve one’s income) is a 
necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for it to be protected from taxa-
tion. If we lived in a world in which everyone received the value of her 
meritorious contributions, then everyone’s income would be perfectly 
deserved. But that does not in turn imply that everyone’s income would 
be immune from taxation. The point is simply that undeserved income 
ought to be exhausted before the government turns to deserved income 
for a source of revenue.
Many economists believe that we ought to tax rents before all else. Yet 
I can find no contemporary proposals for doing so, and the prospect is 
absent from the political debate about taxation. This is a result, I think, 
of the unique challenges associated with rent taxation. It can be hard to 
disentangle economic activity that makes a bona fide contribution from 
that which serves only to extract rents. Some forms of genuine contribu-
tion, like providing liquidity in markets, are subtle. Moreover, there is the 
potential for major economic distortion if we get things wrong. Many of 
us have the sense that CEOs are overpaid, but caution is called for before 
we regulate their compensation, given the influence that these men and 
women have over the labor and capital markets, the course of research 
and development, and the economy at large.
The lesson is that we should attack rents decisively—but through 
conservative means. I offer three suggestions. First, we can prohibit the 
“golden goodbyes” discussed in §6.4. Because—in the United States at 
least—boards of directors may hire or fire corporate executives at will, 
there is no justification for paying departing executives more than is 
required by their contracts. This is especially true when the executives are 
being dismissed for poor performance. These payments are inimical to the 
directors’ duty to shareholders, and, as Bebchuk and Fried (2004) observe, 
send the wrong message to incoming hires—namely, that poor perfor-
mance is no barrier to high reward. Golden goodbyes undermine merit.
Second, we can increase top marginal income tax rates. In 1982, the 
top marginal tax rate in the United States fell from 70 percent to 50 
percent, and 5 years later it fell to 39 percent. This period was also the 
start of the accelerated income inequalities that confront us today. There 
are two explanations for this change. The first is the supply-side story: 
With lower taxes comes increased incentive to work, a larger productive 
contribution, and in turn a higher wage. The second explanation is that 
high top tax rates protect against rent extraction (why exert effort to get 
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a rent when it will just be taxed away?), and, thus, lower top marginal 
rates lead to larger rents.
Piketty, Saez, and Stantcheva (2014) find that the latter is true: (1) 
There is no correlation between the lowering of top marginal tax rates 
and economic growth, and (2) most of the economic gains which have 
accrued to top earners are due to rent extraction, via Bertrand and Mul-
lainathan’s (2000, 2001) model. Piketty, Saez, and Stantcheva suggest a 
top marginal rate of 83 percent. Especially attractive now, I think, would 
be the addition of a new “supermanager” bracket—something like a 75 
percent tax on all income over $5 million.
Third, we might consider an “inflatable wage ceiling” which would 
operate in the following way: Company owners or their agents would be 
limited by law to paying some maximum compensation to employees—
say, $500,000 a year. So there would be a wage ceiling, but it would be an 
atypical one: Owners could exceed it so long as any excess payments were 
tied to performance in a reasonable way. For example, a board might 
contract with its CEO to pay her $500,000 annually plus $1 million for 
each percentage increase in profits she achieves.
Despite the connotation of “wage ceiling”, this is in fact a weak con-
straint. In principle, there would be no limit on compensation, and direc-
tors would have broad latitude to define “performance” as they saw fit. 
For example, a CEO would not have to achieve profitability to exceed 
the ceiling; if the business environment were challenging, a board might 
reasonably decide that the CEO deserved $10 million if she could limit 
market share loss. But directors would not have carte blanche here—they 
would have to define “performance” in the best interests of the firm. 
Importantly, the incentives would be explicit, performance-based, and 
transparent—and the best defense against wasteful rents is shareholder 
scrutiny. An inflatable wage ceiling would help shareholders make their 
own, fully-informed judgments about two important questions: (1) “Are 
our directors acting as they should in compensation matters?” And (2) 
“have our workers, and especially our corporate officers, fulfilled their 
end of the compensation bargain?”
Some will charge that this constraint is so weak as to be toothless—the 
inflatable wage ceiling, they will say, is merely symbolic. That may be 
right. But to say something is “merely symbolic” is not to say that it is 
unimportant. Symbols have power. What holds for society at large—that 
there is value in celebrating excellence and ignoring irrelevancies, in part 
through symbols—holds for firms as well.
Finally, I imagine it is clear to the reader by now that I have a special 
distaste for current corporate compensation practices. Although this is 
not an unusual view—I think it is held by most economists—there are 
reasonable arguments on the other side. In fairness, I wish to register 
these here. Benjamin Hermalin (2005), for example, provides a model of 
CEO pay in which compensation rises with the diligence of his directors. 
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If board diligence has increased over the past three decades (owing to, e.g. 
regulation like Sarbanes-Oxley), then these CEO compensation packages 
may be deserved.
Although I do not find these arguments compelling in light of the coun-
tervailing evidence, nothing philosophically important turns on this. If 
corporate compensation reflects merit and not cronyism, then we have a 
labor market that is operating as it should, and we ought not meddle in it.
8.3  Pigovian Taxes and the Provision of Public Goods
So far as I know, Mankiw’s address to the Eastern Economic Associa-
tion was the first time that desert had been recommended as a normative 
ground for tax policy. Mankiw did not discuss policy in detail, except to 
suggest that a desert-based tax system might include (1) taxes on produc-
ers of negative externalities, and (2) progressive taxes in support of public 
goods, including transfer payments to the poor. In this section, I consider 
these two possibilities.
Mankiw has long been a proponent of Pigovian taxes (see, e.g. Mankiw 
2009)—taxes on economic agents who impose costs on third parties, 
equal to the total social cost imposed. The typical justification for these 
taxes is that they are efficient. My argument is that they are required by 
justice as well.
For desert to yield Pigovian taxes, we must understand “economic 
contribution” to mean net, and not gross, contribution. Suppose Dean’s 
market contribution is valued at $100,000. He is paid accordingly. Sup-
pose, also, that through his economic activity he imposes social costs, 
external to the market, of $20,000. Then in order to say that Dean does 
not deserve $20,000 of his income, we must subtract the costs his eco-
nomic activity creates when reckoning his economic deserts. (We must 
also consider the costs created by the marginal capital that Dean’s labor 
employs.)
This would be a trivial point, if not for the fact that it illuminates a 
crucial difference between desert and libertarianism. Externality regula-
tion—which seems to be required by justice, and which is widely endorsed 
by economists for efficiency reasons—sits uneasily within libertarian the-
ory. On the one hand, if nothing that issues from free contracts is unjust, 
then it is not unjust to impose costs on third parties without their consent. 
But, on other hand, if we ought not to infringe on a person without his 
consent, then that seems to rule out any externality-generating activity 
whatsoever—and that is implausible and economically undesirable (see 
Railton 2003).
In contrast, desert nicely captures this desirable theoretical feature. 
The benefit that a person receives from our shared economic life (i.e. his 
income) is proportional to his net contribution to it. If economic justice 
is fundamentally about “align[ing] individual compensation with social 
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contribution” (Mankiw 2010: 296), and not the dogged protection of 
economic liberties, as the libertarian believes, then the externality prob-
lem is dealt with cleanly.
Moreover, desert justifies subsidies for producers of positive externali-
ties: If Jess’s economic activity produces benefits that stretch beyond his 
customers—if, say, he sells environmentally-friendly technology that ben-
efits the public health, then Jess deserves an income above and beyond that 
which he receives in the market. That could be provided in the form of a 
tax credit. Yet libertarians are even less inclined to intervene in markets in 
order to subsidize producers—and so economists who support these sub-
sidies should look elsewhere for their moral justification. Desert provides 
it, with positive and negative externalities dealt with symmetrically.7
There are two other desert-based justifications for Pigovian taxes and 
subsidies. First, because it is a matter of conceptual necessity that what-
ever I do or not deserve must turn on facts about my character (§4.1), 
I deserve to bear the burden of the costs associated with pollution, say, 
only if they are the result of my own decisions. But externalities are by 
definition imposed on me. I do not deserve the loss that results from 
another’s economic activity, there is a moral drive to return me to my 
desert-mandated level, and the natural source for the resources needed to 
do this is the imposer of the loss in the first place.
Second, the core value of a desert-structured society is personal respon-
sibility (§6.9). And in a responsible society, a person is held to account for 
the effects of his actions on others. If a person physically hurts another, he 
is brought before the court; if he imposes an economic harm on another, 
he is taxed.
Mankiw’s second suggestion is that desert justifies progressivity in the 
tax code. Since higher-income citizens derive a greater benefit from public 
goods than lower-income citizens, they deserve to pay more (on average 
and at the margin). Note, first, that this suggestion, while certainly plausi-
ble, is categorically different from desert-based demands for taxes on rents 
or externalities. In those cases, we want to transfer wealth in the name of 
justice—away from the extractors of rents to those whose deserved income 
has been extracted; away from producers of negative externalities to those 
who have endured those costs. In considering public goods, we are asking 
a different question: Given some revenue target, who should pay?
According to the meritocrat, income and wealth that is connected 
to meritorious contribution is justly held; income and wealth that is 
unconnected to meritorious contribution is not. And before we consider 
confiscating justly held income—which we almost certainly must do—we 
should exhaust all sources of undeserved income and wealth. So here we 
are supposing that the government has done this and still needs more.
Mankiw’s view harkens back to Smith’s (1776), and it is fair to call it 
a desertist principle. But this benefit-based taxation is not the only con-
tender.8 A second possibility is taxation based upon a principle of equal 
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sacrifice. This approach was first suggested by J. S. Mill (1848), and it 
is attractive for a few reasons. For one thing, public goods are hetero-
geneous (we all derive utility from some but not others), and it may be 
difficult to say with precision what a given person’s benefit is. If this is 
so, then equal sacrifice may be sensible a priori. Perhaps, too, we ought 
to regard the provision of public goods as we sometimes regard military 
staffing. Just as we should not make exceptions to conscription on the 
basis of socioeconomic status—all able-bodied citizens ought to be sub-
ject to conscription, for equal terms—we should not vary the burden of 
taxation, either. This idea fits with the communitarian element of desert: 
Values like compassion (in the case of the safety net, a public good) and 
courage (in the case of the military, a public good) are best cultivated 
when every able-bodied citizen shoulders an equal burden.
I am going to leave this as an open question, whether meritocracy and 
desert call for benefit-based or equal sacrifice taxation. I lean toward the 
latter. Note that Weinzierl (2014, Forthcoming) has shown that the two 
approaches share a number of quantitative similarities, suggesting that 
the tax schedules they recommend may not be so different.9
To get a sense of what this tax approach would look like in practice, 
Young (1990) finds that American income tax schedules from 1957 to 
1986 did a good job of placing an equal sacrifice on all taxpayers. An 
even better result could have been obtained with (1) more brackets for 
low-income taxpayers, (2) lower rates for low-income taxpayers, and 
(3) higher rates for high-income taxpayers. Young finds that equal sacri-
fice was abandoned with the 1986 Tax Reform Act.
8.4  a New Inheritance Tax
The single most important step we can take toward establishing a desert-
based society is the implementation of a robust inheritance tax.
How does the current U.S. federal estate tax work? In short, it doesn’t. 
It brings in almost no revenue (less than $20 billion annually), and this is 
because the law is weak. The top tax rate is only 40 percent; there is a $5 
million exemption; and the law is filled with loopholes, the most serious 
of which is the stepped-up basis on assets that heirs enjoy. Not only does 
this render the tax toothless, it enables wealthy citizens to pay almost no 
tax whatsoever, even in their living years, by using what Edward McCaf-
fery (2000) calls the “buy-borrow-die strategy”: (1) Buy investment 
assets that produce little income, like real estate and growth stocks; (2) 
borrow to finance your lifestyle; and (3) when you die, pass these assets 
along to your heirs, who can immediately sell them tax-free owing to the 
stepped-up basis.
So estates represent a nearly untapped source of revenue. Havens and 
Schervish (2014) estimate that, conservatively, $66 trillion (in 2016 dol-
lars) will be transferred from generation to generation during the first half 
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of this century. At an optimal tax rate of 60 percent (Piketty and Saez 
2013), the estate tax could serve as a major new source of government 
revenue.
The moral justification for the estate tax is twofold. The first justifica-
tion, which is the more minor of the two, is simply that inheritances are 
undeserved. Heirs have no claim of justice on their inheritance because 
justice is a matter of deserts, and the goods that one deserves are deter-
mined by facts about one’s character or one’s contributions. The possibil-
ity that a person deserves an inheritance is ruled out conceptually.
There is a superficially plausible route toward justifying inheritance 
under desert, but it collapses under analysis. The idea would be that the 
person who earned the money—who does indeed deserve it—thereby 
deserves to pass it along to his heirs. That is, the argument is that taxing 
inheritance does violate desert—the deserts of benefactors, not heirs.
However, even if this were true—even if the person who deserves his 
money thereby deserves to give it to his heirs—it could only be an opera-
tive moral principle during the person’s lifetime, for once a person dies, 
it is nonsensical to talk about what he deserves: He does not exist. Fol-
lowing that logic, gifts but not estates would be protected, and that is a 
non-trivial difference (e.g. the problematic stepped-up basis for estates 
does not apply to gifts).
In any case, it is not true that a person deserves to give away his 
deserved wealth however he pleases. Obviously, a person cannot justly 
spend his deserved wealth to support terrorism, and the government can 
and should prevent him from doing so. The same argument, attenuated, 
applies here. Just as the government can justly constrain wealth transfers 
in the name of the national security, it has a responsibility to ensure that 
the desert-based, meritocratic framework of society is maintained. This 
is the more important justification for the estate tax.
Recall the conceptual necessity of equal opportunity to desert (§4.3): 
Justice is about desert, and equal opportunity is a necessary precondition 
for giving people what they deserve. But inheritance violates equal oppor-
tunity in an obvious way. Therefore, a just government will eliminate, or 
at least severely curtail, the practice. Indeed, brute inheritance is the single 
largest driver of the awful intergenerational mobility which confronts us 
today (Mazumder 2005; Piketty 2000). So even if an estate tax were inef-
ficient (because it discouraged some parents from working more), that 
is a distant concern in light of the injustice it perpetuates. In any case, 
a robust estate tax can replace parts of the tax code that are even more 
distortionary, such as the corporate tax.
Now there are a few things to note. First, the estate tax has nothing to 
do with envy. We are not motivated to implement the tax out of a sense of 
envy (for the goodies that scions have). Nor are we trying to minimize the 
occurrence of envy. We are simply trying to maintain the fair, meritocratic 
structure of society.
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Second, as I have already mentioned, we are not trying to enforce a 
strict concordance between wealth and desert. Meritocracy calls for no 
such concordance, which is difficult to justify theoretically and imple-
ment in practice. The problem, from the meritocratic point-of-view, is 
that scions have underserved advantage over their peers. This is illus-
trated by the fact that, in the United States today, the wealthiest 1 per-
cent of households inherit, on average, $3 million (Wolff and Gittleman 
2014). There is simply no fair framework.
Question: Should inheritance and gifts be treated equivalently? The 
former is plainly a problem for the meritocrat, but is that true for the 
latter, as well?
I think that the answer is “no”. We must scrutinize the extents to 
which these social practices undermine the meritocratic framework. And 
in this respect, when it comes to gifts between adults, the problem is very 
much less.
Suppose that Jimmy is rich as a result of his merit. He deserves his 
wealth. He then decides to give it all to his friend Robert. Does this violate 
the meritocratic framework of society? It is hard to see how. If Robert 
could subsequently pass it along to his children, it would; it would violate 
equal opportunity. But Robert cannot do this owing to the inheritance 
tax. Does it help Robert get a job that he otherwise could not? Not if 
Formal EO prevails; I cannot think of a job for which being rich is a per 
se merit. Does it disrupt meritocratic income distribution? For similar 
reasons, not when it comes to labor income.
It does disrupt the pattern of capital income—if Robert invests his new 
wealth, he will get an income stream which is undeserved. Yet this does 
not seem so worrisome when one remembers that Robert’s undeserved 
income is coming only at the cost of Jimmy’s income. And Jimmy has 
given his consent to this. This is wholly different from typical cases, in 
which a deserving person would have an income stream, which he wants, 
if not for a meritocratic violation.
There are complexities. One might object, for example, that some 
gifts may undermine meritocratic society in insidious ways. Suppose that 
Robert gets a fancy yacht from Jimmy (or he buys a yacht with the money 
Jimmy gives him), and Robert uses that yacht to wine and dine his clients 
at sea. His competitors, who do not have rich and generous friends, can-
not do this. That would be anti-meritocratic, no?
It is hard to say; much will turn on the specifics. I suspect that most 
gifts—especially small gifts—do not disrupt the meritocratic framework. 
But if turned out, positively, that even small gifts violated the meritocratic 
framework, these, like inheritances, would have to be proscribed.
Third, the estate tax does not “level down” citizens. It merely ensures 
that no undeserved advantage accrues to some citizens—those lucky to 
have rich relatives. The estate tax helps ensure that these citizens’ eco-
nomic gains reflect their merits and not the merits of others.
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We should also not dismiss the possibility, counterintuitive though it 
be, that it is not in a child’s interest to receive an inheritance. There does 
seem to be something to Andrew Carnegie’s warning that inheritance 
“deadens the talents and energies of the son, and tempts him to lead a 
less useful and less worthy life than he otherwise would” (1891: 371). 
We know that inheritance size is inversely proportional to labor force 
participation, and that, for those who are in the labor force, inheritance 
size is inversely proportional to earnings growth (Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, 
and Rosen 1993). And as a cultural matter, what we, the proponents of 
desert, wish to extol is pluck, innovation, talent, and good old-fashioned 
hard work. While a life of guaranteed luxury is not incompatible with 
these, they are not natural bedfellows.
Inheritances, therefore, have a number of morally problematic features: 
They are undeserved; they violate equal opportunity; they undermine the 
cultural value of merit; and they may not be in the best interests of their 
recipients. They are attractive targets for confiscation. In contemplating a 
particular tax rate, Piketty and Saez’s 60 percent can only serve as a lower 
bound, since any inheritance may be incompatible with a desert-based 
society. At the same time, a 100 percent estate tax would be inefficient 
and a radical shock to our culture and our capital structure: Wealth has 
always been earned and then passed between generations, to be spent, 
invested, and, in the end, given to another.
I happen to think that these changes would be for the better, but 
even if this traditional feature of our capital structure were sacrosanct, 
modifications could still be made in the name of fairness. For example, 
if some capital C had to be passed between generations in the name of 
maintaining productivity, this could be done by lottery rather than by the 
heredity principles currently in use. When the owner of C died, under this 
lottocratic system, some random young person, rather than the owner’s 
child, would receive C. Now, such a system is obviously absurd. But it 
is no more absurd than the windfalls that inheritance provides, and it is 
at least more fair. It’s unjust to throw virgins into volcanoes, but if we 
are going to throw virgins into volcanoes then we should throw random 
virgins, rather than just the virgins of some minority race. Perhaps the 
most sensible approach would be to give C not to the son or the daughter 
of the person who earned it, as we currently do, but to the young man 
or woman who, we believe, is most likely to make productive use of it.
I have been using the terms “estate tax” and “inheritance tax” inter-
changeably, but in fact they are not the same thing. An estate tax targets 
the stock of wealth built up by the decedent. An inheritance tax targets 
the flow of wealth from the decedent to her heirs. Accordingly, an estate 
tax is blind to heirs’ ability to pay; if three siblings share in an estate 
equally, each one of them—janitor, lawyer, and CEO alike—receive the 
same amount of money, post-tax. An inheritance tax, on the other hand, 
may take into account differences in income and wealth. Indeed, the 
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simplest way to tax inheritance is simply to treat it as (earned) income. 
A further surtax might be leveled against the inheritance; this is the 
approach favored by Lily Batchelder (2009), in her proposal for a com-
prehensive inheritance tax.
As Sheffrin (2013) notes, although the estate tax is unpopular, inheri-
tance taxes might not be. The reason is desert: People think that because 
a person worked hard and became wealthy, he deserves to be able to do 
whatever he likes with that wealth (that is wrong, as we have seen). When 
the money is thought of in terms of inheritance, it is viewed as an unde-
served windfall. The lack of connection between the money and merit is 
clearer. So even when the fiscal effect of an estate tax and an inheritance 
tax would be the same, the psychological impact could be quite differ-
ent: “I would suggest that taxing inheritances does not trigger the same 
emotional chords as taxing estates. . . . Taxing those who inherit wealth 
removes the tax one level from those who earned the funds, creating more 
psychological distance” (Sheffrin 2013: 210).
I should say a word about why Americans are so opposed to the estate 
tax. It is, I believe, an artifact of the anti-meritocratic nature of our soci-
ety. Parents love their children and want the best for them. And parents 
judge that their children will be deprived of the good things in life unless 
they, the parents, provide them. We have seen that this judgment is cor-
rect. In the United States today, one’s socioeconomic status is determined 
to a commanding degree by one’s parents.
Would we feel the same drive to protect intergenerational wealth trans-
fers if we knew that our children would enjoy equal opportunity? If we 
knew that they would have a fair shot to obtain scarce social goods on 
the basis of their merits? I do not think so; or at least the drive would be 
very much less. It is only because we do not live in a meritocracy, and 
have not for so long, that we have such an affection for inheritance. This 
is the message sent when positions of wealth, prestige, and influence are 
obtained not on the basis of merit but on the basis of one’s social cir-
cumstances. This is the message sent by Trump, whose successes—such 
as they are—were enabled by tens of millions of dollars in inheritance.
In a meritocracy, parents appreciate the injustice of providing their 
children with special advantages. They understand that these advantages 
perforce disadvantage other children. They identify their interest in their 
own children’s welfare with other parents’ interests. This produces a 
happy equilibrium among parents, all of whom are willing to protect the 
meritocratic structure of society through the inheritance tax.
For similar reasons, we must eliminate the passage of non-monetary 
economic influence. In addition to receiving millions upon his father’s 
death, Trump also took control of his father’s real estate empire. There is 
no moral reason to allow a child to succeed his mother or father in this 
way, except in the special case in which he happens to be the most meri-
torious candidate for the job. Otherwise, he does not deserve it.
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The hereditary passage of corporate control is inefficient. Francisco 
Pérez-González has looked at how firms perform when their control is 
determined via inheritance versus meritocratic selection, concluding that 
“the costs of nepotism are large and that they are likely to be borne by 
minority investors who do not share in the private benefits of control” 
(2006: 1561). In a similar study, Bennedsen et al. find that “family suc-
cessions are significantly negatively correlated with firm performance 
around CEO successions . . . family CEOs cause an average decline in 
firm profitability on assets of at least four percentage points” (2007: 651).
Perhaps the best approach to inheritance is the one suggested by D. W. 
Haslett (1986), who argues that the government should seize all of a 
person’s assets upon his death and then auction them off. (Haslett makes 
an exception: that people specifically designated by the decedent, like 
his children, may purchase these assets before the auction at fair market 
value.)
Such a system would have to be developed with care. Suppose that the 
majority shareholder of WidgetCo dies, and his shares in the firm are put 
up for auction. The government would have to ensure that they are not 
bought up by Best Widgets, a competitor. And the government will have 
to ensure that anti-competitive practices do not arise subsequently (i.e. 
we can’t have the owners of Best Widgets, barred from participating in 
the auction, simply buying those shares of WidgetCo from those who did 
participate in the auction).
Finally, to say we ought to implement a robust inheritance tax, as I do, 
is not to say that no exceptions to it should be made. There are plausible 
exceptions: for the intergenerational passage of a family home; for the 
perpetuation of a small family business between generations; and for the 
transfer of heirlooms of sentimental value. I support all of these excep-
tions. If you ask me where exactly the line should be drawn, I reply that 
that is a question which cannot be answered and which need not concern 
us. Let us eliminate 90 percent of inheritance—that part that is plainly 
anti-meritocratic and that does not fall under these special cases. Once 
that is done, I suspect we will find that our worries about the line-drawing 
problem will have disappeared.
8.5  Is all Unearned Income Undeserved?
Inheritance is undeserved, but is this true for all unearned income? Need 
we worry about the potential for injustice when we levy a tax on the 
dividends and interest a rentier receives? Or are these forms of unearned 
income, like inheritance, also undeserved as a conceptual matter?
This question is of practical importance in light of contemporary wor-
ries about wealth inequality and its possible remedies. Piketty (2014), for 
example, endorses a progressive tax on wealth, with the tax rates coupled 
to the rates of return within various wealth brackets. Such a tax will be 
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rendered more or less viable depending on whether all unearned income 
is undeserved. I argue here that, unlike inheritance specifically, unearned 
income is not generally undeserved.
Again, the reason that a person has no claim of justice on an inheritance 
is that it is undeserved; if it were deserved, then it would be grounded in 
his contributions, but inheritance is grounded in one’s father’s or mother’s 
contributions, or their fathers’ or mothers’ contributions, etc.
Some unearned income does not operate in this way. Suppose that I 
earn $100,000 through my labor, which I deserve, which I then deposit 
in an interest-bearing account which produces $4,000 annually. Observe, 
first, that I make a contribution to the economy not only with the labor 
that earned me $100,000, but with the $100,000 itself; when I invest it, I 
am making a direct equity investment in a company or loaning it money, 
or helping a bank to make loans to its customers, and so on. These 
activities lead to greater output. Thus, when determining my meritorious 
contribution for the purpose of reckoning my deserts, it is appropriate 
to consider not only the output created by my labor, but also the output 
created by my capital.
Second, there is no dispute over whether I deserve the $100,000—the 
dispute is over whether I deserve the $4,000 of interest from it which I 
receive annually. This is categorically different from the case of inheri-
tance—there, the debate is centered on the justness of my coming to 
possess the principal itself. There is an asymmetry between inheritance 
and other forms of unearned income: In the case of inheritance, issues 
of justice may arise with (1) the receipt of the inheritance itself, and (2) 
the subsequent way in which it is invested. In the case of other forms of 
unearned income, only (2) arises.
Third, even if it were true that that $4,000 annually does not reflect a 
contribution to the economy—which is not the case—it reflects my pos-
session of $100,000, which, in turn, does reflect my contribution. Unlike 
inheritance, where both the principal and the subsequent unearned income 
from it cannot be traced to one’s own economic contributions, this $4,000 
is part of a causal chain which is grounded in the relevant desert basis.
Fourth, the logic of regarding all unearned income as undeserved 
introduces injustice into cases of trade where there is none. Suppose I 
am awarded a prize, which I deserve on the basis of my performance 
but which I do not want. I convert the prize into money via a mutually 
beneficial trade with another person. But it was the prize, not the money, 
which was the proximate desert good—so must we conclude that I do 
not deserve this money? That seems wrong on its face, and it has the 
further, untenable implication that maintaining just control over my 
income means never consuming or investing it at all. But it seems to me 
that I deserve, say, the books that I bought with my deserved income, even 
though the proximate desert good was the income and not the books. In 
the same way, I deserve the benefits that my investments provide me.
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Most economists oppose higher rates on capital gains and interest 
owing to the distortionary effect of these taxes on investment and entre-
preneurship. The above analysis shows that there is no urgent demand of 
justice to level taxes on these. It remains true that desert-based taxation 
is efficient.
8.6  Desert-Based Taxation: Efficient and Progressive
The preceding policy prescriptions flow from a moral source of desert. 
If we think that justice is a matter of giving people what they deserve, 
then we ought, morally, to tax economic rents, negative externalities, and 
inheritance.
In conclusion, I wish to note, first, that desert-based taxation would go 
some ways toward rectifying salient worries about economic injustice. A 
tax on rents would flatten the income distribution, progressivity would 
be incorporated into the tax code via the public goods argument, and 
wealth would be redistributed away from rich families through new taxes 
on inheritance. Indeed, these policy results are not dissimilar to the ones 
that Piketty (2014) desires—and which have resonated with the public. 
But take care to note that the moral justifications involved are quite dif-
ferent: We do these things not because we are worried about inequality, 
but because we want people get what they deserve.
Second, a common feature of the tax policies I advance is that they are 
efficient. Moral considerations aside, we will be wealthier, as a society, if 
we tax rents and negative externalities (and subsidize producers of posi-
tive externalities, as described).
With an inheritance tax, things are less clear. There will be deadweight 
loss insofar as the prospect of passing wealth along motivates a person, 
at the margin, to work. I could find no conclusive data on this, although, 
as James Himes notes, “there is a part of the optimal taxation literature 
that can be taken to imply that the optimal tax rate is very high, possibly 
close to 100%, on windfalls received by unusually wealthy individuals” 
(2010: 196).
There is deadweight loss today owing to the existence of unrestricted 
inheritance. As I have described, receiving an inheritance is a disincentive 
to labor force participation. In short, there are arguments both for and 
against the efficiency of an inheritance tax, and of course the particulars 
of a proposed tax matter greatly. This is an open question.
The tax policies meritocracy calls for are, by American political stan-
dards, progressive. In this way, desert may be regarded as a conservative 
justification for progressive policy. The normative ideal is that citizens 
should be guaranteed an equal opportunity—not equal outcomes—and 
that each ought to receive the economic goods that he can achieve for 
himself, through the market, on the basis of his merit. In contrast to 
many philosophers, I don’t think that there is anything distinctively 
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conservative about this ideal. But insofar as there is, then the harbinger 
of just tax policy approaches not from the left but from the right.
Notes
1 Halliday’s survey article (2013) and Murphy and Nagel’s The Myth of Owner-
ship are two exceptions.
2 See Mankiw (2010).
3 There are, in addition, a few efforts to adapt the optimal tax approach to 
accommodate normative goals other than utility maximization. See Fleurbaey 
and Maniquet (Forthcoming) and Saez and Stantcheva (2016).
4 The relevant papers are collected in Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2012). See also 
Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2011).
5 This allowance provides, in effect, a free human capital upgrade to some citi-
zens. These citizens need not be leveled down, nor does the equal opportunity 
regime have to spend resources to compensate other citizens for their relative 
natural disadvantage. Keep in mind, though, that the advantage due to natural 
traits is quite small (§6.5).
6 Or a number of people are each receiving some fraction of r less than they 
deserve.
7 Lockwood, Nathanson, and Weyl (2017) have developed an interesting, albeit 
coarse, approach to externality taxation/subsidization through the income tax. 
Rates end up being highly sensitive to estimates of the prevalence of externali-
ties. For example, under “Tea Party” estimates, marginal rates start at 0 and 
decrease so that highest earners end up receiving a subsidy of about 20 percent 
of their income. Under “Occupy Wall Street” assumptions, those making under 
about $40,000 receive a small subsidy, and then marginal rates rise rapidly, 
leveling out around 50 percent.
8 Weinzierl (Forthcoming) shows that the optimal tax model may be adapted to 
benefit-based taxation under the assumptions that (1) we measure benefit by 
earning power, and (2) earning power is a function of both individual ability 
and public goods.
9 See also Feldstein (1976).
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9.1  On Schooling
I hesitate to write much about education policy, which is outside of my 
expertise. But given how important education is in a meritocracy—as a 
driver of equal opportunity above all else—I want to make two broad 
comments.
First, on this matter we must take special care to exercise epistemic 
modesty (§4.5). Education policy is complex and expertise-apt, but it 
is also a topic which makes people’s blood run hot. Citizens tend to be 
highly confident that their opinions about education are correct, and they 
act on the basis of that confidence. But, lacking expertise, their confidence 
is unwarranted—and so their influence deviates from their merit. This 
reduces the probability that the right education policies, whatever they 
be, get selected.
Effective education might include smaller classes or larger ones; private 
education or outlawing charter schools; culling ineffective teachers or 
strengthening teachers’ unions. There are no normative complications 
here. No liberties are violated if we tax to support public education; 
teachers have no right to organize if that’s not in the interests of students; 
etc. I have no idea what the right policies are, but there are experts who 
do, and we should act in accordance with their guidance.
Second, research suggests that disadvantage that arises early in life—
say, from birth until age six—persists and is difficult to neutralize. Thus, 
an effective and efficient equal opportunity regime will operate at this 
stage in young citizens’ lives. The earlier an equal opportunity invest-
ment is made, the bigger the payoff. (Some late-stage investment remains 
necessary.)
But education can only go so far. From this fact, a normative prob-
lem arises. One possible way to establish equal opportunity is through 
transfers to poor parents. One-fifth of American children live in poverty,1 
which leads to long-term cognitive deficiencies.2 Intuitively, there is a 
causal relationship here (impoverished children are malnourished, and 
so their development is stunted; parents who aren’t worried about where 
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their next meal will come from are more attentive to their children; etc.) 
And so a transfer payment to the parent might improve matters for 
the child, thereby aiding the equal opportunity cause. (And, indeed, it 
appears to have this effect—see Akee et al. 2015.)
But what if the parent doesn’t deserve that money? When we make 
such a transfer, haven’t we disrupted the just pattern of distribution?
Not necessarily. First, it is plausible that the average poor person today 
is getting less than he deserves (the just distribution is a proportional one 
(§6.3), and the rich, not the poor, are extracting rents (§6.4)). This sug-
gests that these transfer payments could be undertaken without violating 
justice.
Second, the injustice could only arise to the extent to which these poor 
parents fail to spend the payment altruistically on their children. This 
mitigates the problem.
Third, we must remember that the achievement of justice has two 
parts—equal opportunity and merit-based distribution. These work in 
tandem, and in the long run they will reinforce each other. But in the short 
term, we might need to break the cycle of unequal opportunity through 
this kind of redistribution. This is an empirical conjecture; I do not know 
if it is true or not. If it is, then perhaps we should tolerate, for a generation 
or two, modest violations of the just distributive pattern in the name of 
equal opportunity. This is more defensible given that it is quite hard now 
to judge citizens’ deserts because of unequal opportunity (§6.10).
Whatever policies we choose, citizens must have confidence that their 
government is taking both equal opportunity and judgment-based-on-
merit seriously. If transfer payments like these were deemed an efficient 
way to establish equal opportunity, then extra steps would have to be 
taken to assure citizens that merit mattered. The elimination of affirma-
tive action programs, which I shall now discuss, would be a sensible step.
9.2  (Most) affirmative action Is Unjust
“Affirmative action” refers to a range of policies which have quite differ-
ent justifications and effects. Some of these policies are not controversial. 
Consider a college that makes special efforts to solicit applications from 
black high schoolers, by, for example, sending admissions counselors to 
inner city schools. The college might increase its black enrollment in this 
way—by increasing the number of black applicants and then discriminat-
ing on the basis of merit. This form of affirmative action does not tend to 
strike us as morally troublesome.
I want to focus on the form of affirmative action that is controversial—
and by many people’s lights, including my own, deeply unjust. This is 
the deviation from merit-based selection, such that race advantages or 
disadvantages an applicant. As of 2017, it is legal for American universi-
ties to prefer a less-qualified black applicant (lower SAT scores; worse 
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grades and essays; etc.) over a more-qualified white applicant in the name 
of increasing diversity on campus. We wish to know if this is just or not.
Keep in mind that the college case is difficult (§5.4): It is unclear 
whether applicants to college should be considered (1) full moral agents 
beginning their plans-of-life, or (2) children entering the final step of the 
equal opportunity framework. If it’s the latter, then there shouldn’t be 
any competition for university in the first place; it should be available to 
all young citizens, just like quality secondary education. Our intuitions 
in the college case get confounded by this factor. A better case to consider 
is graduate admissions: This is plainly not part of the equal opportunity 
framework, and yet the arguments given in favor of affirmative action in 
college admissions, like the promotion of diversity, still apply.
If affirmative action is just, it must be because it is required for reasons 
of meritocratic discrimination or Fair EO.
One might think that affirmative action unambiguously violates merit-
based discrimination. But that is too quick. Suppose we discover that 
some employers suffer from implicit bias against a group. That is, per-
haps without any ill-will, they regard members of this group as less 
attractive than their resumes imply. Indeed, this appears to have been a 
problem in academia in the not-so-distant past—academics, male and 
female, rated the very same curriculum vitae higher when it had a male 
name on it rather than a female name.3
This is a threat to merit-based selection: A hiring committee might be 
bound by the rules to select the most meritorious applicant; it might in 
fact wish to do this; but because of implicit bias it does not.
Once recognized, implicit bias can and should be corrected by affirma-
tive action-style assignment of extra “points” (the details to be settled 
here through empirical research) to relevant applicants. That ensures that 
everyone is chosen on the basis of her merit. The meritocrat encourages 
this form of affirmative action. It is important to combat non-merit-based 
discrimination wherever we find it.
There is a related argument for the use of race, gender, etc.—but this 
one is not compelling. It is sometimes argued that being a minority (e.g.) 
should be considered a merit in itself. If an admissions committee wanted 
to establish a racial pattern in their entering class, then to the extent to 
which an applicant contributes to that goal, their race is putatively a 
merit. If that were so, then extra consideration could be given to race, 
gender, etc. without violating meritocratic selection.
This idea is counterintuitive. While there are arguments to be made (I 
think bad ones) for the importance of diversity, their supporters typically 
concede that they require violating meritocratic standards. They do not 
maintain that being black is a merit in itself.
More important, we have already seen, in Chapter 5, why a line like this 
is untenable. First, it violates the meritocratic hiring principle. Second, it 
is analogous to taste-based arguments (§5.9): “Because my company is 
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filled with racists who will produce less if I hire a black widget-maker, 
black applicants really are less-qualified, on account of their race.” That 
is conceptually wrong. Race is irrelevant to one’s merit as a widget maker, 
but it can be highly relevant when it comes to consequences. Race may 
induce effects, like reduced productivity in other workers and a more 
diverse university experience. Of course, one could call this “merit” or 
whatever else one likes—but that flies against the common usage of the 
term, and it is incompatible with the concept of merit.
This does not appear to be a controversial point within the affirmative 
action debate:
The aims of real world affirmative action make race and ethnicity (and 
sometimes gender) salient, not personal desert or merit. The test of 
real world affirmative action lies in the urgency of its ends (preventing 
discrimination, promoting diversity or integration) and the aptness 
(moral and causal) of its means (racial, ethnic, and gender preferences).
 (Fullinwider 2017)
Therefore, the only way to justify an affirmative action program on 
grounds of meritocratic selection is to show that it nullifies anti-meri-
tocratic bias. I am not aware of any affirmative action programs that 
purport to do this, although I am sure that there are some that have this 
as a side-effect in some cases (but which on the whole violate meritocratic 
selection).
We now consider whether affirmative action can be justified on grounds 
of Fair EO. Of course, we cannot provide equal opportunity to the gradu-
ate school applicant; he has already left the equal opportunity frame-
work. But maybe by providing him an advantage now—an advantage on 
the basis of his race—we can improve opportunities for other members 
of his race. Ronald Dworkin has argued along these lines:
Increasing the number of blacks who are at work in the professions 
will, in the long run, reduce the sense of frustration and injustice 
and racial self-consciousness in the black community to the point at 
which blacks may begin to think of themselves as individuals who 
can succeed like others through talent and initiative. At that future 
point the consequences of nonracial admissions programs, whatever 
these consequences might be, could be accepted with no sense of 
racial barriers or injustice.
(1977: 11)
This is affirmative action justified on grounds of equal opportunity. It is 
possible that children must have “role models” (Allen 1990) whom they 
resemble in order to feel that the full range of jobs is in fact open to them. 
But do children require this? As Dworkin concedes, this is a positive 
claim, open to empirical confirmation or disconfirmation.
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So far as I am aware, there is no empirical evidence that affirmative 
action benefits equal opportunity as described. In fact, the evidence that 
does exist suggests that just the opposite is true: Affirmative action puts 
people into competitive environments for which they are ill-equipped. 
This is known as the “mismatch theory”.4
For example, being black is a powerful advantage when applying to 
law school, but academic outcomes for black law students are poor: 
52 percent of black students find themselves in the bottom 10 percent of 
their class after their first year (only 8 percent find themselves in the top 
half). And for those blacks who do go on to graduate, they are four times 
more likely than whites to fail their bar exams (Sander 2004).
Affirmative action reinforces a sense of inferiority in young blacks: 
Even with these benefits, they think, we cannot succeed. Of course, that 
is untrue; but it is a predictable result of violating meritocratic selection 
criteria along racial lines. The solution is not to keep violating merito-
cratic selection on the basis of these tortuous arguments, but to provide 
real, unambiguous equal opportunity support. Not “role models”, but 
education, health care, mentorship, maybe cash.
There is an added danger to affirmative action. When we promote 
racial “role models”—or gender “role models”, or “role models” of a 
certain ethnicity, or religious affiliation, or whatever—we reinforce the 
division of society along racial, gender (etc.) lines. This undermines the 
meritocratic ethos necessary for economic solidarity. It foments resent-
ment in the labor market and reinforces nasty racial stereotypes. It sug-
gests to children that admiration is due to people not on the basis of their 
merit, but on the basis of superficial characteristics, like skin color.
Affirmative action has a further problem: Because it is a racial, not 
a socioeconomic, instrument, it provides unjust benefits to blacks born 
into social advantage. Consider a case in which a black child, B, is born 
into a wealthy and loving family. He enjoys excellent private schools 
and health care. A white child, W, is raised in a blue-collar household. 
He attends a lackluster public school and works full-time to support his 
family. Obviously, even if there is some type of disadvantage that only 
B experiences owing to his race, he—the black child—is the immensely 
privileged one.
Suppose that through hard work, W becomes more meritorious than 
B. When they apply to university, the young man who was on the losing 
end of unequal opportunity, yet still made himself the most meritorious 
applicant, is denied admission because of the color of his skin. There is 
little more unjust than that.
Let us consider one final justification for affirmative action: that it pro-
vides reparations to the descendants of slaves.
Note, first, that reparations are hugely unpopular and are regarded as 
a radical, left-wing idea. Fair EO, on the other hand, has always enjoyed 
wide support; conservatives support it in word, if not in action. At the 
same time, the redistribution necessary to effect Fair EO would dwarf 
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the redistribution any plausible reparations program would require. The 
conservative ideal calls for the more radical policy.
Unlike Fair EO, reparations would have little effect on the long-term 
prospects of blacks. Most of the reparations payment would support pres-
ent-day consumption; only a portion would be invested, and only a portion 
of that in black human capital. Black socioeconomic outcomes would not 
change much. At the same time, public sentiment would harden: “With 
these reparations payments, we are putting the slavery matter to bed for-
ever”. This would reinforce false racial stereotypes about black inferiority.
There are a host of other objections to reparations (metaphysical, legal, 
etc.) Desert levels its own. For one thing, what people deserve turns on 
facts about their character—not their ancestors’. The descendants of those 
who participated in the slave trade do not deserve to be punished for the 
sins of their fathers, and none of us deserves compensation for harms done 
to relatives long ago. All of these problems are avoided with Fair EO.
Finally, affirmative action provides cover for those unwilling to make 
the much deeper economic sacrifices necessary to establish Fair EO. For 
the economically dominant class in America, it is not much of a sacrifice 
to toss a few university slots every year to blacks. Nor would these elites 
find a one-time reparations payment terribly troubling. It would be a real 
sacrifice to eliminate the institution of inheritance; or to support mas-
sive public investment in education; or to implement a confiscatory top 
income tax rate. As we have seen, all of these measures are required by 
justice, and would be far more effective in achieving racial equality. Affir-
mative action is unjust—in itself, and in the change it precludes.
9.3  Structuring Social Spending
The newest cause célèbre in the fight against poverty, unequal oppor-
tunity, our stagnant labor market, etc., is universal basic income (UBI). 
Supporters—found on both the right and the left—say that the solu-
tion to our social ills is to provide every citizen with an unconditional, 
government-provided cash payment. Because of the attention that UBI 
has received in recent years, and because it has attracted philosophical 
defenders,5 I wish to say a few words about why it is a bad idea.
The best-developed UBI proposal is Charles Murray’s (2006), which 
calls for each adult American to be given $10,000 a year. It is critical to 
keep in mind that UBI replaces the current social welfare system. This is 
sometimes made explicit, sometimes not—but in any case it is necessary 
to make UBI even minimally plausible in light of the costs involved (Mur-
ray’s proposal would cost ~$2.5 trillion/year). UBI would replace Social 
Security, Medicaid and Medicare, food stamps, and the other compo-
nents of the current system.
Even so, this would leave a revenue shortfall; and so UBI proponents 
must explain whose taxes they are going to raise, and by how much (or 
Meritocratic Social Programs  209
whether they will borrow). It is impossible to evaluate any program, 
including UBI, independent of the tax regime that will fund it. The distri-
butional effect of UBI is determined by both (1) whom it pays and how 
much it pays them, and (2) how it is funded. In light of this, it is not obvi-
ous that UBI will make the poor or the working class better-off, or indeed 
have a distributional effect that anybody would find appealing.
There are efficiency worries, too. We should not incur deadweight loss 
without a good reason. Establishing justice is an excellent reason. But I do 
not see what justification there is for providing an unconditional income 
to the wealthy. As we have seen, they probably have more money than 
they deserve. And a UBI will hardly affect their welfare. So whatever else 
we might want to do along these lines, we should certainly restrict pay-
ments to poor and middle-class Americans in exchange for lower taxes. 
But then it is no longer a UBI.
Meritocratic principles suggest that we should take a dim view of UBI. 
First, UBI rests on an unprincipled presumption of equality. Not everyone 
is equally deserving. It is wrong to give additional income to citizens who 
are making more than they deserve; it is wrong to give to the undeserving 
poor (§6.10).
Second, UBI will not help establish equal opportunity. It might even 
make things worse. This is because (1) unlike our current social welfare 
system, UBI pays no direct attention to the well-being of children, and 
(2) UBI (like reparations) would sap any public will for the badly needed 
economic reforms which I have described in this work.
Third, what are we supposed to do with deserving citizens who fall on 
hard times? Suppose Deborah is an industrious worker, a single mother, 
and a fine woman. She is terribly injured by a drunk driver. We’re sup-
posed to give her $10,000 a year and say, “that’s the end of the matter, 
you and your child are on your own”? I’ll buy that for the inveterate drug 
user, but for Deborah, no thanks.
Fourth, a UBI would reduce labor force participation and change 
social attitudes toward work for the worse. As I alluded to in §2.5, 
work is a fundamental part of the human experience: Producing goods 
and services, contributing to the welfare of others, and developing one’s 
professional merits are important to realizing a full life. This is not to 
say that these experiences cannot be had outside of the labor market—a 
stay-at-home parent provides a good example of how they can be—but 
those are exceptions to the rule. For most of us, work provides necessary 
meaning. I fear that a UBI would promote mindless consumption, fur-
ther isolate citizens from each other, and lead to a culture of low moral 
and aesthetic quality.
I also worry about the effects of any large cash transfers. There are 
good reasons to prefer the in-kind benefits (food stamps, health care, edu-
cation, etc.) that comprise much of our current welfare system. This view 
flies against the accepted wisdom,6 but I think it has much to commend it.
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To begin with, we have seen that universal education is essential to a just 
society. But the state cannot give money to children to fund their education 
(or for any other reason, for that matter). The state can give money to par-
ents, but many will not act altruistically toward their children. Universal 
public education, or perhaps a school voucher system, makes more sense.
Cash transfers to the poor perpetuate a cycle of poverty (Buchanan 
1975). Because one receives the transfer only if one is poor, the incentive 
is to not develop one’s human capital. But human capital development 
is what we should like most of all. Achieving equal opportunity requires 
that we subsidize human capital formation. Cash transfers, even large 
ones, are ineffective toward this end.7
We must also be attentive to the way that social spending affects prefer-
ence formation (§6.7). A pure cash transfer more-or-less encourages the 
formation of whatever preferences prevail in the market. On the other 
hand, an education benefit (e.g.) increases citizens’ desire to be educated. 
And a greater appreciation for education may redound to our collective 
benefit (§4.8).
If we do have pure cash transfers, we must ensure that they are con-
nected to desert. An exemplar is the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), 
which redistributes wealth to poor and lower-middle class Americans—to 
the tune of $70 billion in 2015. What makes the EITC distinctive is that 
to qualify for it, one must have earned income, defined by the Internal 
Revenue Service as income gained through “purposeful effort”. Effort is, 
of course, one of the classic bases for desert (§6.2), and the result is that 
the EITC strikes us, viscerally, as just. Despite its progressive nature, the 
EITC has always enjoyed bipartisan support: It was introduced during 
the Ford administration and expanded under Reagan, Clinton, George 
W. Bush, and Obama—and with strong support from both Democratic 
and Republican legislators.
Another admirable example comes from the Netherlands, which has 
in recent years reformed its social welfare system—which remains gener-
ous—toward the ideal of the “participation society”. Welfare recipients 
must demonstrate that they deserve the benefits that other citizens’ labor 
makes possible. For example, able-bodied Dutch must show that they 
have tried to find a job before obtaining unemployment benefits, and 
upon receiving these benefits, they must do unpaid work “for the benefit 
of society”. The policy has been wildly popular, supported even by those 
“forced” to do community service in this way (Veldboer, Kleinhans, and 
van Ham 2015). In light of the empirical data surveyed, that is no surprise.
9.4  Positive Predictions of Meritocracy
I have endeavored to give a consistent and complete theory of justice. For 
justification, I have appealed primarily to intuition, and to the metatheo-
retical desiderata discussed in §2.3.
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It is important that a theory of justice cohere with our intuitions, but it 
is also important that our theories be bold—to use Karl Popper’s (1959) 
term—and make predictions. This provides reason to believe that the 
theory has explanatory power, and is not merely an ad hoc accommo-
dation of known facts. Predictions are especially important if we want 
our theories to actually guide policymaking—as I think we should. The 
policymaker needs some objective means by which she can judge the cor-
rectness of a normative theory. Epistemic modesty (§4.5) tells us that the 
mere fact that she believes it to be true does not justify her acting on it. 
Predictions verified or falsified provide a measure of justification which 
can ground policy.
Rawls’s theory is commendable in that it does make predictions. The 
most important is that contractors in the original position would elect the 
difference principle as their distributive rule. Unfortunately, this predic-
tion appears to have been falsified (§3.5). As I discussed, this does not 
doom Rawls’s broader normative project, and of course one might take 
issue with the relevant experiments. But surely, a policymaker who is 
aware of these experiments, if she is being rational, reduces her reliance 
on Rawls when choosing policy.
Libertarianism fares worse, in that its theory—at least in its Nozickian 
form—rests on principles that are not only unfalsifiable but unverifiable as 
well. I, at least, can think of no way to verify that we have natural rights 
to acquire and exchange goods. Of course, this unverifiability has led some 
philosophers to reject the very idea of natural rights; as Bentham puts it,
that which has no existence cannot be destroyed—that which cannot 
be destroyed cannot require anything to preserve it from destruction. 
Natural rights is simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible rights, 
rhetorical nonsense,—nonsense upon stilts.
(1843: 501)
Nozick concedes that he can provide no “precise theory of the moral 
basis of individual rights” (1974: xiv)—a drawback tempered, he thinks, 
by the fact that Locke also “does not provide anything remotely resem-
bling a satisfactory explanation of the status and basis of the law of 
nature” (p. 9).
To be sure, we should not afford verifiability and falsifiability the 
same deference in political philosophy as we do in the natural sciences. 
Nozick’s theory is obviously legitimate in a way that astrology is not. 
Nozick may well be right. But ceteris paribus we should prefer theories 
that are bold enough to make claims about the way the world one day 
will be, as opposed to theories that cloak themselves in unassailable, 
unfalsifiable claims.
In order for fulfilled predictions to justify belief in a theory of justice, 
it must be that the world is becoming a more just place. In the sciences, 
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we accept that the true laws of nature are fixed. But if the world is 
becoming less just, then the wrong theories gain support through fulfilled 
prediction.
I do not know what argument I can give to support the idea that we 
have made and are making moral progress; each reader must decide that 
for himself. By my lights it is plainly true, although progress is less a 
steady climb toward the ideal of justice and more a scamper across peaks 
and troughs. Jim Crow was better than slavery; police brutality toward 
blacks today is better than Jim Crow. Relations between the sexes have 
improved but remain imperfect. Our economic distribution is better than 
feudalism.
In contrast to science, philosophical prediction is imprecise. It is usually 
obvious when a scientific prediction has been falsified, but whether meri-
tocracy fulfills or fails the below predictions—which involve imprecisely-
defined social, cultural, and economic trends—requires interpretation. 
We must do the best that we can.
The First Positive Prediction of Meritocracy: Well-ordered societies 
will be increasingly unwilling to discriminate on grounds irrelevant 
from the point-of-view of merit.
Recent years have seen increasing intolerance toward allowing race, 
gender, and sexual preference to play a role in hiring and similar contexts, 
like college admissions. (Except, of course, when positive preference is 
unjustly granted to blacks, women, et al.)
Meritocracy predicts that this trend will continue. Specifically, meritoc-
racy predicts that this trend will continue until only those features that are 
relevant from the point-of-view of merit remain as legitimate grounds on 
which to discriminate. The next personal features which are likely to be 
found objectionable—and rightly so—are sexual behavior; beliefs about 
controversial moral issues, like abortion; and partisan identification.
The Second Positive Prediction of Meritocracy: Affirmative action 
programs that violate meritocratic standards will be largely inef-
fective in achieving their desired ends. Affirmative action programs 
aimed at establishing equal opportunity will be largely effective in 
achieving their desired ends.
In §9.2 I provided theoretical grounds for believing this to be the case. 
In coming years, empirical work should tell us whether the conjecture is 
true or false.
The Third Positive Prediction of Meritocracy: Welfare policies that 
are sensitive to citizens’ deserts will become and remain law; welfare 
policies that are not, will not.
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In the last section, I described the success of the EITC and some recent 
European moves toward a desert-sensitive welfare system. Meritocracy 
predicts that this idea will spread. Welfare policies that find their way 
into law will include mechanisms to ensure that the undeserving do not 
benefit from the efforts and the contributions of others. The ethos of the 
participation society should increase in appeal.
The Fourth Positive Prediction of Meritocracy: Pre-theoretical sup-
port for desert-based justice will persist.
In Chapter 3 I provided an overview of the empirical research on 
justice. This research demonstrates that there is strong, cross-cultural, 
nonpartisan consensus that justice is a matter of giving people what 
they deserve. Meritocracy predicts that this consensus will persist, and 
that research into the justice-feelings of yet-unexplored communities (to 
include, perhaps, non-humans) will reinforce the primacy of desert.
The Fifth Positive Prediction of Meritocracy: Social satisfaction will 
positively correlate with the presence of meritocratic institutions.
Since 1980, Americans have become unhappier with each passing 
year (Blanchflower and Oswald 2004). We do not know why. Possible 
reasons include (1) the changing pattern of income distribution; (2) the 
collapse of communism, which left us without a uniting mission; (3) our 
foreign policy decisions after 9/11 (e.g. the Iraq War), which deprived us 
of the moral high ground; (4) a decline in the traditional family structure, 
decreased religious participation, and the loss of close-knit ethnic com-
munities; and (5) ideological and political partisanship, which has ruined 
friendships and family comity.
I think that there is truth in all of these. But I posit another, more 
important, factor—namely, that social satisfaction is highly correlated 
with the existence of a meritocratic social framework. A happy country 
is one in which citizens believe that (1) they enjoy equal opportunity to 
pursue the social goods they deem important, and (2) they will be judged 
strictly on their merits. In short, the healthier the American Dream, the 
happier citizens (of whatever nation) will be.
9.5  Justice in Our Lifetimes
As I have presented meritocratic justice, I have contrasted it with egali-
tarianism and libertarianism, explaining what it has in common with 
these two dominant theories of justice and what it does not. Once again: 
There is a sort of equality that should concern us—namely, equality of 
opportunity—but unequal outcomes are not only morally unproblematic 
but evidence that we are living under a just distributive system. And while 
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we should embrace markets, we should do so instrumentally, as useful 
tools for giving people what they deserve.
Just as meritocracy is a third, better way of thinking about justice, so too 
is it an alternative to the partisan stand-off which characterizes contempo-
rary American politics. Those on the political right complain about govern-
ment bailouts of irresponsible homeowners; welfare programs that support 
drug users; and tax policies that punish the talented and hard-working. As 
we have seen, these arguments are not really about liberty. They are argu-
ments against harming the deserving to reward the undeserving.
On the other side of the aisle, the left inveighs against exorbitant CEO 
salaries and racial and gender discrimination. And these are morally 
worrying features of our economy, but not because of any inequality 
involved. They are worrying because they violate desert.
Over the past few decades, the left has failed to win significant eco-
nomic policy change, even as the economy has transformed in ways not 
to the advantage of most Americans. We now know the reason for this 
failure: The left has failed to use the language of desert, and has rested its 
arguments on egalitarian principles which are widely regarded as unjust. 
What meritocracy can do, and other theories of justice cannot, is advance 
progressive public policies through arguments that appeal to people on 
the political left, right, and center. As we have seen, valuing personal 
responsibility, merit, and economic efficiency means higher taxes, new 
anti-discrimination laws, and increased social spending.
Nevertheless, it is hard to effect lasting political change without a firm 
theoretical foundation. While I have tried to put down the most impor-
tant roots here, there is much work to be done. The literature on equality 
and liberty is enormous. On meritocracy it is threadbare.
Empirically-minded scholars must turn ideals of merit-based hiring and 
equal opportunity into concrete policy proposals. What interventions are 
necessary to ensure robust equal opportunity? Clearly, education is one, 
but in what form should that be provided (§9.1)? How can we distinguish 
economic rents from returns to capital? What redistributive policies will 
move us closer to the just pattern of contribution-based income?
Normative questions remain, too: What is the precise extent of legiti-
mate parental influence over children? Should the social safety net be 
extended to people who are neither unambiguously deserving nor unde-
serving? What are those cases? Should this kind of public support come 
in gradations, metered to desert?
Another normative question concerns the definition of “economic con-
tribution”: Should it be understood more broadly than I have defined it? 
For example, if a citizen rushes into a burning building to save another, 
isn’t that an economic contribution that deserves remuneration? On a 
plausible theory of intergenerational justice, aren’t stay-at-home parents 
making a bona fide economic contribution when they care for their chil-
dren? Don’t they deserve an income for that? I am inclined to say “yes”, 
but the answer is not obvious.
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These are debates for another time. I do not doubt that many 
thoughtful arguments can be made on behalf of the many perspectives 
therein. Our responsibility is to do the best that we can to get to the 
truth about justice, by judging these arguments, as of course we must, 
on their merits.
Notes
1 See Proctor, Semega, and Kollar 2016.
2 See, e.g. Hair et al. (2015); Hanson et al. (2013); and Noble, Norman, and 
Farah (2005, 2015).
3 Steinpreis, Anders, and Ritzke (1999). Clearly, in light of recent research (§5.1 
n. 3), things have changed in academia—at the very least, bias against women 
has been eliminated.
4 See, e.g. Arcidiacono, Aucejo, and Hotz (2016); Sander (2004); Sander and 
Taylor (2012); and Williams (2013).
5 E.g. Munger (2015); van Parijs (1995); van Parijs and Vanderborght (2017); 
and Zwolinski (2015).
6 Cash benefits are putatively superior because, e.g. they reduce bureaucracy, are 
not paternalistic, and because individuals can make better choices about how 
to improve their welfare than the government can.
7 See, e.g. Bénabou (1994); Durlauf (1996); and Lundberg and Startz (2000).
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